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In their efforts to hold financial institutions accountable after 
the 2007 financial crisis, U.S. regulators have repeatedly turned 
to anti-money-laundering laws. Initially designed to fight drug 
cartels and terrorists, these laws have recently yielded 
billion-dollar fines for all types of bank engagement in fraud and 
have spurred an overhaul of financial institutions’ internal 
compliance. This increased reliance on anti-money-laundering 
laws, we argue, is due to distinct features that can better help 
regulators gain insights into financial fraud. Most other financial 
laws enlist private firms as gatekeepers and hold them liable if 
they knowingly or negligently engage in client fraud. Yet, as long 
as gatekeepers maintain deniability, they can accommodate 
dubious client requests. Instead, anti-money-laundering laws 
require gatekeepers to report to regulators suspicions of 
misconduct, even without clear proof of fraud. Because suspicions 
arise early in the gatekeeper–client relationship, conflicts of 
interest are not likely to be as strong. Moreover, the task of 
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identifying suspicious cases can be more readily outsourced to 
compliance departments, lessening dependence on front-line 
employees whose future might be tied to specific clients. Finally, 
suspicions may arise even in gatekeepers who only have partial 
access to clients’ transactions and, thus, cannot come to full 
knowledge of the fraud.  
Inspired by the collaborative relationship between gatekeepers 
and enforcement authorities in anti-money laundering, we develop 
a theoretical framework that explains why this approach could 
operate as a general template for financial regulation. We then 
investigate the implementation of the collaborative model in 
practice. Starting from anti-money-laundering laws’ history, we 
present new evidence from recently released archival materials to 
illustrate that, rather than fighting proposals for expanding their 
regulatory obligations, private industry embraced them. Turning 
to the present, we discuss how the collaborative model has 
reshaped banking oversight in money laundering: It has leveraged 
the power of big data, encouraged the creation of dedicated 
compliance departments, and spearheaded one of the biggest 
inter-agency collaborations in the United States. Finally, we 
discuss how the collaborative model could work in the future in 
two other areas of financial activity: broker-dealer regulation and 
equity issuance. 
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I. Introduction 
In his annual letter to shareholders for 2014, Jamie Dimon, 
J.P. Morgan’s CEO, made an astonishing revelation.1 That year 
alone, his firm hired 8,000 new employees just to improve its 
compliance with anti-money-laundering laws.2 J.P. Morgan’s 
recruitment zeal stemmed from a $2.6 billion penalty for 
anti-money-laundering violations, due to its failure to spot 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.3 This was hardly an isolated case4: 
Anti-money-laundering laws have played a central part in four 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Letter from Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO, JP 
Morgan Chase & Co., to Shareholders (Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan 
Letter], http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3844439630x0x820077/8af 
78e45-1d81-4363-931c-439d04312ebc/JPMC-AR2014-LetterToShareholders.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 21. 
 3. See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit C, Statement of 
Facts, United States v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter DPA Statement of Facts], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/JPMC%20DPA%20Packet%20(Fully%2Executed 
%20w%20Exhibits).pdf. The U.S. Attorney’s office struck a deferred prosecution 
agreement for an indictment of two years. Id. ¶ 12. Under the terms of this 
agreement, J.P. Morgan is required to reform its anti-money laundering 
compliance in accordance with a consent order issued by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. See generally Consent Order, JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., No. AA-EC-13-04 (OCC, 2013).  
 4. See Tom Braithwaite, Richard McGregor & Aaron Stanley, Banks Pay 
Out $100bn in US Fines, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/802ae15c-9b50-11e3-946b-00144feab7de.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2016) (discussing the key role anti-money laundering laws have played since the 
financial crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS 801 
out of the eight biggest fines in the wake of the financial crisis,5 
becoming a key legal basis in the quest to hold banks 
accountable. The newfound prominence of the 
anti-money-laundering framework is striking. These laws target 
drug cartels and terrorists, the criminal periphery of the financial 
system rather than its core weaknesses. But, since 2007, the 
anti-money-laundering framework has evolved into a critical 
detection and enforcement mechanism for regulators, and a key 
priority for private industry compliance.6 So far, there is little in 
the legal literature that could explain this puzzling shift towards 
the anti-money-laundering toolkit.7  
This Article argues that regulators have turned to 
anti-money laundering because of distinct features that set it 
apart from other common bases of financial misconduct, such as 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Most 
financial laws require financial institutions to identify 
misbehaving clients, imposing heavy liability when they 
knowingly or negligently fail to shut them out of the financial 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Stephen Grocer, A List of the Biggest Bank Settlements, WALL 
STREET J. (June 23, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/06/23/a-
list-of-the-biggest-bank-settlements/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (noting that 
cases against J.P. Morgan, BNP Paribas, HSBC, Credit Suisse, and UBS 
involved anti-money laundering violations, among others) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See infra Part V (discussing the anti-laundering regime in practice). 
 7. Legal scholarship on anti-money laundering laws focuses mostly on its 
criminal law dimensions. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1979–80 (2008) (arguing that money laundering’s impact 
has been felt mostly against underprivileged groups); DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 105 (2008) (arguing that 
money laundering is a case of overcriminalization); Samuel W. Buell, The 
Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1537 (2008) (arguing that 
broader doctrine has assisted the federal government in gaining convictions); 
Richard G. Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 149, 165–75 (1989) (discussing interpretative problems likely to arise after 
the criminalization of money laundering). See generally Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2003) (examining “the fight against money laundering as a 
case study of the separation between an enforcement system’s objectives and 
performance”). For a discussion of the impact of money laundering’s 
criminalization on the banking industry, see Sarah Jane Hughes, Policing 
Money Laundering Through Funds Transfers: A Critique of Regulation Under 
the Bank Secrecy Act, 67 IND. L.J. 283, 287–97 (1992) (discussing the burden of 
fund transfer policing for banks). 
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system.8 We argue that this liability threshold produces a 
perverse effect: Market players are very careful to ensure that 
they never reach such knowledge or negligence. Instead of 
looking for signals of underlying fraud and investigating 
indications, our laws incentivize market players to turn a blind 
eye. 
In contrast, anti-money-laundering laws require private 
industry to share with authorities suspicions of misconduct, even 
when these pieces of information fall far short of proving 
illegality.9 This reporting obligation, we argue, can help financial 
intermediaries overcome conflicts of interest and motivates them 
to organize more effective compliance operations. In this Article, 
we explore this approach as a template for other areas of 
financial regulation. We develop a theoretical framework that 
explains the advantages of our proposed model, explore its 
history and application in anti-money-laundering law, and 
discuss how it could operate in other fields. 
Enlisting private firms as the primary line of defense against 
fraud and misconduct is the dominant strategy in financial 
regulation and is known as the “gatekeeper model.”10 
Gatekeepers are intermediaries whose cooperation is essential for 
many financial transactions: bankers, accountants, lawyers, 
credit rating agencies, and other professionals.11 Gatekeepers 
help address the informational asymmetries between investors 
and companies by verifying the credibility of contractual 
representations, be it the accuracy of financial statements, the 
risk profile of bonds, or the enforceability of legal claims.12 In 
theory, gatekeepers must maintain a reputation for integrity and 
should not be persuaded to participate in fraud just to win one 
                                                                                                     
 8. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining gatekeeper liability). 
 9. See infra Part IV.D (describing liability under the anti-money 
laundering laws). 
 10. See Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986) (explaining the concept 
of gatekeepers). 
 11. See id. at 53 (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to 
disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”); see also 
infra Parts II.A–C (discussing the literature on gatekeepers). 
 12. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 62 (noting the role of gatekeepers in 
ensuring investors and companies are on the same page). 
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client’s fees. In many instances, laws supplement gatekeepers’ 
reputational incentives with the threat of heavy sanctions.13 
But, as a spate of financial scandals has illustrated, 
gatekeepers have often found themselves involved in client fraud 
due to conflicts of interest between gatekeeper employees and 
their firms.14 Gatekeeper employees are likely to have invested 
significant time and effort in building client relationships and 
may not be willing to sacrifice a loss in compensation. 
Acquiescing to dubious client demands can be particularly 
tempting because the probability of detecting financial fraud is 
notoriously low. Fraudulent schemes are often designed to look 
like legitimate profit-making transactions. Victims often do not 
realize that they have been misled until their investment has 
evaporated and perpetrators have disappeared or are unable to 
repay. Moreover, the sheer volume and sophistication of modern 
transactions make the financial system very hard to police. 
Without an inside tip about fraud, regulators seem reduced to 
playing catch-up; they often fail.15 
Recognizing that information from the inside is essential in 
combatting financial fraud, policymakers have tried various 
strategies for strengthening gatekeepers’ incentives to come 
forward.16 Sarbanes–Oxley enacted measures to insulate 
accountants from the pressures of corporate executives, but in 
most cases, weaknesses in companies’ financial statements 
remained unreported.17 Dodd–Frank provides some 
                                                                                                     
 13. See infra Part III.C (highlighting how economic sanctions can 
supplement the threat of reputational harm for gatekeepers). 
 14. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS 
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE] (noting how gatekeepers can be torn between their legal 
responsibilities and their firms’ interests); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper 
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 301, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure] (same). 
 15. See infra Part II.B (giving examples of various past failures of the 
gatekeeper model, which highlight the importance of inside whistleblowers). 
 16. See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL L. REV. 53, 107 
(2003) (discussing possibilities policymakers considered to promote gatekeeper 
reporting). 
 17. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (2007) (discussing the motivations behind 
Sarbanes–Oxley and reviewing empirical evidence regarding its performance in 
practice); infra Part II.C.1 (using Arthur Andersen as an example of an 
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whistleblowers a share of the bounty but does not extend this 
offer to professionals required to report misconduct to regulators 
under other rules.18 Academics have also debated how to beef up 
the gatekeeper regime.19 Prominent proposals involve making 
gatekeepers strictly liable for client misconduct up to a capped 
amount.20 But there are fears that such an expansion of liability 
would place too high a burden on the industry and push out 
legitimate clients.21 
This Article explores an alternative design for structuring 
gatekeepers’ obligations, which can help overcome many of the 
above problems and provide regulators with more information on 
potential fraud. Imagine requiring gatekeepers to report not 
positive knowledge, but suspicions of illegality. In their dealings 
with clients, gatekeepers may come to realize that there are gaps 
in a client’s rationale for pursuing a transaction or that the 
information the client provides does not add up. Alternatively, a 
client’s conduct might be very unusual or have much in common 
with past instances of client fraud. Such indications of potential 
illegality are information that gatekeepers can collect and pass on 
to authorities. In return, regulators could guarantee the 
anonymity of the report, so as not to disrupt the gatekeeper–
client relationship should the transaction turn out to be 
legitimate. 
Setting the reporting threshold at the level of suspicions—
rather than knowledge—can radically change gatekeepers’ 
incentives and improve the effectiveness of regulatory 
interventions. Suspicions are bound to arise at a much earlier 
stage in the gatekeeper–client relationship, when the resources 
invested in building this relationship are lower and the bond of 
                                                                                                     
accounting firm pressured by its corporate clients). 
 18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C) 
(2012); see infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Dodd–Frank). 
 19. See infra Part II.C.3 (providing examples of academics discussing the 
role of gatekeepers). 
 20. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 349 (“In this article’s 
view, the most direct and practical means to this end would be to convert the 
gatekeeper into the functional equivalent of an insurer, who would back its 
auditor’s certification with an insurance policy that was capped at a realistic 
level.”). 
 21. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
strict liability for gatekeepers). 
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loyalty between the two parties is not as strong. Some client 
proposals may trigger suspicions even before gatekeepers actually 
start offering any services. Consequently, the conflicts of interest 
that gatekeepers are likely to face will be weaker. Moreover, 
regulators may be able to combine multiple reports on a single 
client or transaction and take preventive actions even if each 
gatekeeper has come to know only part of the client’s activities or 
dealings.22 Because of the close interactions between gatekeepers 
and regulators, we term this approach “collaborative 
gatekeeping.”  
To change industry attitudes towards client cover-ups, the 
law should provide for sanctions against gatekeepers who fail to 
submit a report. The threat of sanctions can motivate gatekeepers 
to establish internal systems for identifying suspicious cases, 
train front-line employees to be alert about potential fraud, and 
draft reports.23 Importantly, sanctions underline that suspicious 
activity reporting is a regulatory obligation enforceable against 
everyone in the financial industry. As all gatekeepers flock to 
submit reports, the stigma associated with providing client 
information to regulators is likely to fade away.24 
Gatekeepers will be more likely to submit reports if they gain 
immunity against enforcement actions arising out of the 
information they provide.25 Immunity will allow gatekeepers to 
continue working with the client even after the report without 
immediately foregoing all future revenue when a transaction is 
legitimate, tempering further the impact of conflicts of interest. 
Immunity also shields gatekeepers from the risk of 
self-incrimination if an ensuing investigation reveals that their 
firm’s involvement in client fraud was greater than initially 
suspected. Thus, immunity removes important inhibitions 
gatekeepers may have and offers greater benefits upon providing 
information. That said, immunity should extend to gatekeepers 
only as long as they continue to act in good faith.26 
                                                                                                     
 22. See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing proposal to require gatekeepers to 
report suspicious client activity to regulators based on client information they 
collect). 
 23. Infra Part III.C. 
 24. Infra Parts III.E–F. 
 25. Infra Part III.D. 
 26. Infra Part III.D. 
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While these arguments underscore the theoretical appeal of 
the model, there might be doubts as to its workability. One set of 
worries might focus on the political economy of financial 
regulation. Private industry might choose to oppose the 
expansion of its regulatory obligations and the additional effort 
and resources it entails. Another set of questions might concern 
the promised informational upside. The financial industry might 
choose to stick with client loyalty and refuse to embrace 
suspicious-activity reporting. Or, in the exact opposite scenario, 
finance professionals might flood regulators with reports about 
clients’ activities, providing incomplete information about 
countless cases that authorities could not possibly analyze or 
pursue any further.  
We can shed some light on these concerns by looking at 
anti-money-laundering law, which, due to a historical 
happenstance, follows closely the theoretical model outlined 
above. While the conventional gatekeeper model is deeply 
embedded in U.S. law, the anti-money-laundering regime has its 
origins in 1970s Switzerland, from where it spread around the 
world, including to the United States.27 Taking advantage of 
archival materials released publicly from the Swiss central bank 
for the first time after forty years, the Article brings to light the 
motivations of the regime’s inspirers and the contributions of key 
players, such as financial institutions and industry associations. 
Our exploration of the historical record reveals collaborative 
gatekeeping as a rare case of a regulatory scheme that the 
industry chose to embrace, rather than bitterly oppose. Of course, 
the industry’s consent did not come without concessions from 
regulators, such as standardized, objective criteria for suspicions 
and universal application to all market participants. Moreover, 
the spread of collaborative gatekeeping as a template for 
anti-money-laundering laws around the world shows that stricter 
laws do not necessarily place a national market in a competitive 
disadvantage, but can trigger parallel developments elsewhere. 
A unique constellation of enforcement bodies and market 
players have seen the value of intelligence gathered through the 
anti-money-laundering regime and launched large-scale 
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra Part IV.A (discussing Switzerland’s response to money 
laundering scandal in 1977). 
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collaborations aided by cutting-edge technology.28 In the last few 
years, over 1.5 million suspicious-activity reports have reached 
the Treasury Department annually.29 Institutions across the 
financial industry have espoused suspicious activity reporting, 
from banks to brokerages to wire services, from big financial 
powerhouses to small community ventures, from urban centers to 
rural areas. To fulfill their obligations, private firms have 
revolutionized their compliance operations and introduced 
digitalized systems using “big data” approaches. All this private 
industry activity shows how the collaborative model can 
effectively change market-wide attitudes. In turn, these reports 
have helped regulators pursue a wide range of financial and 
criminal misconduct beyond money laundering, including tax 
evasion, mortgage fraud, and insider trading. Financial 
regulators such as the Federal Reserve and the SEC, as well as 
government agencies such as the IRS and the Department of 
Justice, have expanded their oversight operations to better take 
advantage of gathered intelligence.30 Over 100 review teams from 
these agencies pore over the reports in weekly or monthly 
meetings, while the Treasury also operates a central database 
that is open to hundreds of local and state authorities.31  
The first two Parts of the Article outline its theoretical 
contributions, presenting collaborative gatekeeping as a coherent 
model for enlisting the help of financial intermediaries in 
enforcement. Part II below discusses the analytical foundations of 
the current gatekeeping regime and the problems associated with 
conflicts of interest. Part III delineates collaborative gatekeeping 
as a theoretical model, explores its key elements, and discusses 
how it could help blunt the conflicts of interest that plague 
gatekeepers. The remaining Parts of the Article discuss the 
application of collaborative gatekeeping in the case of 
                                                                                                     
 28. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL. 1 (2014) [hereinafter SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL.], 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/SAR01/SAR_Stats_proof_2.pdf. 
 29. Id. at 1. 
 30. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING: 
TREASURY’S FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 7–9 (1991) [hereinafter 
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK], www.gao.gov/assets/220/213999.pdf. 
 31. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(B) (2012) (explaining what the 
government-wide data access service is supposed to contain). 
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anti-money-laundering law and explore the potential extension of 
the model to other areas of financial regulation. Part IV shows 
how regulators and private industry worked together to complete 
the anti-money-laundering regime over time, first in Switzerland 
and then at the international level under U.S. leadership. Part V 
presents some tentative evidence about the operation of the 
anti-money-laundering regime in the United States. Part VI 
discusses how the principles of collaborative gatekeeping could 
work in the context of broker-dealer regulation and securities 
issuance. Part VII concludes. 
II. Gatekeepers in Current Theory and Practice 
A. The Theory of Gatekeeping—Market-Based Regulation 
Through Reputation 
Financial transactions typically involve a professional 
intermediary: Investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers help 
companies issue securities to the public; retail banks help 
long-term borrowers access funding from short-term depositors; 
rating agencies assess bonds’ risk of default on behalf of buyers; 
and so on.32 For investors wary about their money, these 
professionals’ stamp of approval can turn a risky investment into 
a legitimate business proposition, rather than a venture into the 
unknown.33 In turn, businesses seek these professionals’ help to 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
411, 415–16 (2008) (“[T]he ideal gatekeeper would be an ‘outsider with a career 
and assets beyond the firm,’ such as auditors, investment bankers, securities 
analysts, securities attorneys, and, as more recently posited, credit rating 
agencies.”); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 309 
Obvious examples of gatekeepers who provide such verification or 
certification services would include: (1) the auditor providing its 
certification of the issuer’s financial statements; (2) the debt rating 
agency certifying the issuer’s creditworthiness (or relative 
creditworthiness); (3) the security analyst providing its objective 
assessment of the corporation’s technology, competitiveness, or 
earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker providing its “fairness 
opinion” as to the pricing of a merger; and (5) the securities attorney 
for the issuer providing its opinion to the underwriters that all 
material information of which it is aware concerning the issuer has 
been properly disclosed. 
 33. See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1595 
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boost their appeal to investors and gain access to a wider pool of 
funds.34 By facilitating a transaction, these professionals open the 
gates of the financial system to new entrants; thus, they are 
termed “gatekeepers.”35 Enlisting gatekeepers in the fight against 
fraud and misconduct is the most prominent strategy across 
many different fields in modern financial regulation.36 This 
strategy, premised on gatekeepers’ desire to keep their 
reputations pristine, has received much attention by scholars and 
policymakers alike. The following paragraphs outline the 
reputation-based theory of gatekeeping, while subsequent 
sections explore the limitations of this reputation-based 
approach, and regulatory reforms and academic proposals 
intended to place greater liability on gatekeepers.  
As intermediaries in many transactions, gatekeepers occupy 
a unique place in the market. Because of their close connections 
with clients, gatekeepers are better informed than regulators 
regarding the goals, intentions, and underlying financial realities 
of client firms.37 Due to this informational advantage, the market 
looks at gatekeepers to verify the disclosures, risk profile, or 
general quality of financial instruments offered in a 
transaction.38 Gatekeepers command markets’ trust because, over 
                                                                                                     
(2010)  
Gatekeeper certifications provide a measure of assurance to investors 
as to the accuracy of corporate disclosures, reducing the extent to 
which investors, fearing they will be sold “lemons,” discount the value 
of the asset being sold. In metaphorical terms, gatekeepers are 
regarded as renting their reputations to corporations, a function that 
economizes on information costs and creates value for the relevant 
corporations. Gatekeepers thus function as so called reputational 
intermediaries. 
 34. See id. at 1596 (“[T]he certification function of gatekeepers also favors 
corporations relying on the market for gatekeeping services.”). 
 35. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 54 (“Accountants and lawyers are 
natural gatekeepers for fraudulent securities transactions that require audits or 
legal opinions in order to close . . . .”). 
 36. Supra note 10. 
 37. See Coates, supra note 17, at 95–96 (stating that, in response to 
“information constraints” faced by government enforcers, securities legislation 
incorporates “a ‘gatekeeper’ strategy designed to prevent fraud before it 
happens”). 
 38. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423 (“By certifying the issuer’s public 
statements to the market, these intermediaries attest that they have evaluated 
the issuer and are prepared to stake their reputation on the accuracy of the 
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time, they have built significant reputational capital by verifying 
transactions and statements that have repeatedly proven 
accurate.39 Their business model relies on maintaining and 
augmenting this reputational capital; without it, they can no 
longer perform their verification role.40 Certainly, gatekeepers 
receive hefty fees for their verifications, which they stand to lose 
if they do not cooperate with a client’s fraudulent scheme. But, if 
gatekeepers’ role in a fraudulent transaction is found out, they 
stand to lose all credibility with the market and, thus, all future 
business. This risk is so great, it is thought, that no single client’s 
fee payment can possibly compensate for it.41 For these reasons, 
conventional wisdom holds that gatekeepers will not sacrifice 
their reputations and future profits to satisfy any individual 
client’s requests, however well the client pays. 
Gatekeepers’ verification function is also the basis for their 
role in enforcement.42 If gatekeepers realize that their client is 
violating the law, they can withhold their approval and prevent 
this wrongdoer from entering the financial system. Taking 
advantage of this power, the law has often required mandatory 
gatekeeper participation in transactions plagued by significant 
information asymmetries, such as securities offerings.43 In those 
cases, the law has imposed on gatekeepers a duty to examine 
each client’s conduct and credentials.44 To back this duty, the law 
                                                                                                     
issuer’s statements.”). 
 39. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 308. 
 40. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423–24 (“They effectively pledge their 
reputation to the issuer, which in turn increases investor confidence.”). 
 41. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 308 
These two elements—that the gatekeeper is a reputational 
intermediary and that it receives only a limited payoff from any 
involvement in misconduct—suggest a strategy for law compliance: 
the more the law makes the involvement of gatekeepers in sensitive 
transactions mandatory, the more it acquires a lever by which it can 
effectively discourage law violations. 
 42. See id. at 302 (“The clearest examples of such reputational 
intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or assess 
corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in different ways.”). 
 43. See id. at 324 (“[A]uditors continue to be used more because SEC rules 
mandate their use . . . .”). 
 44. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53 (“[C]ollateral liability supplements 
efforts to deter primary wrongdoers directly by enlisting their associates and 
market contacts as de facto ‘cops on the beat.’”). 
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establishes harsh penalties against gatekeepers that fail to catch 
misconduct on their watch.45 Gatekeepers must compensate 
victims of their clients’ fraud unless they satisfy demanding 
defenses.46 In addition to investor-driven enforcement, 
gatekeepers are also subject to sanctions by regulators, such as 
fines or bans from the industry.47  
The main function of this regime is to deter gatekeepers from 
acquiescing to fraudulent activities.48 In order to avoid these 
penalties, it is hoped, gatekeepers will monitor their clients 
closely and steer them away from misconduct through their 
advice.49 Kraakman aptly called this type of gatekeeper a 
“chaperone”: someone who, as the relationship with a client 
unfolds, intervenes to prevent a violation from happening, 
realigning the client’s actions so that they fall within the 
requirements of the law.50  
In this conception of gatekeeping, regulation plays a limited 
role, besides brandishing the threat of sanctions. If everything 
works as intended, gatekeepers will either discipline misbehaving 
clients or cut them off from the financial system before fraud is 
committed. In both cases, harm to third parties is averted, so 
there is little reason to involve enforcement authorities. Although 
the law expects gatekeepers to monitor their clients and direct 
                                                                                                     
 45. See id. at 60 n.18 (“Legal penalties against wayward gatekeepers 
generally function as taxes on gatekeeper transactions by imposing costs and 
legal risks without compensation. However, penalties can also assume the form 
of withdrawing privileges or subsidies, in which case gatekeeping duties may be 
compensated ex ante (consider, for example, the withdrawal of professional 
licenses).”); see also id. at 70 (penalties include “civil damages, fines, or license 
revocations”). 
 46. See id. at 84 (“The securities acts extend statutory liability to all 
‘persons’ who control primary violators, subject to a good faith defense . . . .”). 
 47. See id. at 70 (“Whenever entry into a gatekeeping market requires 
significant capital, including investment in specific human capital or reputation, 
simple legal penalties such as civil damages, fines, or license revocations can be 
powerful deterrents.”). 
 48. See Kim, supra note 32, at 423 (“Gatekeeping theory operates on the 
assumption that for the gatekeeper to act, the expected benefits should 
outweigh the expected costs. The most salient benefit of closing the gate is 
avoiding the costs associated with acquiescing in misconduct.”). 
 49. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 62–66 (discussing “the likelihood that 
gatekeepers will prevent misconduct and the cost of inducing them to detect it”). 
 50. Id. at 62. 
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their activities, it provides neither any guidance nor any tools to 
help them achieve these goals. Gatekeepers’ reputational 
incentives and fear of sanctions are thought to provide enough 
motivation; gatekeepers’ close knowledge of client workings 
ensures they are best positioned to deal with attempted 
misconduct; finally, gatekeepers’ market power leaves clients 
with no other option but to follow gatekeepers’ recommendations. 
Essentially, regulators are expected to intervene only ex post, in 
the rare event that something in the gatekeeper–client 
relationship goes amiss. 
B. The Harsh Realities of Gatekeeping: Repeated Collapses Show 
Weaknesses in Reputational Model 
In practice, neither reputational incentives nor the deterrent 
effect of harsh sanctions have managed to discipline gatekeepers, 
as the last fifteen years of financial turmoil have shown. In 2001, 
Enron collapsed when it was revealed that its management had 
successfully pressured its outside accountant, Arthur Andersen, 
to overlook liabilities hidden through off-balance-sheet 
transactions.51 But, if Enron’s deceptions were masterfully 
designed, Worldcom’s fraud was much more mundane: Its CFO, 
in cooperation with its outside accountant, Arthur Andersen 
(again), simply misclassified expenses and inflated revenues.52 
While Enron and Worldcom are the most famous examples of 
large-scale accounting irregularities, they were not the only 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Jonathan Weil, How Leases Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting, 
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB109580870299124246 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“A big part of the 
[Enron] scandal centered on off-balance-sheet ‘special purpose entities.’ These 
obscure partnerships could be kept off the books—with no footnote disclosures—
if an independent investor owned 3% of an entity’s equity.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see, e.g., David Henry et al., Who Else Is 
Hiding Debt, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2002), www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2002-
01-27/who-else-is-hiding-debt (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“A suit filed earlier 
this month shows that many U.S. finance companies are among 52 partners in 
LJM2, an Enron off-balance-sheet entity with over $300 million in assets.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, 
Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/technology/26TELE.html (last visited Feb. 
17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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ones.53 Nor were accountants the only gatekeepers found to 
succumb to such conflicts of interest. In 2003, securities analysts, 
who write independent reviews of securities offerings and issue 
buy-sell-hold recommendations, were found to overwhelmingly 
favor companies that had hired the analyst’s employer to run the 
offering54 after being promised under-the-table rewards.55  
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 brought to light a new set of 
gatekeeper missteps. To successfully repackage and sell 
mortgage-backed securities, investment banks represented to 
buyers that their products had a much lower risk profile than the 
one eventually revealed once the subprime market collapsed.56 
Credit rating agencies, hired by investment bankers to conduct 
an independent assessment of the securities’ risk profile, 
contributed to the collective euphoria by downplaying the 
possibility of default.57 In the midst of this upheaval, Bernie 
                                                                                                     
 53. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go 
Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 786 (2004) (discussing the Tyco 
International Ltd. racketeering scheme); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco 
Executives Charged With $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 
2002), www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/business/2-top-tyco-executives-charged-with- 
600-million-fraud-scheme.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (same) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Europe’s Enron, ECONOMIST (Feb. 27, 
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1610552 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) 
(discussing the Royal Ahold scandal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). See generally Claudio Storelli, Note, Corporate Governance Failures—
Is Parmalat Europe’s Enron?, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 765 (2005) (discussing 
the Parmalat scandal). 
 54. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: 
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003) 
(“[A]nalysts face firm pressure to issue positive reports because those reports 
have greater potential to generate commission revenue for their companies.”). 
 55. See Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions 
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2003-54.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“UBS Warburg and Piper Jaffray 
received payments for research without disclosing such payments . . . . Those 
two firms, as well as Bear Stearns, J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley, made 
undisclosed payments for research . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 56. See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (presenting SEC allegations that Goldman Sachs misrepresented to 
investors in ABACUS vital information about the risk profile and portfolio 
selection process). 
 57. See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–
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Madoff, a well-respected financier and former head of NASD, 
shockingly confessed to running an estimated $50 billion Ponzi 
scheme.58 For decades, Madoff’s fraud continued under the nose 
of the nation’s biggest bank, JP Morgan.59 In 2014, JP Morgan 
agreed to a hefty $2.6 billion in monetary sanctions for failing to 
alert regulators about the Madoff case.60 
These events dominated national headlines, attracted 
enormous scholarly attention, and triggered important legislative 
and regulatory reforms.61 While each of these cases involved 
distinct failures, they also underscore fundamental weaknesses 
in the conventional gatekeeper model. Gatekeepers, it turned out, 
sometimes went out of their way to keep their clients satisfied, 
even when this meant disregarding indications of potential 
fraud.62 After all, the probability that clients’ fraud will be 
detected is relatively low. And even when fraud is revealed, our 
laws often allow gatekeepers to avoid liability if they were not 
aware of it, or at least not negligent in ignoring it. Below we 
explain why our current laws have allowed the conflicts of 
interest in gatekeeping to burgeon in light of the low probability 
of detecting fraud. 
                                                                                                     
Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1301 (2011) (“Probably the 
most reprehensible players in the subprime crisis have been the credit rating 
agencies.”); id. at 1302 (“In 2004, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ‘eased their 
standards’ under pressure from Wall Street to enable more securities to be rated 
AAA.”). 
 58. See Aaron Smith, Five Things You Didn’t Know About Bernie Madoff’s 
Epic Scam, CNN (Dec. 11, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/10/news/ 
companies/bernard-madoff-ponzi/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review) (“He [Madoff] pled guilty to charges of 
fraud . . . .”). 
 59. See Hamilton & Pfeifer, supra note 3 (discussing JP Morgan’s 
complacency with Madoff’s actions). 
 60. Id.  
 61. For examples of legislators calling for reform following the Madoff 
scandal, see generally Liz Moyer, Can New Regulation Stop Another Madoff?, 
FORBES (Jan. 5, 2009), www.forbes.com/2009/01/05/madoff-regulation-banking-
biz-wall-cx_lm_0105madoff.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); The Securities and Exchange Commission 
Post-Madoff Reforms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying texting (discussing Enron 
and Worldcom). 
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1. The Conflicting Interests of Gatekeeper Firms and Their 
Employees 
In the eyes of the law, ideal gatekeepers are sizeable 
corporations that boast a strong reputation won after decades of 
experience, command large market shares in their industry, and 
employ thousands of professionals.63 With such leverage, 
gatekeepers have little reason to acquiesce to devious client 
demands. It is individual gatekeeper professionals that strike 
deals with client executives. Some gatekeepers, such as certain 
investment banks or law firms, operate on the basis of “eat what 
you kill” models, where each professional’s compensation or 
bonus depends on the billings she brings to the firm.64 But even 
in firms that do not keep strict tally of the loot, gatekeeper 
professionals are in charge of specific client accounts, which they 
are expected to cultivate and grow.65 Thus, a gatekeeper 
professional’s annual pay and future in the firm may depend 
entirely on a few clients, or even on a single one. These clients 
may only represent a sliver of the firm’s aggregate billings but 
mean the world to the individual professional who caters to their 
needs. Forging these client relationships requires significant time 
and effort from gatekeeper professionals, and building trust with 
clients may take years. When such a profitable client relationship 
is lost, it could take considerable time for the professional to 
                                                                                                     
 63. See DELOITTE, 2015 GLOBAL REPORT 3 (2015) (employing more than 
225,000 employees), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/ 
Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-gr15-main-final.pdf; ERNST & YOUNG, 2015 
GLOBAL REVIEW 2 (2016) (employing 212,000 employees), http://www. 
ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Global_review_2015/$FILE/EY_Global_revi
ew_2015.pdf.  
 64. For “eat what you kill” models in the banking industry, see generally 
Suzanne McGee, ‘You Eat What You Kill’: Wall Street Bonuses Keep Soaring as 
Profits Decline, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2015), www.theguardian.com/ 
money/us-money-blog/2015/mar/15/wall-street-bonuses-rise-profits-decline (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For 
“eat what you kill” models in law firm settings, see Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Lisa 
H. Rohrer, Money and Meaning: The Moral Economy of Law Firm 
Compensation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 74, 115 (2012) (providing a description of 
eat what you kill from a Partner’s perspective). 
 65. See Kim, supra note 32, at 432–33 (“Since a partner’s welfare is now 
based almost entirely on her own individual efforts to generate revenue from 
her own client base, the potential threat of client defection incentivizes her to 
accede to client demands out of a desire to keep the client.”). 
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identify and develop a suitable alternative.66 Moreover, long-term 
relationships between gatekeeper professionals and client 
executives often start as staid business transactions but develop 
into personal friendships. Sentiments such as trust, loyalty, and 
affinity become the basis for lasting and rewarding interactions.67  
So, if these valued clients and trusted friends ask the 
individual professional to cooperate with them and violate the 
law, will she be willing to go along, or will she resist? In the cases 
examined above, the short-term incentives of personal 
enrichment won over the long-term goals of maintaining the 
firm’s reputational capital, or even its continued existence.68 
Apart from specific considerations generated by gatekeepers’ 
investment in client relationships, market-wide norms paint 
cooperating with authorities as betrayal of one’s own clients. In 
tightly regulated industries, such as finance, regulators are often 
seen, if not exactly as the “enemy,” but as someone whose gaze is 
best avoided.69 Moreover, informing enforcement authorities 
about somebody else’s misconduct carries negative social 
connotations: informants are labeled snitches.70 In service 
industries that prize loyalty above all else, working with 
regulators against one’s own clients is often seen as the ultimate 
betrayal. Stigmatized by their actions, these gatekeepers are seen 
as unfaithful agents who put their own interest ahead of their 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 346 (2007) (“A final—and pervasive—
limitation on gatekeeping efficacy is how the enterprise pays the gatekeeper. 
That creates an inherent inclination for solicitude simply to retain business.”). 
 67. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside 
Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1065 (2005) (noting the 
importance of trust and affinity in the client relationship). 
 68. See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeepers Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1103 (2008) (discussing why people sometimes prefer 
short-term incentives over long-term ones). 
 69. Illustrative of this point is a speech delivered by Xerox Corporation’s 
CEO at an SEC conference. The CEO joked that all CEOs feel strange when 
entering the SEC building. Anne M. Mulcahy, CEO, Xerox Corporation, 
Remarks at the SEC Interactive Data Roundtable Panel on Getting Analyst and 
Investors Significantly Better Information 109 (June 12, 2006), 
www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/xbrlofficialtranscript0606.pdf. 
 70. See Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House 
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities 
Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3351 (2014) (noting that policymakers 
historically referred to whistleblowers as “snitches” and “rats”). 
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client’s, as overly sensitive to their regulatory obligations, as 
unpredictable and untrustworthy collaborators who will not 
protect their client at moments of crisis. Gatekeepers whose 
reputation is thus tainted have trouble attracting business and 
may have to abandon the industry. 
2. The Low Probability of Detecting Fraud 
Modern finance is an exceedingly technical environment, 
with layers of intermediaries interacting through complicated 
transactions using ever more refined instruments with diverse 
motivations. Highly knowledgeable market participants take 
advantage of this complexity, typically to make legitimate gains, 
but sometimes to devise intricate fraud schemes. However deep 
the machinations behind fraud run, the outcome is often similar: 
the probability of detecting financial fraud is often very low. 
But surely, one might think, at some point the fraudulent 
edifice will collapse, the harm done to victims will be revealed, 
and enforcement will restore order. While true for most crimes or 
torts, this proposition does not necessarily stand for financial 
fraud. Some financial crimes take place in order to address 
presumably short-term problems, such as a liquidity crunch or a 
temporary market downturn, with the intention of replenishing 
misappropriated funds once things look up.71 Other fraudulent 
schemes are designed to continue in perpetuity and can even 
withstand some disturbances.72 Madoff successfully ran his Ponzi 
scheme for decades, and he finally revealed it himself.73 In still 
other cases, misconduct has a clearly harmful impact for markets’ 
credibility, but pinpointing specific losses and connecting them to 
specific victims might be impracticably difficult because of the 
                                                                                                     
 71. See, e.g., Matthew O'Brien, Meet the Most Indebted Man in the World, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2012), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/11/ 
meet-the-most-indebted-man-in-the-world/264413 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) 
(discussing Jerome Kerviel, Société Générale rogue trader) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72. See, e.g., supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (providing Madoff 
as an example of a long-term fraudulent scheme). 
 73. See Smith, supra note 58 (“Some reports say that Madoff’s epic crime 
may have started as early as the 1960s . . . .”). 
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sheer number of victims harmed just a little.74 Finally, some 
fraudulent schemes take advantage of a systemic weakness that 
affects all market participants in one way or another, as was the 
case with the security analysts’ conflicts of interest.75 For all 
these reasons, identifying or even conceptualizing victims might 
be exceedingly hard. When the victims themselves do not have a 
clear sense of harm, they are unlikely to point authorities to the 
fraud and demand action. 
The low probability of detecting financial fraud further 
sharpens the conflict of interest between gatekeeper firms and 
employees discussed above. Motivated by short-term gains, such 
as increased compensation, better reputation, and professional 
advancement, employees might be more tempted to disregard 
warning signs if they believe no one is going to find out. 
Succumbing to misguided client requests is easier if the 
probability of being discovered is really low. Moreover, employees 
might have pocketed their gains and left the firm by the time the 
effects of the fraud fully unfold. Whether these individuals’ assets 
will be available for compensating fraud victims depends on 
doctrines of gatekeeper fault, which often raise hurdles.76 In 
practice, sanctions against individual employees are rare.77 
Economic theory suggests that, when the probability of 
detection is low, policymakers can still deter harmful conduct 
successfully with a substantial increase in sanctions.78 However, 
increasing sanctions might not be a viable option in the case of 
gatekeeper misconduct. To start, market reaction to severe 
gatekeeper fault can be immediate and overwhelming, as Arthur 
                                                                                                     
 74. In the market-timing scandals, the losers were the people who traded 
right before the close of the market. See James Surowiecki, Right Trade, Wrong 
Time, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2003), www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2003/10/20/right-trade-wrong-time (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“A 
Stanford Business School study found that this kind of market timing could be 
robbing investors of more than four billion dollars a year.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75. Infra Parts III.E–F. 
 76. Infra Part II.B.3. 
 77. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from 
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 682 (2012). 
 78. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 427–29 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
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Andersen’s collapse after Enron illustrates.79 When the 
gatekeeper firm dissipates, there are really no additional 
sanctions that policymakers can impose. Moreover, our 
regulatory framework utilizes gatekeepers to such an extent that 
eliminating them through harsh sanctioning might leave the 
market even more exposed to misconduct than before. The global 
financial system relies on just four big accounting firms and three 
credit rating agencies, and many fear about the already 
diminished levels of competition among them.80  
Yet, it is because of the low probability of detection that 
gatekeeper collaboration is absolutely essential in any effort to 
uproot fraud. Many of the recent headline financial scandals have 
come to light or reached resolution because someone with direct 
knowledge of the scheme worked with enforcement authorities. In 
Worldcom, it was internal accountants that unearthed the 
scheme; in Goldman’s Abacus deal, it was months of interviews 
with industry insiders that allowed the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to zero in on this particular deal;81 Enron’s Andrew 
Fastow,82 and, of course, Bernie Madoff,83 offered up themselves 
                                                                                                     
 79. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying texting (discussing the 
Arthur Andersen case). 
 80. See Adam Jones & Simon Rabinovitch, Accounting: Stalking the Big 
Four, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cd74664e-9797-
11e2-97e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz417TnJu9m (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) 
(discussing the major accounting firms) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Patrick Kingsley, How Credit Rating Agencies Rule the World, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/ 
15/credit-ratings-agencies-moodys (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) (discussing the 
major credit rating agencies and criticizing their “mysterious” power) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 81. See Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of 
Fraud in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/04/17/business/17goldman.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) (“For months, 
S.E.C. officials have been examining mortgage bundles like Abacus that were 
created across Wall Street. The commission has been interviewing people who 
structured Goldman mortgage deals about Abacus and similar instruments.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 82. See Jen Rogers, Fastow and His Wife Plead Guilty, CNN MONEY (Jan. 
15, 2004), www.money.cnn.com/2004/01/14/news/companies/enron_fastows (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2016) (providing details of Fastow’s guilty plea) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 83. Scott Cohn, Madoff Says He Provided “Key Information” to Authorities, 
CNBC (Dec. 13, 2013), www.cnbc.com/id/101272415 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016) 
(“In a new email from federal prison, convicted con artist Bernard Madoff claims 
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to authorities. Inside information can save a lot of effort and 
resources for regulators by directing them right to the target. 
Gatekeepers are uniquely placed to provide such direction, 
because they are sophisticated professionals who understand the 
intricacies of the financial system and can spot signs of 
misconduct. But instead of enlisting their cooperation in finding 
out more about fraud, our laws steer them towards knowing as 
little as possible about it so as to avoid liability, as the next Part 
argues.  
3. For Gatekeepers, Knowledge Is Liability 
Gatekeeper liability is not strict. Rather, to be liable toward 
victims of their clients’ misconduct, or subject to regulatory 
sanctioning, gatekeepers must have violated a duty specifically 
prescribed by law.84 In defining these duties, the law typically 
requires that gatekeepers either intend to or at least know that 
their actions violate the law.85 Take for example Rule 10b–5, the 
catch-all definition of securities fraud that has allowed investors 
to launch thousands of private claims against investment banks, 
accountants, and lawyers.86 A key element of 10b–5 fraud is 
scienter,87 satisfied when the information that the defendant 
possesses allows her to know or reasonably foresee the potential 
result of her action.88 In the same vein, the Securities Exchange 
                                                                                                     
federal regulators ‘eagerly accepted’ information he offered about JPMorgan 
Chase, which is in talks with U.S. authorities about a potential $2 billion 
settlement over its alleged role in the Madoff fraud.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 
697 (1997) (defining duty-based liability). 
 85. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 76 (explaining the intent requirement 
in gatekeeper liability laws). 
 86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (1975). 
 87. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) 
(“[Section] 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of 
scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”). 
 88. See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 
2000) (noting that it “is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege and prove that a 
defendant could have foreseen the consequences of his actions but forged ahead 
nonetheless” to demonstrate scienter for a claim under § 10b). 
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Act of 1934 authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission 
to suspend or revoke the operating license of broker-dealers when 
they willfully violate, or aid and abet in violating, securities 
laws.89 On the banking side, liability arrangements are similar. 
For example, the billion-dollar fines that banks have paid for 
misrepresenting the value of mortgage portfolios in the run-up to 
the 2008 crisis are based on FIRREA.90 Because FIRREA civil 
penalties arise in cases of mail and wire fraud that harms 
federally insured financial institutions, they also require 
scienter.91 
Tying gatekeeper liability to knowledge of illegality has an 
important perverse effect that has been largely overlooked by the 
literature.92 If a gatekeeper is not held liable unless it knows 
about client mischief, then the less it knows about the client, the 
more likely it is that the gatekeeper will avoid liability 
altogether. By maintaining a position of unawareness, 
gatekeepers can continue offering services to and collecting fees 
from clients that are engaging in illegalities. In this way, 
gatekeepers caught between their client loyalties and their 
regulatory obligations can satisfy both masters. Thus, rather 
than pursuing their market-monitoring role to the fullest, 
gatekeepers are actually better off by averting their gaze, so that 
they limit the chances of coming across information that would 
compromise their unawareness. Only when they cannot plausibly 
                                                                                                     
 89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(D)–(E), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(b)(4)(D)–(E) (2012). 
 90. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989, § 951, 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012) [hereinafter FIRREA] (listing the civil 
penalties for violating FIRREA). 
 91. See id. § 1833(c)(2) (“This section applies to a violation of, or a 
conspiracy to violate . . . section 287, 1001, 1032, 1341 or 1343 of title 18, United 
States Code, affecting a federally insured financial institution.”). These sections 
include false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims (§ 287); fraud or false claims 
(§ 1001); the concealment of assets from a conservator, receiver, or liquidating 
agent (§ 1032); mail frauds and swindles (§ 1341); and fraud by wire, radio, or 
television (§ 1343). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (including mail and wire fraud); 
see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 (establishing the scienter requirement 
for Rule 10b–5). 
 92. Note that Professor Jennifer Arlen makes a similar point for corporate 
liability regime for employees’ torts and crimes. See generally Jennifer Arlen, 
The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 833 (1994). 
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deny knowing about clients’ scheming are gatekeepers forced to 
abandon their neutrality. As a result, indications that are likely 
to signal misconduct, but do not positively prove it, might often be 
left unexplored.  
In few notable cases, gatekeeper liability departs from 
scienter and employs a negligence standard, as is the case for 
inaccuracies in a registration statement for underwriters, 
accountants, attorneys, and others under § 11 of the 1933 Act.93 
Courts are left with the challenging task of defining what 
constitutes reasonable care in each case, a rather costly and 
complicated exercise that typically entails significant uncertainty 
for all parties involved.94 To reach this determination, courts 
typically refer to the standards of due diligence in the relevant 
professional setting and invite expert testimony on whether the 
defendant took all the appropriate steps to investigate and assess 
the situation at hand.95 Defendants are found liable if they 
continue to work with clients that their peers would have cut off 
from the financial system and referred to enforcement 
authorities. Recent cases have added more bite to this due 
diligence exercise, requiring that gatekeepers consider “red flags” 
(i.e. facts that put the defendant on notice that the client is 
engaged in wrongdoing, or that would suggest to the average 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (creating a cause 
of action for security holders against certain parties if a registration statement 
“contain[s] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein 
not misleading”). 
 94. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 59 (stating that strict liability for 
gatekeepers relieves “courts from entering the thicket of determining what 
constitutes reasonable care in a given set of circumstances” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 95. See, e.g., Wikoff v. Vanderveld, 897 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that expert testimony used at trial to help determine whether 
defendant “had breached her warranties concerning MSCI’s financial 
statements”); Danis v. USN Commc’n, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1191–92 (N.D. 
Ill. 2000) (“Plaintiffs fail to present evidence to support their claims of material 
misrepresentations in regard to Deloitte’s GAAP and GAAS certification. 
Violations of GAAP and GAAS standards are established through expert 
testimony.”); In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 943 F. Supp. 924, 935 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) (“This Court finds that whether FASB CON No. 6 constitutes a GAAP is 
best resolved by expert testimony, and thus should not be addressed on a motion 
to dismiss.”). 
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investor that she has been defrauded).96 Red flags must “strip a 
defendant of his confidence” in the accuracy of his clients’ 
representations.97 Although less demanding than scienter, this 
negligence standard still requires gatekeepers to turn away their 
clients only after evidence starts mounting against them.98 Thus, 
it still leaves gatekeepers significant space to accommodate client 
demands before they run into trouble.  
Before information about client misconduct reaches the level 
of scienter or negligence, as the discussion above shows, 
gatekeepers have no legal obligation to alert regulators, and very 
little reason to do so voluntarily. If gatekeepers terminated their 
engagement based on unverified suspicions, their relationship 
with the clients in question would probably be irreparably 
damaged, and their reputation in the market would suffer.99 If 
gatekeepers reported their suspicions to regulators, the 
transaction would probably stall or be canceled and the client 
may suffer as a result. Again, gatekeepers put the opportunity to 
collect fees for their services at risk, and might even find 
themselves targeted in an enforcement action. As a result, 
gatekeepers often find themselves tiptoeing around the red line of 
illegality, putting up a shield around their own liability, rather 
than worrying about the impact of their clients’ actions for third 
parties and the financial system as a whole. 
Even when revelation of the fraud is imminent and the 
delicate balancing act between satisfying client demands and 
complying with regulatory obligations is about to crumble, we 
have seen gatekeepers trying to protect their position by 
concealing evidence. At least in past financial scandals, 
gatekeepers had in fact gone to great lengths to keep authorities 
                                                                                                     
 96. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 672–73 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (providing an example of a “red flag”). 
 97. Id. at 674. 
 98. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 83–85 (discussing the negligence 
standard for gatekeepers). 
 99. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 59–61 (“Whatever their actual 
intentions, then, all regulatory targets have a powerful incentive to withhold 
information from potential whistleblowers and to refrain from transacting with 
anyone of suspect loyalties. Conversely, these responses create a matching 
incentive for putative whistleblowers to avoid actual whistleblowing at any 
cost.”). 
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in the dark. For example, they obstructed evidence,100 got the 
cooperation of other gatekeepers in the transaction101 and even 
created secret code words and reference schemes.102 By 
misdirecting gatekeepers’ efforts in this way, the regulatory 
framework loses the chance to fully capitalize on their role as 
intermediaries and collect valuable intelligence that could help 
with enforcement. 
C. Attempts at Reform: Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank 
As successive waves of financial scandals drove the economy 
into a tailspin, Congress made repeated efforts to reform the 
gatekeeper model.103 While these reforms targeted only certain 
types of gatekeepers, each represents a different strategy that 
could be applied to gatekeeping more generally. More specifically, 
Congress tried two new approaches. First, it sought to instill 
greater discipline from the inside; it created procedures that 
streamline gatekeepers’ due diligence obligations and supervisory 
                                                                                                     
 100. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 544 U.S. 696, 701 (2005) 
(discussing the shredding of documents by auditor Arthur Andersen in the 
midst of the SEC investigation of Enron); see also Samuel W. Buell, The 
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473–75 (2006) 
(discussing various gatekeepers’ efforts to shield clients and proposing entity 
criminal liability). 
 101. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 152 (2008) (discussing the liability of a gatekeeper who had not made a 
public misstatement or violated a duty to disclose, but had participated in a 
scheme to assist fraudsters); Anthony Sallah, Scheme Liability: Conduct Beyond 
the Misrepresentations, Deceptive Acts, and Possible Janus Intervention, 45 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 181, 187 (2013) (describing a scenario where multiple directors 
allegedly collaborated to present fraudulent financial statements to the SEC). 
 102. See Collusion in the Stockmarket, ECONOMIST (Jan. 15, 1998), 
www.economist.com/node/111273 (last visited Jan. 20, 2016)  
[I]n 70 of the 100 most heavily traded stocks, Nasdaq dealers avoided 
quoting prices in odd eighths of a dollar. Buyers were far more likely 
to quote shares at 28 1/2 or 28 3/4 than at 28 5/8. This raised the 
possibility that the dealers . . . were tacitly colluding to keep the gap 
between the price they paid for a share and the price at which they 
sold it wider than it would have been in a truly competitive market. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 119, 152–55 (2006) (explaining the focus of recent gatekeeper reform 
initiatives in Congress). 
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mechanisms.104 This set of measures is mostly associated with 
the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act,105 which used this approach in 
relation to financial statement audits. Second, Congress offered 
increased rewards to gatekeepers who decide to “blow the 
whistle” on their employers.106 Although Sarbanes–Oxley also 
included whistleblower provisions, it was the 2010 Dodd–Frank 
Act that revolutionized and greatly expanded this approach.107 
The paragraphs below look briefly at these reforms as models for 
regulating gatekeepers, arguing that there is still more to be 
done. 
1. Sarbanes–Oxley: Intensifying Due Diligence and Increasing 
Independence from Management 
Troubled by accountants who either actively collaborated 
with misbehaving managers, or turned a blind eye toward them, 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act established a new regime to govern the 
interactions between public companies and their external 
auditors.108 The Sarbanes–Oxley regime orchestrates 
accountants’ due diligence obligations extensively. The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a new 
quasi-public regulator, issues Audit Standards that specify steps 
and criteria external accountants must follow when auditing 
public companies.109 By directing accountants’ attention to many 
                                                                                                     
 104. Infra II.C.1. 
 105. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. 
(2012)). 
 106. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten 
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2012) (discussing legislated rewards for 
whistleblowing gatekeepers). 
 107. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 204, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384 
(2012)). 
 108. See Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years On: 
What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333, 333–34 (2008) (“The Act was 
designed to restore investor confidence in the capital markets by introducing 
several sweeping changes and reaffirming other extant rules and regulations.”). 
 109. See General Auditing Standards, PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/ 
Standards/Auditing/Pages/ReorgStandards.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) 
(listing the auditing standards) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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different inquiries, the Sarbanes–Oxley regime makes it harder 
for them to claim that they failed to notice problems. Moreover, 
Sarbanes–Oxley’s § 404 requires auditors to review not only the 
company’s financial statements, but also the systems that the 
company has in place in order to collect the information used to 
produce the financial statements.110 Thus, it expands the scope of 
accountants’ inquiries even further.  
But if these expanded inquiries unearth problems, what are 
accountants to do? Sarbanes–Oxley sets up two new channels 
that accountants can use to pursue their complaints, one within 
the corporate hierarchy and one outside it. First, accountants can 
bring up their concerns with the audit committee, a specialized 
board committee composed entirely of independent directors.111 
Responsible for hiring and firing auditors, as well as for 
supervising the company’s internal systems for financial 
information, the audit committee was designed to offer auditors 
insulation from pressures by the CEO and the CFO.112 Second, 
accountants are required to attest publicly to the adequacy of the 
company’s internal systems for financial information under § 404 
and, thus, they must disclose to the market any material 
weaknesses they identify.113 By forcing auditors to put their 
reputation on the line through public attestation and public 
disclosure, Sarbanes–Oxley sought to boost auditors’ negotiating 
position vis-a-vis management while also providing additional 
information to investors. 
While Sarbanes–Oxley’s stricter due diligence obligations 
underlined the monitoring function of gatekeepers, we argue that 
they failed to change auditors’ calculations when determining 
whether to turn against a client. Accusing a company’s 
management of tinkering with its financial statements remains a 
bold move, one that auditors are unlikely to make without strong 
evidence supporting their allegations. For all their credentials of 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Shakespeare, supra note 108, at 335 (“Section 404 requires an 
annual audit of management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the internal 
control.”). 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2012). 
 112. Id. § 78j-1(l). 
 113. See Coates, supra note 17, at 102 (“[O]fficers must evaluate and 
disclose ‘material weaknesses’ in their firm’s control system . . . outside auditors 
‘attest’ to those disclosures.”). 
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independence, audit committees are likely to be reluctant to start 
a fight with management officials unless they can substantiate 
their concerns. Thus, a significant amount of evidence will be 
necessary before such steps can be taken. Relying exclusively on 
their own investigating powers and having to go through 
company officials in order to collect their data, gatekeepers may 
not be able to surreptitiously collect the necessary evidence.  
Similarly, empirical studies of material weakness disclosures 
under § 404 suggest that the strategy has only partially worked 
and may even have backfired under certain circumstances. On 
the one hand, firms with auditor-disclosed material weaknesses 
suffer higher costs of capital114 and tend to remedy the problem 
after a year.115 On the other hand, two-thirds of all public 
companies do not disclose a material weakness until after an 
earnings restatement.116 Thus, the disclosure does not operate 
preemptively, as Sarbanes–Oxley intended. Not surprisingly, 
firms and auditors that do not have material weaknesses 
disclosed are less likely to face litigation, possibly because they 
can plausibly deny they were aware of the weakness and, thus, 
avoid liability.117 Effectively, the lack of disclosure protects 
                                                                                                     
 114. Jacqueline S. Hammersley, Linda A. Myers & Catherine Shakespeare, 
Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the 
Characteristics of those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002, 13 REV. ACCT. STUD. 141, 150–62 (2008); Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of 
Equity, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 24 (2009). 
 115. However, a significant 30% of all firms with disclosed material 
weaknesses make no effort to remedy them even after three years. Karla 
Johnstone, Chan Li & Kathleen Hertz Rupley, Changes in Corporate 
Governance Associated with the Revelation of Internal Control Material 
Weaknesses and Their Subsequent Remediation, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 331, 
341 (2011). 
 116. Sarah C. Rice & David P. Weber, How Effective Is Internal Control 
Reporting Under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non-)Disclosure of Existing 
Material Weaknesses, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 811, 826 (2012). 
 117. See Sarah C. Rice, David P. Weber & Biyu Wu, Does SOX 404 Have 
Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control 
Weaknesses, 90 ACCT. REV. 1169, 1174 (2015) (“[D]isclosure of control 
weaknesses serves to acknowledge managements’ and auditors’ awareness of 
the existence of those weaknesses, which makes it more difficult for them to 
plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the conditions in the control 
environment that led to the restatement.”). 
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auditors and clients from liability, and probably gains auditors 
their clients’ loyalty.  
2. Dodd–Frank: Empowering Whistleblowers 
Because detecting financial fraud is notoriously hard, 
enforcement authorities have an easier job when someone with 
privileged access to information alerts them about ongoing fraud. 
People who “blow the whistle” on corporate fraud are often 
employees of the perpetrator, but can also be its business 
partners, subcontractors, or even journalists who collected 
evidence on the company’s dealings.118 Financial intermediaries, 
by virtue of their close relationship with the client, are one of the 
most important pools of potential informants.119 But acting as a 
whistleblower also comes with significant negative repercussions 
that might discourage potential informants.  
Once the informant uncovers the fraud and makes her 
intentions known to the company, to enforcement authorities, or 
to the public, she stands the risk of being fired.120 Whistleblowers 
will find it extremely hard to find another comparable job in the 
industry.121 Exposing an employer to the rest of the world is still 
considered morally reproachable, even if the employer’s actions 
themselves were illegal or unfair to others.122 Whistleblowers are 
often described in derisive terms such as “rats” and “snitches.”123 
                                                                                                     
 118. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 
J. FIN. 2213, 2225–28 (2010). 
 119. Id. 
 120. In one dataset, in 82% of the cases involving an employee whistleblower 
whose identity became known to management, the individual employee alleged 
that she was fired or had to quit her job under pressure. See Dyck et al., supra 
note 118, at 2216 (“[I]n 82% of cases with named employees, the individual 
alleges that they were fired, quit under duress, or had significantly altered 
responsibilities as a result of bringing the fraud to light.”). 
 121. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1757, 1763, 1763 n.39 (2007) (citing Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, 
The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes–Oxley: A Proposal for 
Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2007)) (noting that the statute of limitations for a 
retaliation claim is only ninety days). 
 122. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life 
and Crime After Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 365 (2003) (stating that 
whistleblowers are perceived as “disloyal tattletales”). 
 123. See Faqihi, supra note 70, at 3351 (stating that policymakers 
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For this reason, whistleblowers risk not only a significant hit at 
their finances, but also the loss of friendships with co-workers 
and the disdain of their professional and social circle.124  
To counter the negative repercussions of whistleblowing, 
Sarbanes–Oxley declared employer retaliation against 
whistleblowers a felony.125 In practice, however, the Sarbanes–
Oxley employee complaint mechanism protected employees in 
very limited cases.126 Moreover, this approach does little to 
reverse whistleblowers’ blacklisting from the very industry on 
which they depend professionally and have served all their lives.  
Dodd–Frank took a more daring approach: to compensate for 
the loss of income and the destruction of future employment 
opportunities, it offers whistleblowers a share of the bounty. 
Section 922 of Dodd–Frank requires the SEC to offer to person(s) 
that provided information about the fraud an amount between 
10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected, based on 
the value of the information provided and the agency’s 
policymaking priorities.127 The SEC established a separate Office 
of the Whistleblower that runs the agency’s program for 
collecting and assessing information, estimating awards, and 
protecting employees from retaliation.128 In September 2014, the 
SEC made headlines by awarding a record $30 million bounty to 
a single whistleblower, whose identity has remained unknown to 
the public.129  
                                                                                                     
historically referred to whistleblowers as “snitches” and “rats”). 
 124. Brickey, supra note 122, at 365. 
 125. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012). 
 126. According to a study of employee retaliation complaints under 
Sarbanes–Oxley, of the 677 cases submitted to the Secretary of Labor in the 
first three years, the employees won the ALJ’s protection in only six instances. 
See Dworkin, supra note 121, at 1764 (describing success as “an uphill battle” 
for whistleblowers).  
 127. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
§ 922(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 128. For more information, see generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https:// www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf. As of the date of 
this Article, the 2014 Annual Report was the most recent report. 
 129. Josh Hicks, $30 Million Award to Tipster Underscores Banner Year for 
SEC Whistleblower Program, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), www.washington 
post.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/11/19/30-million-whistleblower-award-under 
scores-banner-year-for-sec-program (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (on file with 
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While Dodd–Frank’s bounty program has been met with 
apparent success in providing enforcement authorities with 
information about ongoing fraud, it also has important 
limitations as a model for regulating gatekeepers. To start, Dodd–
Frank’s rule prevents the award of bounty to professionals who 
stumble upon indications of fraud when conducting an audit of a 
company’s financial statements.130 As a result, external auditors 
and their advisers cannot take advantage of the bounty program. 
Internal control officers responsible for internal audits can be 
entitled to the bounty only in limited circumstances, typically 
when management either fails to take action to remedy the 
problem or actively tries to impede the investigation.131 Another 
category of gatekeepers not eligible for bounty awards is persons 
who are already under an obligation to report violations to the 
SEC.132 Over the years, the SEC has established many rules that 
require regulated professionals, such as broker-dealers or 
investment advisers, to provide various reports to the agency.133 
Excluded from the bounty program are also persons who are 
otherwise criminally convicted of fraud in the reported case.134 To 
the extent that gatekeepers find themselves at risk of being 
regarded as primary participants in fraud, they will lose the right 
to claim bounty. Yet, determining gatekeepers’ criminal exposure 
ex ante is not always straightforward. 
That Dodd–Frank’s bounty program is not intended as a 
measure for regulating gatekeepers is also evident in another of 
its key elements: it applies to individuals but does not extend to 
corporations.135 Dodd–Frank envisages the bounty as a reward 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C) 
(2012). 
 131. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
C.F.R § 240.21F-4(2)(b)(4)(v) (2015). 
 132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(c)(2)(D). 
 133. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., REGULATION OF 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
S.E.C. (Mar. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-
042012.pdf. 
 134. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21F(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B). 
 135. See id. § 21(F)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining whistleblower as 
“any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who 
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for the individual professional who does not succumb to pressures 
from superiors in order to help enforcement authorities.136 In 
contrast, Dodd–Frank’s bounty program does not include any 
provisions that seek to harness the corporate enforcer. Dodd–
Frank creates no incentives for gatekeeper firms to set up 
systems that collect and assess information about their clients, to 
dig deeper in their due diligence efforts, or to understand clients’ 
potentially fraudulent intentions. Even if multiple individuals 
within a gatekeeper firm possess a piece of the puzzle, the 
corporate employer is under no obligation under Dodd–Frank to 
put them together. Rather, we argue, gatekeeper firms are left to 
navigate the uneasy terrain between the legality of their 
participation in clients’ transactions and the disloyalty of 
referring to the authorities clients who, in the end, might be 
doing nothing illegal. 
3. Academic Thinkers on Gatekeeper Reform 
As scandals ravaged through the financial markets in the 
2000s, many scholars recognize that gatekeeper reputation alone 
is not sufficient to deter wrongdoing and have debated whether 
and how to expand gatekeeper liability.137 The most radical 
expansion of the current regime would involve holding 
gatekeepers strictly liable for any client wrongdoing, and would 
thus turn gatekeepers into insurers.138 In theory, strict liability 
                                                                                                     
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission” 
(emphasis added)). 
 136. See David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty 
Regimes, Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 605, 610–16 (2014) (discussing bounty regimes). 
 137. See generally COFFEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 14 
(providing academic thoughts on gatekeeper reform); Frank Partnoy, 
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability 
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Barbarians at the 
Gatekeepers?] (same); Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14 (same); Frank 
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 365 (2004) [hereinafter Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers] (same); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy’s Complaint: A Response, 84 B.U. L. REV. 377 (2004) 
(same); Hamdani, supra note 16 (same). 
 138. For a different system of third party insurance for financial statements, 
see generally Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement 
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has major advantages: it would lead gatekeeper firms to put in 
place optimal monitoring systems, and would also free courts 
from the difficult task of trying to ascertain, ex post, what 
gatekeepers knew and did not know about the fraud.139 However, 
a true strict liability regime would be a “draconian response”;140 it 
would not only increase the price of auditor services, but also 
would risk entirely unraveling the market for auditor services.141 
Thus, the most far-reaching proposals currently put forth by 
prominent academics involve creating a strict liability regime 
with some limits.142 These proposals remain controversial, with 
other scholars arguing instead that gatekeepers should be held 
liable only for what they knew143 or should have known.144  
With the debate about how best to expand gatekeeper 
liability to an optimal level far from settled, recent scholarship 
highlights other dimensions of the gatekeeper problem that 
further complicate matters.145 Professor Lawrence Cunningham 
suggests that the financial industry is likely to fight any 
significant expansion of liability tooth and nail.146 For this 
                                                                                                     
Insurance, and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39 (2002). 
 139. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 9–18 (1987); see 
also Hamdani, supra note 16, at 83–86 (comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of strict liability and negligence regimes). 
 140. Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers, supra note 137, at 375. 
 141. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 74–76, 89 (“[T]he market will unravel 
when the increase in gatekeeper fees is sufficiently large to drive all clients—
whether wrongdoers or law-abiding persons—out of the market.”). 
 142. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 14, at 306 (proposing a 
combination of strict liability regime with a cap based on a multiple of the 
revenue gatekeepers received from wrongdoers); Partnoy, Strict Liability for 
Gatekeepers, supra note 137, at 375 (proposing a combination of strict liability 
regime with a cap based on a percentage of damages); Partnoy, Barbarians at 
the Gatekeepers?, supra note 137, at 367, 370 (proposing a strict liability regime 
with damages based on a “minimum percentage of the client’s ultimate 
liability”).  
 143. See Hamdani, supra note 16, at 103–04 (advocating a knowledge-based 
regime). 
 144. See Tuch, supra note 33, at 1628–31 (advocating a fault-based regime); 
Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gomez, Should We Trust the Gatekeepers? 
Auditors’ and Lawyers’ Liability for Client’s Misconduct, 27 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 96, 96–109 (2007) (proposing that under certain assumptions, the 
distinction between knowledge and negligence is not significant). 
 145. See infra notes 146–152 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
recent scholarship and arguments). 
 146. See Cunningham, supra note 66, at 327, 333–35 (recommending that 
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reason, he suggests that rewarding auditors for performing their 
gatekeeping function well rather than punishing them for 
gatekeeping failures may be a more realistic way forward.147 
Professor Andrew Tuch highlights that, while most of the 
literature is based on the simplifying assumption of a single 
gatekeeper, large transactions are typically reviewed by multiple 
gatekeepers, including a law firm, an investment bank, and an 
accounting firm.148 Each of these firms may have only a partial 
understanding of a client’s business transactions, he notes, and 
may “hav[e] incentives to narrow the scope of its activities to 
reduce the likelihood that it will acquire knowledge sufficient to 
attract gatekeeper liability.”149 Finally, Professor Asif Hamdani 
distinguishes between “speaking” and “silent” gatekeepers; 
speaking gatekeepers make statements on which third parties 
rely, as in the case of accountants confirming that financial 
records are accurate, while “silent” gatekeepers simply fail to 
warn third parties.150 Hamdani argues that market-based 
reputation arguments do not work in the case of silent parties, as 
by definition, they do not attach their name to a dishonest client’s 
activities.151 He also notes that, while liability for silent partners 
in fraud could and should be expanded, it is difficult to hold a 
silent party civilly liable under the current securities regime.152  
                                                                                                     
gatekeepers be rewarded for successfully performing gatekeeping functions). 
 147. Id. at 381–83. 
 148. See Tuch, supra note 33, at 1585, 1597–1601 (describing how each of 
these entities is involved in a complex web of interactions when executing 
transactions within the federal securities laws). 
 149. Id. at 1586.  
 150. See Assaf Hamdani, Silent Gatekeepers and Vicarious Liability 12 
(May 2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Hamdani, Silent 
Gatekeepers], http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/schools/law/progs/legalworkshops/ 
documents/stoneridge%20paper%20idc.pdf (“An actor making a statement, 
however, typically faces market incentives to refrain from facilitating fraud. 
Those who make statements are often reputational intermediaries that would 
suffer substantial market penalty upon the discovery of fraud. Non-speaking 
actors, in contrast, do not put their reputation at risk.”). 
 151. See id. at 14 (“Non-speaking actors’ concealed involvement makes them 
less likely to suffer market penalties when issuer fraud is uncovered.”). 
 152. See id. (“[F]rom a deterrence standpoint, there are convincing reasons 
for imposing liability on non-speaking actors who knowingly assist issuers to 
mislead investors.”). 
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Where does this leave us? The discussion of the literature 
above highlights three common themes. First, many scholars 
agree that the market-based mechanism of gatekeeper reputation 
does not suffice to deter financial fraud.153 Second, however, 
prominent scholars note that, while significantly expanding 
gatekeeper liability and turning gatekeepers into insurers, this 
type of mechanism would face strong opposition from the 
financial industry and might lead to a crisis in the gatekeeping 
professions as we know them.154 Third, important recent work 
suggests that any solutions brought forward should take into 
account important and unnoticed realities about the market for 
gatekeepers—namely, that each transaction involves multiple 
gatekeepers, some of which are silent.155 The proposal that 
follows responds to each of these concerns.  
4. Gatekeepers’ Potential Still Unexplored 
For all the repeated attempts at reform and heated academic 
discussions, gatekeepers remain a resource that the current 
regime has not managed fully to tap.156 The prevailing strategy 
for gatekeepers seeks to entice their cooperation mostly through 
heavy sanctions for failing to monitor their clients.157 But heavy 
sanctions are justified when gatekeepers knowingly assisted in 
clients’ fraud or, in a few severe cases, were negligent 
monitors.158 Not surprisingly, gatekeepers have directed their 
energy in clearly demarcating their knowledge or negligence, as 
                                                                                                     
 153. See supra notes 145–152 and accompanying text (explaining the flaws 
in the theory that gatekeeper reputation alone effectively deters financial 
fraud). 
 154. See supra notes 142–152 and accompanying text (discussing 
controversies that arise due to expanding gatekeeper liability). 
 155. See supra notes 142–152 and accompanying text (summarizing 
scholars’ proposals to deter financial fraud more effectively with gatekeepers). 
 156. See supra Part II.B.3 (arguing that, under the current regime, 
gatekeepers face liability if they have knowledge of fraud and are thus better off 
knowing less about their clients). 
 157. See supra notes 93–107 and accompanying text (discussing various 
theories of negligence and strict liability for gatekeepers and the underlying 
incentives for each theory). 
 158. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text (describing 
gatekeepers’ assistance, knowledge, or negligence in three well-known cases). 
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the case may be, so that they can avoid liability.159 In this effort, 
information that does not render gatekeepers knowledgeable or 
negligent, but could still offer helpful tips in investigations, never 
reaches enforcement authorities.160 Worse still, gatekeepers have 
an incentive to suppress this information, for fear that, if found 
out, it might be considered incriminatory in hindsight.161  
Policymakers’ efforts to address this problem by opening up 
new channels of communication for gatekeepers and enforcement 
authorities have so far fallen short. Sarbanes–Oxley tried to get 
external auditors to entrust their concerns either to independent 
directors or even to the market itself.162 Not surprisingly, neither 
of these new outputs has yielded much. Before becoming certain 
that their clients are violating the law, gatekeepers are unlikely 
to turn openly and publicly against them, especially if voicing 
concerns can later be used in a lawsuit against the gatekeeper 
itself. Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower rules offer a valuable 
framework for disillusioned employees and other insiders but do 
not fit corporations dedicated to monitoring.163 
Still, in a financial system that grows ever more vast, 
complicated, and interconnected, our regulators cannot afford to 
ignore the indications of fraud that gatekeepers are bound to 
come across. We need a framework that allows gatekeepers to 
share this information, while also protecting them from the 
negative consequences they might face down the line. If they fail 
to do so, their liability should be tied to the severity of their 
particular failure rather than the full extent of the underlying 
fraud. The following Part proposes such a system. 
                                                                                                     
 159. See supra notes 93–99 (examining gatekeepers’ roles in reporting, 
considering negligent and strict theories of liability). 
 160. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (describing the 
incentives for gatekeepers averting their eyes from wrongdoing to protect their 
own liability). 
 161. See supra notes 114–117, 130–144 and accompanying text (noting 
gatekeepers concerns about criminal liability in light of post-2000 financial 
reforms). 
 162. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that Sarbanes–Oxley created the 
PCAOB to establish audit standards for auditors and established a regime for 
auditors to make complaints). 
 163. See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that internal auditors are exempt from 
claiming a bounty under the whistleblower rules and further that the 
whistleblower rules do not reward corporations, only individuals). 
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III. Collaborative Gatekeepers: Elements of a New Paradigm 
The model proposed here seeks to motivate gatekeepers to 
share client information that has so far remained untapped in 
enforcement efforts. While interacting with a client hiding 
misconduct, the gatekeeper may come across some indications 
that raise suspicions but fall far short of confirming problems. 
But because these indications might prove extremely useful for 
enforcement authorities, this proposal requires gatekeepers to 
report suspicions to regulators without informing clients. In 
return for submitting their suspicions, gatekeepers gain 
immunity with regard to client misconduct. If they fail to submit 
their suspicions, gatekeepers are subject to sanctions. This 
framework, we argue below, can help gatekeepers overcome 
conflicts of interest because it incentivizes them to report as soon 
as they realize something is amiss before investing even greater 
efforts in building client relationships. Anonymity shields 
gatekeepers from clients’ objections, and immunity tempers fears 
of self-incrimination. Rather than barricading themselves behind 
alleged unawareness of client misconduct, gatekeepers can limit 
their exposure to client risk by collaborating with authorities. 
A. Background: Collecting Client Information 
Existing regulatory obligations already require finance 
professionals to obtain, or even actively collect, information about 
their clients. For example, client suitability rules require 
broker-dealers and investment advisers to understand the risk 
profile of their clients.164 Accountants must attest to the adequacy 
of the company’s internal controls, as discussed above.165 
Investment bankers must confirm the accuracy of their clients’ 
                                                                                                     
 164. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 14.16 (6th ed. 2009) (outlining brokers’ obligations to customers 
with regard to recommendations, including suitability requirements); see also 
Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr., Note, Broker-Dealer Sales Practice in Derivatives 
Transactions: A Survey and Evaluation of Suitability Requirements, 52 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1441, 1449–51 (1995) (analyzing risks present (e.g., market, credit, 
legal, liquidity, funding) for derivatives). 
 165. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (providing rules for “management 
assessment of internal controls”). 
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statements at the registration stage.166 Moreover, financial 
institutions are subject to a general obligation to supervise their 
employees so as to ensure that they are not engaging in illegal 
activity, either on their own or in conjunction with clients.167 
More generally, Delaware court rulings set out general rules 
requiring all corporations, including gatekeepers, to set up 
compliance systems that monitor their employees’ conduct.168  
In the course of tailoring their services to their client’s needs 
and particularities, gatekeepers often ask for client information. 
As gatekeepers plan client transactions, manage client accounts, 
or represent clients in negotiations, they can come across 
information on clients’ backgrounds, motivations, and plans. For 
example, a client’s financial documents might have 
inconsistencies; a client may have abruptly fired its outside 
auditors right before a quarter of challenging performance; the 
documentation of underlying loans in a securitization might have 
gaps; or the timing of trades before or after corporate events 
might raise doubts. Under current law, this information does not 
reach regulators unless growing indications of misconduct risk 
putting the gatekeeper at fault.169  
Collaborative gatekeeping puts this information front and 
center. This information could point to potential illegality and 
offer a missing piece of the puzzle for enforcement authorities. 
Gatekeepers should evaluate this information and, if necessary, 
make additional inquiries to supplement their intelligence. 
Typically, these inquiries will take place at the beginning of the 
client relationship. Through this process, gatekeepers could 
                                                                                                     
 166. See id. § 77k (imposing liability on the underwriter for material 
misstatements or omissions in an issuer’s registration statement). 
 167. See Gadinis, supra note 77, at 714–22 (discussing the supervision 
obligation using empirical data from recent SEC investigations of large and 
small firms for failure to supervise). 
 168. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (establishing that corporate directors have an affirmative duty 
to monitor their corporations); see also Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s 
Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719–20 (2007) (celebrating the landmark 
Caremark case and its progeny). 
 169. For gatekeepers, there is no ledger’s liability. See supra Part II.B.3 
(explaining that gatekeepers may be liable if they have knowledge of clients’ 
misconduct, which may incentivize gatekeepers to remain unaware). 
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assess whether their clients’ conduct raises suspicions, as 
outlined below. 
B. Key Obligation: Filing an Anonymous Suspicious Activity 
Report 
The central part of this Article’s proposal is a new obligation 
for gatekeepers: to file a report alerting regulators to suspicious 
activities by their clients. Suspicion of misconduct is, by design, a 
particularly low reporting threshold, one that sets this proposal 
apart from gatekeeper liability provisions under the current 
regime.170 Suspicions could arise when clients’ rationale for 
pursuing a transaction has gaps, when the information they 
provide is inconsistent or false, or when their proclaimed strategy 
does not fit well with specific actions that they instruct the 
gatekeeper to pursue on the ground. Rather than waiting to 
gather evidence that fully delineates clients’ illegal actions, the 
proposal encourages gatekeepers to come forward at a much 
earlier stage. Moreover, the suspicion standard incentivizes 
gatekeepers who have only partial information to still alert 
regulators about potential client misconduct. While gatekeepers 
have no means to collect intelligence on the remaining pieces of 
the puzzle, regulators can utilize their investigatory powers to 
extract valuable evidence.  
Which client actions can give rise to a suspicion of illegality? 
Rather than relying on subjective judgments, this proposal’s 
suspicion threshold calls for an objective, fact-based inquiry. To 
start, suspicions should arise when a client’s conduct resembles 
past instances of fraud. Courts, regulators, and self-regulatory 
organizations have built a rich jurisprudence that determines the 
                                                                                                     
 170. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 
(2007) (noting that, “[t]o establish liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a 
private plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, [meaning] ‘a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’” and 
reserving the question of whether recklessness also meets the scienter 
standard); see also 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1301.1 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing the standards for pleading 
scienter after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Gideon 
Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1102–04 (2007) (arguing that courts have severely limited 
auditor liability by setting a high scienter requirement). 
COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS 839 
elements of many violation types.171 This wealth of material also 
suggests fact patterns that tend to be connected with misconduct. 
For example, when a bank suddenly increases its loan granting 
supply, it may raise concerns that standards are falling and 
obligations to assess carefully borrowers’ profiles are overlooked. 
To take a different example, intense trading around corporate 
events might indicate abuse of inside information. In another 
example, reluctance to provide information about odd accounting 
treatments might suggest that something is amiss.  
Moreover, gatekeepers might be suspicious when a client 
deviates abruptly and sharply from his own past conduct or 
departs significantly from the conduct of clients with similar 
profiles. For example, sudden large cash deposits might suggest 
money laundering; repeated trading in a stock, even as its price is 
increasing, might indicate attempts for market manipulation. 
Gatekeepers should seek justification for such odd patterns. By 
directing gatekeepers’ efforts to similarities with past fraud and 
outlier transactions, the new gatekeeper duty can become readily 
administrable. 
To shield gatekeepers from their clients’ discontent upon a 
suspicions filing, the reports must remain anonymous. After all, 
gatekeepers are expected to actively alert authorities about their 
clients’ conduct; one cannot imagine that this will go down well, 
even if no illegal activities are actually occurring. At a minimum, 
clients may be displeased by the administrative burden of a 
potential regulatory investigation. Clients might also read into 
the report’s submission a betrayal of their trust by their closest 
advisors. Worse still, clients may threaten to move their business 
elsewhere if a report is submitted. But, even if clients understood 
that gatekeepers have very little choice in submitting a report, 
and even if there is no follow-up by the authorities, the doubts, 
concerns, and suspicions expressed in the report’s contents might 
still prove unnerving. To reduce acrimony between clients and 
gatekeepers and protect the smooth operation of suspicious 
activity reporting, it is essential that reports submitted to 
authorities remain anonymous. Without anonymity, gatekeepers 
would be more likely to hold off reporting as long as possible 
because they would not want to see a profitable client 
                                                                                                     
 171. See generally Buell, supra note 100. 
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relationship destroyed, barring clear evidence that it could not 
continue. 
If protecting the anonymity of reporting gatekeepers is 
essential for the successful operation of the model, how likely is it 
that the client finds out who submitted a report anyways? In 
many cases, no regulatory action will follow the submission of a 
suspicious activity report, and thus the client-gatekeeper 
relationship will not be disturbed. Even if an investigation 
begins, it is possible that a client will not be able to deduce who 
passed the tip to the authorities. This is because most deals 
involve a multitude of gatekeepers—bankers, lawyers, and 
accountants—assisting multiple parties, and all have a separate 
obligation to report.172 Moreover, regulators are especially likely 
to take action when they receive multiple reports and thus, many 
investigations may not point toward a single source of 
information. For example, regulators might investigate both the 
legal and the accounting aspects of a transaction at the same 
time, thus muddying the waters for the clients. As an additional 
safeguard, the contents and wording of the suspicious activity 
report itself will never be made available to the client and, thus, 
clients will not be able to connect particularized facts in the 
report with certain gatekeepers. With these precautions, 
conclusively linking the investigation to a suspicious activity 
report, and the report to a specific gatekeeper, might prove hard 
for clients. That said, the risk that a client-gatekeeper 
relationship will be interrupted once an investigation begins 
cannot be excluded. 
C. Sanctions for Failing to Report 
Backing up gatekeepers’ new obligations with sanctions is 
essential to alter gatekeepers’ behavior. Gatekeepers who fail to 
report suspicions may be subject to civil penalties at the 
corporate level, while individual employees may be subject to 
monetary penalties or other disciplining sanctions. Ex ante, the 
threat of sanctions might prompt gatekeepers to set up effective 
reporting systems. Ex post, these sanctions will help regulators at 
                                                                                                     
 172. For example, in Escott v. BarChris Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), defendants included lawyers and accountants. 
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trial, as much less evidence will be needed to punish gatekeepers 
who suspected misconduct and failed to act, than to punish 
gatekeepers for actively participating in fraud. 
The threat of sanctions for failure to report should induce 
gatekeepers to submit their suspicions even in cases where 
gatekeeper involvement would not otherwise be punishable under 
other substantive law provisions. For example, gatekeepers might 
have suspicions about clients’ misconduct, but they might not 
have any direct involvement themselves, and thus their actions 
may fall outside the scope of provisions like Rule 10b–5.173 But 
under the threat of sanctions, gatekeepers now have an obligation 
to report even those client activities. 
Elevating failure to report to an independently punishable 
offense also has a symbolic power, which can help bring about the 
cultural and institutional change in the financial industry 
envisaged by this proposal. Diverse audiences—clients, 
collaborators, even colleagues—might be displeased with having 
suspicions filed. To avoid clashes, gatekeepers need to convince 
these audiences that the report is mandatory, triggered by factual 
considerations over which the gatekeeper has little discretion, 
and must be filed even if the gatekeeper believes that the client is 
not engaging in misconduct. Moreover, sanctions underline that, 
even if a client chose to move its business elsewhere, all 
gatekeepers are subject to a uniform regime and would be faced 
with the same choices as to the filing of the report.  
D. The Payoff: Immunity About Reported Actions 
Many regulatory schemes seek to boost implementation 
through sanctions for failure to comply ex post, rather than 
incentives to comply ex ante. Sanctions are also an essential part 
of the collaborative model, as discussed in the previous subpart. 
But we also put forward an important incentive: that gatekeepers 
gain immunity for reported actions provided they submitted 
reports in good faith. This incentive, we believe, is dictated by the 
nature of the problem that the collaborative model seeks to 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 
(2007) (explaining that liability under Rule 10b–5 requires scienter, or intent to 
defraud). 
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address, namely to get gatekeepers to share information about 
their clients.  
To understand why immunity is worth considering in this 
context, imagine that you are advising a gatekeeper who has just 
come across indications of client misconduct. A comprehensive 
report of these indications immediately creates a record of the 
extent of gatekeeper suspicions at the time. If it turns out that 
the client is indeed committing fraud, victims will ask the court 
to evaluate this record ex post. Clearly, there is a risk that the 
court will side with fraud victims and hold that the record meets 
the fault standard for gatekeeper liability (i.e., knowledge or 
negligence, depending on the case). Indeed, the stronger the 
indications of fraud, the more likely the court is to side with 
victims.  
On the other hand, the gatekeeper faces a different outcome 
if she holds off from reporting her suspicions, even after fraud is 
revealed. Without a record of gatekeeper knowledge or 
negligence, the court may be more readily convinced that the 
gatekeeper was not at fault and impose sanctions only for failing 
to identify suspicions. Still, these sanctions are likely to be less 
onerous than damages to fraud victims. Thus, in some cases, 
gatekeepers are likely to be better off by not reporting, 
particularly when they are uncertain about how courts will 
interpret their reports ex post.  
The proposed immunity can alleviate this uncertainty for 
gatekeepers acting in good faith. With the benefit of hindsight, a 
court may examine the reported facts and conclude that, from an 
objective perspective, any professional faced with such evidence 
should have terminated the client relationship. Yet, if the specific 
gatekeeper in question acted in good faith from a subjective 
perspective, for example, because she was still trying to sort out 
the client’s intentions, the immunity would operate in her favor. 
Thus, the immunity would relieve gatekeepers from the need to 
tiptoe between legality and illegality and allow them to report all 
relevant facts and avoid unwanted legal and regulatory 
adventures. Because the immunity comes into effect by law as a 
result of the suspicions filing, gatekeepers do not need to 
negotiate separate relief with enforcement authorities. Moreover, 
the immunity attaches to the actions reported, irrespective of the 
specific statutes or rules violated. For these reasons, immunity 
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helps create a more stable and predictable regulatory 
environment for gatekeepers. This increased stability for 
gatekeepers comes at little direct cost to their business. 
Essentially, the proposal envisages that the gatekeeper, after 
reporting, can continue offering its services to the client, to the 
extent otherwise allowed by law. The relationship with the client 
would have to be interrupted only if the facts outlined in the 
report could establish that the gatekeeper is in bad faith. 
The proposed immunity can help gatekeepers not only 
toward potential victims of clients’ fraud, but also toward clients 
themselves. Reporting clients’ suspicious activity to regulators 
may clash with gatekeepers’ obligations toward their clients. For 
example, there might be professional rules mandating 
confidentiality or general privacy laws.174 By shielding 
gatekeepers from such causes of action, the immunity removes 
any remaining impediments to reporting.  
While the promise of immunity may induce gatekeepers to 
submit a report, they still have significant leeway in deciding 
what facts to include in their report. Strategically minded 
gatekeepers might wish to provide regulators with just enough 
facts so as to secure the immunity benefits, while also 
discouraging the regulator from actually conducting further 
investigations. There may be doubts as to the scope of the 
immunity, the sincerity of the reporting gatekeeper, and the 
extent to which the information provided actually assisted 
regulators’ efforts. To avoid this problem, regulators should be 
able to strip away the immunity from gatekeepers who withheld 
information from their reports intentionally or recklessly. To 
resolve any disputes in accordance with principles of due process, 
reporting gatekeepers should have access to a hearing before 
regulators, as well as the ability to contest regulators’ decision to 
strip them of the immunity in court.  
                                                                                                     
 174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted 
by paragraph (b).”). 
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E. How Can Reporting Suspicions Help Gatekeeper Professionals 
Overcome Conflicts of Interest? 
Suspicious activity reporting pays close attention to the 
dynamics of the gatekeeper–client relationship, we argue, 
because it interjects a regulatory obligation at a very early stage 
in the development of this relationship. At that stage, the 
conflicts of interest that often burden gatekeepers are less likely 
to have gained real strength. To start, the time and effort that 
gatekeepers will have invested in building the client relationship 
is likely to be much smaller. In some instances, suspicions may 
even arise right out of the client’s profile, before any professional 
services are offered. The sooner gatekeepers take notice of 
suspicions and submit a report, the lower the investments they 
will have to make in a client relationship that might be lost if 
regulators decide to move forward with an action. Even on a 
personal level, the connections between gatekeeper professionals 
and clients are not as deep at this early stage, and inhibitions due 
to long-standing bonds are unlikely. For these reasons, suspicious 
activity reporting’s early kick-start can smooth many of the 
dilemmas that gatekeepers face when clients misbehave.  
The high volume of suspicious activity reporting has the 
potential of bringing about a culture shift in the way financial 
professionals understand and perform their regulatory 
obligations. Financial executives are likely to file many reports in 
their career because many fact patterns can generate suspicions 
of misconduct.175 In fact, gatekeepers will be required to file 
reports even when they do not believe that their client is actually 
violating any laws. Because the obligation to report would arise 
in a similar manner over any gatekeeper faced with similar client 
facts, reporting gatekeepers will not see themselves as standing 
apart from their competitors. Through these repeated filings, 
executives will become acquainted with the process and its 
mission and better understand their role as an important link in 
safeguarding market integrity. Hopefully, in this way, individual 
professionals will come to see the reports as a fulfillment of an 
                                                                                                     
 175. For example, some banks file hundreds of SAR reports in a year. See 
infra Part V.A (explaining the shift of banks’ attitudes toward preventing money 
laundering). 
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obligation rather than the action of a fiduciary that violates their 
clients’ trust. Similarly, the intensity of suspicions reporting can 
also shift the attitudes of the financial industry and the public as 
a whole. Instead of a rarity that needs to be excoriated, 
cooperation with the authorities will become a regular part of 
gatekeepers’ continued operation.  
F. How Can Reporting Suspicions Help Address Conflicts of 
Interest at the Corporate Level? 
Suspicious activity reporting can help improve the 
performance of existing corporate compliance infrastructure in 
two ways. First, the fact-based suspicion standard provides a 
more workable reporting obligation because it does not require a 
particularly close understanding of the specific violation in 
question. Second, the immunity resulting from suspicious activity 
reporting provides stronger incentives for corporations to build 
effective compliance mechanisms.  
Because a client’s transaction is suspicious if it simply 
resembles past instances of fraud, the obligation to report carries 
a lower evidentiary burden, thus facilitating the work of internal 
compliance officers. Once the suspicions threshold is met, the 
personal beliefs of the professional handling the client or its 
superiors do not really come into play. In fact, the gatekeeper 
could also explain in the report why it believes that its client is 
not actually violating the law, thus addressing any resistance 
that compliance officers may face in reporting clients. Turning 
the suspicion standard into a fact-based inquiry delinks it from 
the subjective disposition of individual executives and, thus, 
reduces the pernicious impact of conflicts of interest between 
executives and their corporate employers. Examining whether a 
certain set of facts or pieces of information amounts to reportable 
suspicions does not require intimate knowledge of the 
transactions or parties involved.  
Delinking reporting obligations from people with intimate 
knowledge of misconduct allows the gatekeeper to build a 
separate compliance mechanism oriented towards identifying 
suspicious activity and informing regulators accordingly. The 
gatekeeper can develop a group of specialists trained to identify 
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problematic patterns who will become the chief supervisors of the 
institution’s daily activities. These specialists will combine their 
constantly developing knowledge of the financial system with a 
deep sense of mission to maintain its integrity. The fact that 
there is a wider circle of qualified individuals who can safeguard 
the company’s compliance is a significant improvement over the 
current gatekeeper framework, which relies on the individuals 
with the closest relationship to the potentially illicit transaction 
to come forward and alert regulators.  
Apart from facilitating the task of internal compliance 
mechanisms, suspicious activity reporting also boosts the benefits 
that the effective operation of these mechanisms can bring to 
gatekeepers. In particular, the immunity associated with timely 
reporting can help the gatekeepers continue their services with 
little disturbance, even after regulators proceed against some of 
its executives for misconduct. Under the immunity, direct 
consequences—such as civil penalties, monetary awards, or 
damages in private lawsuits—are not likely, thus calming 
immediate fears about the health of the gatekeeper’s finances. By 
pointing to its report filing, the gatekeeper can protect its 
reputation by showing that its compliance mechanism works 
effectively and has contributed to regulators’ efforts. Moreover, it 
can argue more convincingly that the instances of misconduct 
within its ranks are limited to the executives already targeted by 
regulatory action. Thus, effective reporting and immunity can 
help prevent the collapse of the gatekeeper when some of its 
executives are found to have been violating the law, as was the 
case with Arthur Andersen following Enron’s collapse.176  
IV. A Case Study of Collaborative Gatekeeping: The 
Anti-Money-Laundering Regime 
Part III above argues that collaborative gatekeeping holds 
significant promise as a theoretical proposition.177 However, bold 
                                                                                                     
 176. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing how Arthur 
Andersen shredded documents relevant to the ongoing SEC investigation of 
Enron). 
 177. See supra Part III (explaining the elements of the collaborative 
gatekeeper paradigm). 
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policy proposals are often saddled with uncertainties. A first set 
of concerns centers on the feasibility of the model. Would 
financial institutions balk at the idea, fearful they would pay 
dearly for costly compliance systems, only to risk alienating 
clients once these were in place? And, in a globalized world, 
where capital can easily move from one state to another, why 
would a country place itself at a competitive disadvantage by 
placing unusually strict regulations on its gatekeepers? But, even 
if the collaborative model were adopted, a second set of questions 
concerns its effectiveness. Would the resulting suspicious activity 
reports prove informative for regulators, or would gatekeepers 
provide minimal information to maintain client relationships? 
And would regulators be able to analyze all the reports that came 
their way, or would they be flooded with data, unable to separate 
signal from noise?  
To answer these questions, one could start by examining 
examples of collaborative gatekeeping in practice. Yet, in almost 
all areas of financial regulation, the conventional gatekeeper 
model is dominant. For all the inherent variety of policy missions 
in finance, from accurate disclosure in securities issuance to best 
execution in stock exchange transacting and to diversified 
investing in mutual funds, U.S. laws have entrusted the 
conventional gatekeeper model with serving investors and the 
market. This remarkable uniformity in such a foundational 
concept has left little room for experimentation with alternative 
regulatory solutions.  
However, one area of financial regulation closely follows the 
collaborative gatekeeping model developed above: 
anti-money-laundering.178 Anti-money laundering is the singular 
area where U.S. policymakers, and policymakers around the 
world, have opted to step off the well-trodden path and engage in 
a different relationship with financial intermediaries. Therefore, 
there are valuable lessons in studying the anti-money-laundering 
framework, both as it has been conceptualized in law, and as it 
has been implemented in practice. This Part begins our analysis 
of the anti-money-laundering regime by studying its history, 
which shows how regulators and private industry came to a 
                                                                                                     
 178. See infra Part IV (explaining how governmental regulators reached a 
compromise with private industry to reach a mutually beneficial result). 
848 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016) 
mutually beneficial compromise. Part V completes the analysis of 
this regime by exploring how it has worked in practice.  
Using historical records that were recently declassified, 
following a forty-year embargo, we recount the origins of the 
money-laundering current approach in Switzerland.179 
Switzerland, banking secrecy paradise par excellence, pioneered 
the modern money laundering approach following a series of bank 
scandals in the 1970s.180 The Swiss were the first to call on 
private banks to identify potentially suspicious transactions and 
alert regulators accordingly.181 We underline information 
collection as the key challenge that motivated this experimental 
regulatory framework. Private banks agreed to collect and report 
this information on two conditions: that the process for collecting 
information would be standardized, and that the regulatory 
obligation would be applicable to everyone in the industry.182 
This historical account of the origins of modern 
money-laundering laws upends conventional narratives: U.S. 
policymakers183 and scholars think the United States pioneered 
                                                                                                     
 179. Documentation for the support of this Article was acquired in the 
Archives of the Swiss National Bank in Berne. The authors would like to thank 
the Swiss National Bank archival staff for their assistance. Information on the 
Archives, SWISS NAT’L BANK, https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/snb/hist/id/ 
hist_archiv (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The authors would also like to thank the staff of the OECD Library 
and Archives Service. OECD Archives, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ 
general/oecdarchives.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 180. See Thomas D. Grant, Toward a Swiss Solution for an American 
Problem: An Alternative Approach for Banks in the War on Drugs, 14 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 225, 241 (1995) (noting that a bank scandal involving a Credit Suisse 
manager who helped clients evade detection of their assets led to the Inter-Bank 
Agreement of 1992, which created a code of conduct relating to due diligence for 
Swiss banks). 
 181. See Swiss Bankers’ Agreement on Due Diligence (Vereinbarung über die 
Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken), art. 1 (July 1, 1977) (requiring Swiss-domiciled 
banks to “determine that the identity of the bank customer will be reliably 
clarified [to] prevent an abuse of banking secrecy [that would permit] activities 
otherwise forbidden under the Agreement”) (on file with author). For the latest 
version of the Convention, see generally AGREEMENT ON THE SWISS BANKERS’ 
CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE (2008), 
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20080410-vsb-cwe.pdf. 
 182. Letter from Swiss Bankers Ass’n to Swiss Nat’l Bank, (Oct. 20, 1977) 
(on file with author). 
 183. See, e.g., Russian Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
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the modern regulatory approaches in this area. Instead, as we 
explore below, early U.S. efforts, including the 1970 Bank Secrecy 
Act, took a very different approach.184 After agreeing to back the 
Swiss approach internationally, the United States adopted it 
domestically as well and redesigned its regulatory infrastructure 
to implement it.185 This Part first traces the development and 
international spread of the Swiss approach and then presents 
legal mechanisms that U.S. laws have put in place to implement 
it.  
This historical narrative serves to illustrate the plausibility 
of a model that might, at first, encounter significant objections. 
Imposing new regulatory obligations on any industry is likely to 
meet powerful opposition initially. However, once a few large 
countries have adopted the new regulatory requirements, they 
have strong incentives to lobby so that all their competitors, 
domestically and internationally, are held to the same high 
standard. The pages that follow trace this upward regulatory 
ratchet in the adoption and spread of money-laundering laws 
globally. Similar processes have led to heightened regulation in 
many different fields—from the elimination of ozone-producing 
chemicals, to the strict regulation of car emissions, to uniform 
consumer protection, to harmonized anti-trust regimes. 186 These 
historical antecedents make the adoption of the collaborative 
model to other areas of financial regulation seem more plausible. 
More specifically, this historical narrative helps illustrate that it 
                                                                                                     
Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 120 (1999) (statement of James A. Leach, 
Chairman, Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.), http://commdocs.house.gov/ 
committees/bank/hba59889.000/hba59889_0f.htm (“[I]t is incumbent upon the 
United States to lead in cracking down on money laundering as a technique to 
crack down on much more significant crime, and crime that has enormous 
implications for the national interest of the United States and world security.”). 
 184. See infra Part IV.B (choosing to fight money laundering by requiring 
banks to flag large transactions). 
 185. See infra Part IV.C (explaining why the Swiss approach prevailed over 
the U.S. approach). 
 186. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 54, 76, 139 (1997) (mentioning a variety of 
international laws and agreements, which have led to increased regulation of 
the private sector); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2012) (“The European Union sets the global rules across a range of areas, such 
as food, chemicals, competition, and the protection of privacy. EU regulations 
have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of citizens around the world.”). 
850 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016) 
is possible to overcome industry objections and adopt regulations 
requiring gatekeepers to flag suspicious activity early on. 
A. The Birth of a New Model: Customer Due Diligence 
“Never let a good crisis go to waste”187 was clearly in the 
mind of Leo Schurmann, Vice-Chairman of the Swiss National 
Bank (SNB) in the 1970s. As an independent regulator 
overseeing the country’s banking sector, SNB had been worried 
for a while that intricacies in the financial system could easily be 
used to hide illicit gains.188 Generally, Swiss banking secrecy law 
prevented banks from sharing information about their clients 
with the authorities.189 However, the veil of secrecy was to be 
                                                                                                     
 187. Recently popularized by Rahm Emanuel, this quote is often attributed 
to Winston Churchill, but there is no evidence he really said it. See Gerald F. 
Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2008, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 (last visited Apr. 25, 
2016) (quoting Emanuel when speaking at a conference about using the 
financial crisis to accomplish President Obama’s agenda) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: 
Who Said No Crisis Should Go to Waste?, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 13, 2009, 12:27 
PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/08/13/quotes-uncovered-who-said-no-
crisis-should-go-to-waste (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (tracing the origin to M. F. 
Weiner) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 188. See Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (explaining the issues leading to 
customer due diligence). 
 189. See Swiss Banking Act, art. 47(1) 
[W]hoever intentionally does the following shall be imprisoned up to 
three years or fined accordingly: (a) discloses confidential information 
entrusted to them in their capacity as a member of an executive or 
supervisory body, employee, representative or liquidator of a bank, as 
member of a body or employee of an audit firm or that they have 
observed in this capacity; (b) attempts to induce such infraction of the 
professional secrecy; (c) discloses confidential information to third 
parties or uses this information for own benefits or the benefit of 
others. 
Article 47 was first altered in preparation for the establishment of the Swiss 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, to allow banks to 
disclose confidential information requested as part of an ongoing criminal 
investigation without breaching Swiss banking secrecy. The Treaty entered into 
force on January 1, 1983. See Loi fédérale sur l’entraide internationale en 
matière pénale (Loi sur l’entraidepénale internationale, EIMP) [Swiss Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty], Mar. 20, 1981, Recueil systématique du droit fédérale 
[RS] 351.1 (Switz.) (permitting (in relevant part) Swiss banks to disclose 
confidential client information without violating secrecy prohibitions under 
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lifted when banks became aware that their clients were 
conducting illegal activities.190 In effect, knowledge of illegality 
required banks to share information with the authorities and 
turn away clients to avoid further involvement. This duty 
mirrored the conventional gatekeeper model typical of U.S. 
regulation and was introduced as a result of U.S. pressure 
through a U.S.–Swiss mutual legal assistance treaty.191 But, as 
Swiss central bankers very well knew, evading this duty was far 
too easy: banks simply had to avoid becoming aware of clients’ 
illegalities.192 As a result, money from doubtful sources could 
continue to flow into Swiss banks’ coffers, fueling the central 
bank’s concerns.  
The opportunity to act upon these worries came in 1977, 
when a money laundering scandal hit Credit Suisse, one of the 
largest Swiss banks.193 The manager of the bank’s branch in 
Chiasso, a Swiss-Italian border town, was assisting wealthy 
Italians to transfer funds out of Italy illegally.194 Relying on 
Swiss banking secrecy and using a Liechtenstein shell company, 
the branch official had been able to keep the scheme hidden from 
Credit Suisse’s top management for sixteen years.195 Credit 
                                                                                                     
article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act when such information is requested by U.S. 
authorities). 
 190. See Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks of Nov. 8, 1934, 
amended on Apr. 22, 1999, art. 47 (Arthur Andersen et al. trans., 1996) 
(permitting bank officials to reveal secret information when under a federal 
obligation to testify). 
 191. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 
U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (uniting the United States and 
Switzerland to work together to identify money laundering). 
 192. Memorandum from the Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t to the Swiss Nat’l 
Bank (May 13, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum] 
(on file with authors). 
 193. See Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (“[The Inter-Bank Agreement of 
1992] is the result of a scandal that surfaced in 1977 involving a branch of 
Credit Suisse at Chiasso near the Italian border of Switzerland.”). 
 194. See id. (explaining that the scandal occurred when a manager of the 
Credit Suisse branch “employed shell corporations in Liechtenstein to assist 
clients in evading official detection of their assets”). 
 195. In 1977, in what is known as the Chiasso Scandal, Credit Suisse lost 
1.4 billion Swiss francs when the bank’s account manager lent money to shell 
corporations to help clients evade official detection of their assets. See, e.g., 
Swiss to Vote on Bank Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1984), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1984/05/19/business/swiss-to-vote-on-bank-law.html (last visited 
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Suisse suffered a loss of 1.4 million Swiss francs (equivalent to 
over $2 billion in today’s values).196 More alarmingly, the banking 
industry as a whole faced unprecedented public uproar. The 
popular press fumed against banks’ practices, and politicians 
called for abolishing banks’ privileges and creating a new federal 
regulator.197  
Schurmann, an experienced politician and law professor, 
seized his moment.198 Banks might be able to appease public 
anger and deflect undesirable regulatory intervention, he 
proposed, if they openly agreed to scrutinize their clients more 
closely.199 To lend credibility to this proposal, banks would 
willingly subject their information collection efforts to oversight 
by the Swiss National Bank.200 Thus, the vehicle for introducing 
                                                                                                     
Apr. 2, 2016) (discussing an amendment to modify banking secrecy laws 
proposed in response to the Chiasso scandal) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Grant, supra note 180, at 241 (discussing the Swiss 
Inter-Bank Agreement of 1992). 
 196. Swiss to Vote on Bank Law, supra note 195. 
 197. See Memorandum from Swiss Nat’l Bank on Public Handling of the 
Swiss Bankers’ Agreement 1–4 (May 25, 1977) (detailing the strategy for public 
relations following the publication of the Agreement, and noting the public 
pressure for legislative action following the Chiasso scandal) (on file with 
author). Previous attempts to repeal Swiss banking secrecy continued to gain 
traction after the Chiasso scandal broke. See Motion for a Revision of the Swiss 
Banking Act by MP Carobbio (Social Democrats) [AB III 792-95 (1977)] 
(representing an attempt to repeal Swiss banking secrecy before the Chiasso 
scandal broke). For examples of parliamentary initiatives after the Chiasso 
scandal broke, see also Parliamentary Motion of Jean Ziegler (Submitted May 4, 
Social Democrats–21 cosignatories) (calling for a limitation of Swiss banking 
secrecy’s punitive application and for opening a private right of action for 
parties injured by Swiss banking secrecy); Parliamentary Motion of Felix Auer 
(Submitted Mar. 9, 1977, Free Democratic Party–47 cosignatories) (suggesting a 
revision of Swiss banking secrecy to reduce illegal activities). 
 198. See Members of the Governing Board from 1907 Onwards, SWISS NAT’L 
BANK (July 2015), https://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/snb/hist/histbio/id/hist_bios_dm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (providing Leo Schürmann’s resume) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Swiss Bank Council is comprised of 
members from the political, business, and academic professions. Members are 
jointly nominated and elected by the Swiss Federal Department of Finance and 
the Swiss National Bank. 
 199. Bank Committee, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Meeting Minutes (Mar. 31, 1977) 
(Comments of Chairman Leo Schürmann) (on file with authors). 
 200. See Federal Political Department, Finance and Economics Service (Nov. 
1977) 
The [CDD Agreement] came into effect on July 1, 1977. With 
COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS 853 
banks’ new obligations, and hopefully regaining public 
confidence, would be a private gentlemen’s agreement, to which 
each bank could accede, with the Swiss National Bank as a 
guarantor.201 Internal Swiss bank documents outline these banks’ 
willingness to take on additional compliance obligations as part of 
a concerted public relations strategy.202  
With Schurmann in the lead, the central bank began 
negotiations with the Swiss Bankers Association and the nation’s 
major banks to hammer out the elements of this gentlemen’s 
agreement.203 Minutes of the Swiss National Bank show that they 
                                                                                                     
exception of a British owned bank in Geneva, whose accession should 
take place shortly, all members of the Swiss banking association have 
joined. Of the non-members are only a few institutions remaining 
outside the agreement, however it relates almost entirely to 
unimportant, local banks. This practically total accession is due to the 
will of the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss banking association to 
develop a contractual instrument that from all major banking 
institutions would be adopted.  
(on file with authors). 
 201. See id. (“In order to secure a correct, effective and conform application 
of the requirements of the Agreement, the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss 
Bankers Association have created a working group under the Chairmanship of 
the Swiss National Bank Director, which is to work on the practical 
implementation with trustworthy banking personnel. The goal is to establish a 
unified interpretation and practical application of the Agreement.”). 
 202. See Press Release, Swiss Nat’l Bank, The Swiss Bankers Agreement on 
Due Diligence 1–2 (June 2, 1977) [hereinafter SNB Press Release on Due 
Diligence Agreement] (noting that the “Swiss domiciled banks and the Swiss 
Bankers Association” cosigned an agreement with the Swiss National Bank 
“over the handling of bank secrecy and the due diligence requirements of Swiss 
banks when receiving funds”) (on file with authors). Additionally, the Press 
Release noted that “the banks commit themselves to abscond from active 
assistance to the illegal transfer of capital, as well as falsification to domestic 
and foreign authorities, especially tax authorities.” Id.; see also Letter from 
Swiss Bankers Ass’n to Swiss Nat’l Bank (Oct. 20, 1977) (providing the Swiss 
National Bank with an overview of the policy the Swiss Bankers Association 
intended to implement across Swiss banks in regards to the handling of initial 
client interviews and information) (on file with authors); Memorandum from 
Swiss Nat’l Bank on Public Handling of the Swiss Bankers Agreement 1–4 (May 
25, 1977) (detailing the strategy for public relations following the publication of 
the Agreement) (on file with authors); SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE 
ADVISORY BOARD 25–26 (June 2, 1977) (illustrating the willingness of the Swiss 
banking community to adopt measures which would reduce the political fallout 
from the Chiasso crisis) (on file with authors). 
 203. See Bank Committee, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Meeting Minutes (Mar. 11, 
1977) (Comments of Chairman Leo Schürmann) (noting that “some operations 
carried out under the cover of bank secrecy are not in the long term interests of 
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knew that some of the money in Swiss banks was of “doubtful” 
origins—i.e., potential connections with crime were suspected 
though not positively known.204 In the future, banks should not 
be able to turn a blind eye to such suspected connections. Thus, 
the agreement would require banks to conduct due diligence to 
ascertain the beneficial ownership of the funds. In the course of 
their due diligence, banks could more easily become aware of 
illegal connections. With awareness thus forced upon them, 
banks would have no choice but to cooperate with authorities.  
But what if due diligence did not resolve the question fully, 
so that doubts about the funds still remained? At that stage, 
banks would be required to ask clients for further documentation, 
including a written and signed statement setting out the client’s 
representations about the funds’ origins.205 Even in this scenario, 
the SNB suggested, banks should err on the side of caution and 
be allowed to provide this evidence to the authorities, without 
violating bank secrecy laws.206 This was a very important victory 
for the regulator because it effectively expanded the scope of 
banks’ obligations beyond the safe haven of awareness to the 
unchartered territory of suspicions and doubts. In many cases, 
suspicions and doubts might be the best banks could do. After all, 
the regulator knew that banks’ due diligence tools might be 
limited because the individuals presenting themselves to banks 
would also be the ones to speak as to the origin of their funds.207  
                                                                                                     
the Swiss banking system”) (on file with authors). 
 204. See id. (Comments of Fritz Leutwiler) (“There are bank clients with 
noticeably doubtful, yes even criminal backgrounds, and therefore should not 
have been accepted, nevertheless they were accepted, and there exists related 
money in Swiss banks.”). 
 205. See SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & SIGNATORY BANKS, AGREEMENT ON 
THE SWISS BANKS’ CODE OF CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE OF DUE 
DILIGENCE art. 6 (Apr. 7, 2008), [hereinafter SWISS BANKS DUE DILIGENCE 
AGREEMENT], http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20080410-vsb-cwe.pdf (requiring 
a bank to repeat the identification verification process when doubts arise as to 
the truth of its client’s identity, beneficial owner and contracting partner, or 
declaration of beneficial ownership). 
 206. See Press Release, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Swiss Bankers’ Agreement on Due 
Diligence (June 2, 1977) (noting that, “[i]n doubtful cases, banks should err on 
the side of caution”) (on file with authors). 
 207. See generally Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum, supra note 
192 (noting that “[t]he problem concerns all those to whom Swiss Banking 
secrecy applies. Notably, abuse of Swiss banking secrecy is driven by the 
client”). 
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Upon hearing SNB’s thoughts, the banking community froze 
in disbelief. Bankers feared political pressure might derail the 
regulator into instituting vague and hard-to-satisfy legal 
standards.208 Yet, bankers’ initial skepticism quickly gave way to 
constructive engagement. The Swiss Bankers Association 
believed that it would be ineffective to allow each individual bank 
to determine whether it had satisfied due diligence obligations.209 
Rather, banks needed to create a uniform approach so as to 
ensure high-quality information gathering.210 More specifically, 
standardized forms would guide bank employees in their efforts 
to collect information from clients, thus delineating the questions 
that banks should ask clients and helping bank employees 
evaluate clients’ responses.211 The Swiss Bankers Association and 
                                                                                                     
 208. See Internal Commc’ns between the Swiss Nat’l Bank, the Zurich 
Attorneys Ass’n & the Group of Private Bankers of Geneva (revealing that the 
two private organizations were wary that political pressure would cause the 
Swiss National Bank to rely on vague legal measures) (on file with authors); 
Letter from Zurich Attorneys Ass’n (Verein Zürichischer Rechtsanwälte Zürich) 
to Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t (Sept. 13, 1977) (noting that “the discussion 
over the [Swiss National Bank’s Due Diligence Agreement] was the cause of 
special concern” within the Zurich Attorneys Association) (on file with authors); 
Letter from Groupement des Banquiers Privés Genevois to Dr. Fritz Leutwiler, 
Head of Dep’t of the Swiss Nat’l Bank (June 2, 1977) (noting that the GRPT “is 
conscious of the political pressure on the banking sector” following the Chiasso 
crisis) (on file with authors). 
 209. SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 
202, at 25–26 (illustrating that the members of Advisory Board saw the 
Agreement with the Swiss National Bank as only “a part of” an answer to the 
Chiasso crisis and that internal controls by banks would also have to be 
applied). 
 210. See Swiss Bankers Ass’n, Meeting Minutes (June 2, 1977) (noting that 
an “effective internal monitoring must be adopted for the size, the business type 
and the scope of the internal organization of each individual [banking] 
institution”) (on file with authors). 
 211.  See generally SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra 
note 202 
[I]n order to carry out these tasks, the banks are given a qualified due 
diligence obligation and there will be procedural guarantees created. 
The banks are required to ask about the origin of funds. When the 
bank knows, or by using reasonable diligence should know, that 
money being brought to their bank is from prohibited or illegal 
origins, the bank is not allowed to enter into business. If the client is 
handling funds for another person then the banks are required to 
provide uniform disclosure in forms. In doubtful cases, banks should 
err on the side of caution and fill out standardized forms. The content 
should describe whether the client is handling for his own account or 
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the SNB created a working group to produce the standard forms 
that would streamline the implementation of this requirement.212  
Apart from standardization, bankers believed that another 
guarantee was necessary for this scheme to work: Every Swiss 
bank should be willing to participate.213 Bankers justified their 
insistence on universal participation by arguing that, if there 
were a hole left in this system—however tiny—illegal money 
would find it and exploit it.214 One could imagine that they were 
also concerned about competition. As due diligence imposes 
burdens both on banks and their customers, banks that simply 
stay out of the scheme might immediately gain an advantage over 
their competitors who participate. Regardless of bankers’ 
motivations, the regulator also wanted as broad industry 
participation as possible.215 By using their combined leverage, the 
SNB and the Swiss Bankers Association managed to have 
practically every Swiss bank enter into the customer due 
diligence agreement on July 1, 1977.216  
                                                                                                     
whose account he is handling if not his own. 
 212. See Press Release, Fed. Political Dep’t, Fin. & Econ. Serv. (Nov. 1977) 
(noting that the goal of the working group established under the Chairmanship 
of the SNB Director Ehrsam was to ensure the uniform interpretation and 
practical implementation of the Agreement across the Swiss banking sector) (on 
file with authors). 
 213. SWISS BANKERS ASS’N, PROTOCOL OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 
202, at 25–26. 
 214. See generally Swiss Nat’l Bank Legal Dep’t Memorandum, supra note 
192 
[T]he new formalities for opening an account are intended to provide 
a deterrent effect directed as doubtful clients. A direct blocking of all 
illegally acquired funds is not possible: realistically we have to set 
ourselves straight that the individual who assists in the acquisition of 
funds is also in the position to speak to their origin. In the US for 
example, the heads of organized crime present themselves as 
reputable businessmen. However, they are also in the position to 
provide very good information over themselves if necessary. Hence 
the blocking of doubtful funds is only possible through indirect 
means. 
See also generally id. at 226 (statement of Fritz Leutwiler). 
 215. SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra note 202, at 1–
2; see also Memorandum from Swiss Nat’l Bank on Pub. Handling of the Swiss 
Bankers Agreement, supra note 202, at 1–4 (detailing the strategy for public 
relations following the publication of the Agreement). 
 216. See SNB Press Release on Due Diligence Agreement, supra note 202, at 
1–2 (noting that for the few banks which did not sign “the National Bank is to 
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For all its private nature and contractual basis, the 
agreement also included provisions seeking to cement its 
implementation.217 Upon noticing failures to conduct due 
diligence, the SNB could impose significant fines on banks.218 To 
resolve potential disputes, the agreement set up an arbitration 
tribunal.219 Finally, signatories undertook to avoid participating 
in transactions designed to circumvent the agreement, or to 
otherwise assist clients in deceiving domestic and foreign tax and 
law enforcement authorities.220  
The 1977 agreement established key foundational elements 
of a collaborative gatekeeping model. Importantly, the 
agreement does not let banks off the hook if they simply fail to 
become aware of illegality.221 Rather, it requires them to assess 
whether there are doubts as to clients’ background and gather 
evidence and documentation outlining these doubts.222 As a 
result, the agreement introduces a lower threshold that banks 
must abide by when determining whether to grant access to the 
financial system: Knowledge was not required; suspicions and 
doubts would suffice.223 To implement this regime, the 
agreement required banks to abandon their passive complacency 
regarding incoming clients and actively ascertain the origin of 
clients’ wealth and the goals of clients’ transactions.224 Thus, it 
                                                                                                     
name them so that they can be seen in the associated documents” distributed at 
the time of the Agreement’s publication). 
 217. See SWISS BANKS DUE DILIGENCE AGREEMENT, supra note 205, art. 15, 
(noting that the agreement becomes active “on July 1, 1977 and is valid for a 
fixed period of five years” and that the signatory banks “authorize the 
administrative council of the Swiss Bankers’ Association” to undertake 
amendments or precisions to the Agreement in coordination with the National 
Bank). 
 218. See id. art. 11 (violating the agreement may result in fines of up to 10 
million Swiss francs). 
 219. See id. art. 13 (allowing a bank imposed with a fine for an alleged 
breach of due diligence to arbitrate the matter before paying the fine). 
 220. Id. art. 8. 
 221. Id. art. 1. 
 222. See id. art. 6 (requiring banks to verify clients’ identities again during 
the business relationship if doubts arise). 
 223. See id. (having doubts, not knowledge or certainty, as to a client’s 
identity requires banks to confirm the client’s identity again). 
 224. See Grant, supra note 180, at 245–46 (explaining that bank clients 
complete one form (Form A) and then the bank uses an internal recording form 
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introduced customer due diligence into the banking world. 
Through standardization, it provided banks with clear guidance 
about how to satisfy their new obligations but also called for 
robust compliance departments to handle the newly required 
information collection efforts. 
Although the 1977 agreement introduced customer due 
diligence as an obligation for banks, it also left a significant 
mismatch between banks’ obligations toward clients and their 
relationship with law enforcement authorities. If law 
enforcement authorities requested information about a client in 
the context of an investigation, banks were free to provide it 
without violating bank secrecy and privacy laws, even if they 
only had doubts about the client.225 But, the 1977 agreement did 
not create an obligation for banks proactively to report their 
suspicions to the authorities.226 Rather, it expected that banks’ 
newly detailed customer due diligence and recordkeeping 
obligations would sufficiently deter them from accepting 
criminals’ business because it would be far more 
straightforward to determine the extent of a bank’s knowledge 
or suspicion of client misconduct. As a result, while the 1977 
agreement set banks down the path of collecting information, it 
did not establish a mechanism for utilizing this information to 
prevent money laundering. This final step occurred when the 
international community embraced the Swiss due diligence 
obligations, as the Parts below discuss.227  
B. Different Model: United States Enacts Universal Reporting 
While Switzerland was pioneering the modern 
money-laundering approach, contemporary U.S. regulatory 
efforts to fight money laundering followed a different model. 
                                                                                                     
“compound[ing] information about the client investment aims, family 
background, and other general matters”). 
 225. See Grant, supra note 180, at 244–50 (describing the system for 
collecting information and when it may be necessary to contact authorities). 
 226. Because the 1977 Agreement was purely contractual in nature, it did 
not have an effect on altering Swiss banking secrecy, as it was defined under 
Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act. 
 227. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the Swiss model prevailed over the 
U.S. model in the international community). 
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Instead of requiring banks to screen their clients closely, and 
ask in-depth follow-up questions whenever suspicions arose, in 
the 1970s, American regulators’ asked banks to flag every large 
transaction.228 As this approach did not bring the desired 
results, the United States adopted the conventional gatekeeping 
model in the 1980s.229 
In the early 1970s, Congress was looking for new tools to 
use in its fight against drugs. Drug dealers, it reasoned, had to 
use the financial system to divert profits from illegal operations 
into legal activities. If only authorities had a paper trail of all 
transactions in which customers deposit or transfer cash in 
significant sums, then drug dealers would have far greater 
difficulty laundering their profits.230 Creating this paper trail 
was a cornerstone objective of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.231 
The Act required financial institutions to file a Currency 
Transaction Report (CTR) for all deposits, withdrawals, 
exchanges, or transfers of currency in excess of $5,000, as well 
as multiple transactions conducted in the same business day by 
the same person if reaching that amount.232 The reporting 
threshold was increased to $10,000 in 1984 and has remained 
                                                                                                     
 228. See infra notes 231–234 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
United States’ approach centered on creating a paper trail of large transactions). 
 229. See infra notes 240–242 and accompanying text (describing how the 
U.S. approach failed because criminals broke transactions up into smaller 
transactions). 
 230. See Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash 
Cycle: A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230, 231 (1991) 
(“Congress reasoned that if it were possible to create a paper trail of all 
transactions in which customers deposit, withdraw, mail, or . . . attempt to 
transfer cash sums in excess of $10,000 at one time, the money-laundering 
process . . . would be made far more difficult.”). 
 231. See id. at 232 (“The CTR system represents Congress’s attempt to begin 
creation of the paper trail at the placement stage of the money-laundering 
process.”). The “Bank Secrecy Act of 1970” is the commonly used name for the 
Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting in Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). 
 232. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316(d)(a) (2012) (allowing the Secretary of the 
Treasury to prescribe regulations to further define what amounts to culmination 
of closely related events and, specifically, the term “at one time” for the purposes 
of that section). 
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unchanged ever since.233 Besides cash, the reporting 
requirement was later expanded to wire transfers.234  
The primary objective of the CTR regime is deterrence, 
rather than information collection.235 When filing a CTR, 
financial institutions must simply record their identity and 
details of the individuals appearing before them accurately but do 
not have to make any further inquiries.236 In the CTR scheme, 
financial institutions are passive registers of financial flows, 
rather than active investigators.237 While Congress hoped that 
these records might be useful to law enforcement authorities 
during ongoing crime investigations, it did not really see them as 
jumpstarting new inquiries.238 Rather, Congress expected that 
drug dealers would be loath to have their information recorded.239 
Within the next decade, it became clear that the deterrent 
effect of CTRs would not be as prevalent as had been anticipated. 
After a spat of high sanctions against banks for failing to comply 
with their Bank Secrecy Act obligations, authorities were flooded 
with CTRs from around the country.240 The vast majority of these 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Richard R. Cheatham & James W. Stevens, Absent Regulatory 
Changes, Hispanic Immigrants Pose an Unbankable Risk, 123 BANKING L.J. 195, 
196 (2006) (“Enacted in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act required financial 
institutions to report cash transactions in excess of $5,000 (increased to $10,000 
in 1984) . . . .”); Wuliger v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 394 F. Supp. 2d 
1009, 1013 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining the Bank Secrecy Act). 
 234. See Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1960(b)(2) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘money transmitting’ includes transferring 
funds on behalf of the public by any and all means including but not limited to 
transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire, check, draft, 
facsimile, or courier.”). 
 235. See generally Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 326. 
 236. Id. at 359. 
 237. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 30, at 1 
(“FinCEN does not initiate or carry out any investigations on its own. Rather, it 
provides other agencies with tactical and strategic intelligence analyses . . . .”). 
 238.  See id. at 5 (“In line with the concept first proposed by Customs in 
1981, FinCEN is not to initiate or carry out any investigations on its own. Its 
primary purpose is to serve and assist other agencies . . . .”). 
 239. Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 352. 
 240. See John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and 
the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 497 (1988) (“The most 
significant recent event concerning the BSA occurred in United States v. Bank of 
New England, N.A., where the Bank of New England was convicted of 
committing thirty-one felonies arising out of its failure to file CTRs.”). 
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transactions were innocent,241 and law enforcement authorities 
rarely used this data for preventive reasons. Moreover, drug 
dealers were quick to find ways to evade being reported: they cut 
transactions into smaller pieces, spread them over multiple banks 
and multiple dates, or used legitimate business fronts, such as 
restaurants, to justify cash payments.242  
Congress responded by raising the stakes for violators 
through a familiar technique: criminalization. The Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986243 prohibited structuring 
transactions to evade reporting requirements244 and, more 
lastingly, turned money laundering into a criminal offense.245 In 
both cases, financial institutions would face sanctions if they 
assisted their customers in violating the law. This legislation 
introduced the conventional gatekeeper model, used throughout 
financial regulation in the United States, into 
anti-money-laundering law. Effectively, regulators relied on 
financial institutions as reputational intermediaries, requiring 
them to turn away potential money launderers, or face heavy 
sanctions. 
Yet, courts interpreted these provisions of the Money 
Laundering Control Act as including a “scienter” requirement.246 
                                                                                                     
 241. See Money Laundering: The Volume of Currency Transaction Reports 
Filed Can and Should Be Reduced: Hearing on S. 1664 Before the Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Henry R. 
Wray, Director, Admin. Justice Issues), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat 
4/151052.pdf (“[M]any of the reports being filed are of normal business 
transactions that could have been exempted from being reported. CTRs that 
report normal business transactions are of no value to law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies in detecting money laundering activity.”). 
 242. See Meltzer, supra note 230, at 236 (“Layering is the process of 
transferring these funds among various accounts through a series of complex 
financial transactions that are intended . . . to separate these funds from their 
original sources. Finally, integration is the process of shifting the laundered 
funds to legitimate organizations . . . .”). 
 243. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2012). 
 244. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012) (prohibiting persons from structuring or 
assisting in structuring transactions to evade the reporting requirements). 
 245. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (providing that any person who violates the 
statute “shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the 
value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both”). 
 246. See Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden 
on Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437, 458 (1994) (“These 
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As a result, financial institutions would be liable only if they 
knowingly or willfully assisted their customers in money 
laundering.247 Although the defendant does not need to know the 
specific offense that clients are committing, mere suspicion of 
criminality does not satisfy scienter.248 Yet, money launderers 
could devise transactions precisely in order to mask their 
criminal intentions. As banks were simply required to report or 
analyze what was presented to them, many illicit activities 
continued to remain outside the scope of the law. Consistent with 
the traditional gatekeeper model, the financial institution’s 
liability fell to be determined mostly ex post.249 That said, some 
preventive reporting requirements were also put in place, but 
blanket transaction reporting left authorities with too many cases 
to analyze fruitfully.250 In short, by the end of the 1980s, U.S. 
anti-money-laundering law included both a reporting 
requirement for all large transactions and many elements of the 
conventional gatekeeper prototype.  
C. The International Community Adopts and Extends the Swiss 
Model: From Due Diligence to Suspicious Activity Reporting  
Because financial activity—and financial fraud—cross 
borders easily, efforts to harmonize regulations around the world 
have often been proposed.251 But at least two models were on the 
table in the early 1980s: the Swiss model, requiring banks to 
investigate clients’ suspicious activities,252 and the American 
                                                                                                     
new criminal offenses are broad enough to apply to any person assisting money 
launderers. Courts, however, have read a scienter requirement of ‘knowing’ the 
source of the property or proceeds into this statute.” (citing United States v. 
Massac, 867 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 247. See id. (noting, for example, that a court will find a defendant guilty “if 
he knows that the subject property was derived from some criminal activity; 
however, the defendant need not know the specific offense”). 
 248. See id. (emphasizing the breadth of the money laundering provisions). 
 249. See supra Part II.A (describing the theory of gatekeeping). 
 250. See infra notes 334–341 and accompanying text (noting that all reports 
are not equally informative). 
 251. See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the Swiss model served as a 
template for other countries’ financial regulation efforts). 
 252. See infra Part IV.C (describing Switzerland’s customer due diligence 
and bank recordkeeping requirements). 
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model, requiring banks to pass on information about all large 
transactions.253 This subpart explores why the Swiss model was 
chosen as the template for global financial regulation, how global 
regulators extended Switzerland’s efforts, and how hundreds of 
countries adopted the resultant regulations.  
Once Switzerland started requiring customer due diligence 
and bank recordkeeping, the international community quickly took 
notice, not least because the Swiss themselves were eager to 
advertise their banks’ qualifications. 254 The Council of Europe, an 
international organization best known for establishing the 
influential European Court of Human Rights, recommended the 
adoption of customer due diligence principles as early as 1980.255 
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an 
informal meeting of G10 central bankers that issues the prominent 
Basel accords on capital adequacy, adopted a non-binding 
“Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the 
Banking System for the Purposes of Money Laundering.”256 In its 
                                                                                                     
 253. See infra Part IV.D (outlining U.S. anti-money-laundering law). 
 254. The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs called attention to 
the Agreement within international organizations as a means of indicating 
Swiss efforts to combat financial crime. See Département Politique Fédérale de 
la Suisse, Document aux Représentations Diplomatiques Suisses 4 (Nov. 10, 
1977) (presenting to Swiss diplomatic representations at the OECD, Bureau of 
Observation in New York, Swiss Mission to the European Community in 
Brussels, the Swiss permanent representation to the Council of Europe in 
Strasbourg, and the Consulates General in Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Milan and 
New York) (on file with authors). At the presentation, they stated:  
Swiss banking secrecy and numbered accounts are not affected by the 
Agreement. In fact, [the Agreement] should help deflect the critiques 
that Swiss banks accept funds without regard to their ‘doubtful’ 
origins because the banks now have an obligation of diligence in these 
circumstances. This political element, certainly relative but also 
positive . . . could certainly assist you in your delicate task of 
defending Swiss interest in a subject particularly controversial. 
Id.  
 255. On June 27, 1980, the Council published Recommendation No. R (80) 
10, dealing with measures to combat the transport and sheltering of illegal 
capital. See generally Recommendation from the Council of Eur. Comm. of 
Ministers to the Council of Eur. Member States (June 27, 1980), 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Instruments/Rec%2880%2910_e
n.pdf. 
 256. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PREVENTION OF CRIMINAL 
USE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING (1988), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (“The Committee believes that one way to 
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statement, the Basel Committee put its weight behind customer 
due diligence requirements.257  
These early endorsements were important in propelling 
customer due diligence on the international agenda as one of the 
key elements of a comprehensive anti-money-laundering regime 
with global reach. To create such a regime, the G7 put together 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an informal 
international network of officials from treasury departments and 
ministries of finance.258 Over 180 countries around the world 
have adopted FATF’s Forty Recommendations on the shape of 
national anti-money-laundering, first issued in 1990.259 To draft 
these recommendations, a group of 160 experts from around the 
world met in Paris for six months,260 discussing alternative 
approaches. Having already benefitted from the support of 
central bankers and other international experts, customer due 
diligence became the prototype on the basis of which FATF 
framed its recommendations pertaining to the financial 
industry.261 More specifically, Recommendations 12 through 14 
                                                                                                     
promote this objective, consistent with differences in national supervisory 
practice, is to obtain international agreement to a Statement of Principles to 
which financial institutions should be expected to adhere.”). 
 257. See id. (“With a view to ensuring that the financial system is not used 
as a channel for criminal funds, banks should make reasonable efforts to 
determine the true identity of all customers . . . . Particular care should be taken 
to identify the ownership of all accounts . . . .”). 
 258. For more information on the creation of FATF and the spread of its 
forty recommendations around the world, see generally Stavros Gadinis, Three 
Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2015). 
 259. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 7 
(2012) [hereinafter THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS], http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations 
.pdf (“[FATF Recommendations], together with the Special Recommendations, 
have been endorsed by over 180 countries . . . .”). 
 260. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT 
1990–1991, 4 (1991) [hereinafter FATF REPORT 1990–1991], http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%201991%20ENG.pdf (“Five series of 
meetings were held in Paris. More than 160 experts from various ministries, law 
enforcement authorities, and bank supervisory and regulatory agencies, met 
and worked together during six months.”). 
 261. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY 
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emphasized the need to identify the beneficial owners of bank 
accounts and to inquire further until establishing the true 
identity of account owners.262 Moreover, Recommendation 15 
called for financial institutions to be vigilant toward complicated 
transactions with no apparent financial purpose, as they are 
likely to mask criminal activity.263 These customer due diligence 
requirements reflect the influence of Swiss archetypes because 
they require banks to move beyond passively reporting 
information provided by clients and toward proactively 
investigating the truthfulness of client representations, as well as 
their background.  
Having thus decided in favor of a substantive due diligence 
obligation for financial institutions, FATF experts heavily 
debated what should these institutions do with the information 
they stand to collect.264 Some countries, like the United States, 
which required their financial institutions to report all 
transactions above a certain value to authorities, pushed for a 
similar recommendation at a global level.265 Yet, most countries 
preferred an alternative system, where only suspicious 
transactions would be reported to regulators.266 They argued that 
                                                                                                     
LAUNDERING 2 (1990) [hereinafter FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS OF FATF], 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20 
Recommendations%201990.pdf (enumerating the recommendations falling 
under the “Customer Identification and Record-keeping Rules” category). 
 262. See id. (“Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to 
obtain information about the true identity of the persons on whose behalf an 
account is opened or a transaction conducted if there are any doubts as to 
whether these clients or customers are not acting on their own behalf, in 
particular, in the case of domiciliary companies . . . .”).  
 263. See id. (“Financial institutions should pay special attention to all 
complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, 
which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and 
purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined . . . .”). 
 264. See THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 259, at 19 (concluding 
that “[i]f proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it 
should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial 
intelligence unit (FIU)”). 
 265. See UNITED STATES: REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND 
CODES––FATF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, 6 (2006) (summarizing that the 
United States requires people and entities to report suspicious activity to 
FinCEN). 
 266. See FATF REPORT 1990–1991, supra note 260, at 11 (“A large majority 
of the participating countries continue to consider that the implementation of a 
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they could get similar results with a less burdensome system.267 
Thus, Recommendations 16 through 18 propose that national 
laws permit or require financial institutions to report their 
suspicions to regulators, and protect them from restrictions on 
client confidentiality or privacy.268 These reports, FATF 
recommends, should neither be disclosed nor discussed with 
clients.269 In addition, FATF also suggested that national 
authorities establish databases that can easily aggregate and 
analyze this information.270 
With the introduction of suspicious activity reporting 
through FATF’s Forty Recommendations, all the building blocks 
of the modern anti-money-laundering regime took the form they 
retain to this date. Most commentators saw suspicious activity 
reporting as a mere corollary of customer due diligence, rather 
than the veritable link between regulators and the financial 
system it was due to become.271 At the time, no country had 
implemented a suspicious activity reporting system.272 This 
would soon change, as governments and regulators turned 
FATF’s recommendations into domestic laws.273 The full potential 
                                                                                                     
system to report all important currency transactions is difficult to envisage.”). 
 267. See id. (“They feel that at least similar results can be attained through 
the less burdensome system of a properly implemented suspicious transactions 
reporting scheme.”). 
 268. See FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS OF FATF, supra note 261, at 3 (“If 
financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity, they 
should be permitted or required to report promptly their suspicions to the 
competent authorities.”). 
 269. See id. (“Financial institutions, their directors and employees, should 
not, or, where appropriate, should not be allowed to, warn their customers when 
information relating to them is being reported to the competent authorities.”). 
 270. See id. at 4 (“Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a 
system where banks and other financial institutions . . . would report all 
domestic and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a 
national central agency with a computerized data base, available to competent 
authorities for use in money laundering cases . . . .”). 
 271. See Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, 
Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 967–70 
(2003) (describing Congress’s anti-money laundering initiatives in the 1990s). 
 272. See id. at 966–67 (“The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 
established money laundering as a crime, making the United States one of the 
first countries in the world to criminalize the practice.”). 
 273. See THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 259, at 7 (“[FATF 
Recommendations], together with the Special recommendations, have been 
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of suspicious activity reporting did not become clear until the 
mid-2000s, when developments in information technology 
assisted with analyzing large pools of information.274  
This subpart has traced the development and extension of 
the Swiss regulatory innovations of extensive due diligence and 
record keeping into the modern global system of suspicious 
activity reporting. This history of money laundering provides an 
additional example of an upwards regulatory ratchet. 275 It shows 
how, once leading jurisdictions impose heightened regulatory 
requirements, they have incentives to help spread these around 
the world, to level the playing field and avoid placing their firms 
at a competitive disadvantage. This narrative helps address a 
potential concern about the feasibility of the collaborative 
gatekeeper model—that countries will put up unyielding 
resistance. Instead, this history suggests that, under certain 
circumstances, it is possible for crises to trigger far-reaching 
national and even global regulatory reforms.  
The following subpart and Part discuss the incorporation of 
collaborative gatekeeping in U.S. anti-money-laundering law. 
Subpart D discusses briefly how the U.S. Congress decided to 
experiment with customer due diligence and suspicious activity 
reporting, and how regulators implemented these congressional 
authorizations. Part V presents the U.S. experience with 
suspicious activity reports, which have come to outshine CTRs as 
the key method for detecting criminal links in the financial 
system. 
D. Customer Due Diligence and Suspicious Activity Reporting in 
U.S. Law 
As they were hard at work in negotiating the FATF 
Recommendations, U.S. authorities were becoming increasingly 
uneasy with the pitfalls of the CTR model.276 Not only were 
                                                                                                     
endorsed by over 180 countries . . . .”). 
  274. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 970–73 (outlining the many reporting 
requirements of the Patriot Act). 
 275. For a discussion of upwards regulatory ratchets and other examples, 
see generally VOGEL, supra note 186; Bradford, supra note 186. 
 276. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 967–70 (describing efforts to reduce the 
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regulators inundated with reports of cases that had no connection 
to money laundering or other illegal activity, they also felt that 
really suspicious cases did not get reported because clients 
managed to evade the reporting threshold in one way or 
another.277 This subpart outlines how the United States decided 
to move from the conventional gatekeeper model to the 
collaborative gatekeeper model in the area of money laundering 
and outlines the current U.S. regulatory requirements. 
Beginning in 1985, some federal banking regulators asked 
financial institutions to guide their investigations by pointing to 
particularly suspicious clients.278 But these forms were available 
only to the agency soliciting them and not to other regulators and 
enforcement authorities.279 In 1990, the Treasury asked banks to 
use the CTR form to report transactions that they might find 
suspicious.280 However, banks only had to tick a box for 
“suspicious” in their form, without a single word of explanation 
for the basis of their suspicions.281 The scope of these suspicions 
                                                                                                     
number of CTRs being filed). 
 277. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 326 (“In some cases, traffickers use the 
cover of an existing cash-intensive business, such as a money exchange business 
or a restaurant, to help justify large currency deposits—even if they exceed the 
reporting threshold.”). 
 278. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, The National Money 
Laundering Strategy for 2000, 86 (Mar. 2000) [hereinafter National Money 
Laundering Strategy], http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Documents/ml2000.pdf (“Beginning in 1985, the federal bank supervisory 
agencies required financial institutions that they supervised to report actual or 
potential violations of law and suspicious transactions to federal law 
enforcement authorities and the supervisory agencies on what was then referred 
to as the Criminal Referral.”). 
 279. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED 
IMPROVEMENTS FOR REPORTING SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS ARE PLANNED, REPORT 
TO RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 3 (1995) [hereinafter MONEY 
LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS], http://gao.gov/assets/160/155076.pdf 
(explaining that the agencies did not share forms with each other and there 
were six different agencies collecting different forms). 
 280. See National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 278, at 85 
(explaining that the Appunzio–Wylie Money Laundering Act, for example, 
amended the BSA to authorize “the Secretary of the Treasury to require bank 
and non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious transactions”). 
 281. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 3 
(“In 1990 the Department of the Treasury modified the Currency Transaction 
Report (CTR) form, which financial institutions use to report currency 
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was also very limited, as banks were under no obligation to 
investigate actively clients’ backgrounds or motivations.282 To 
address the fragmentation of information across agencies, the 
Treasury Department established a specialized bureau, the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), as an 
intelligence unit tasked with aggregating and analyzing 
reports.283 At the same time, the Treasury lobbied Congress for a 
redesign of the anti-money-laundering regime that would bring 
U.S. law in line with international standards.284 
The desired overhaul came with the Annunzio–Wylie 
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992,285 which triggered the shift 
toward collaborative gatekeeping.286 Motivated by a foreign 
bank’s collapse for assisting Colombian drug cartels launder 
money through its Miami offices,287 the Annunzio–Wylie Act 
paved the way for incorporating FATF’s recommendations into 
U.S. law. Realizing that the overly simplistic reporting system of 
CTRs could not capture increasingly nuanced money laundering 
techniques,288 Congress introduced suspicious activity reporting 
                                                                                                     
transactions exceeding $10,000 to IRS. A block was added to the form that could 
be checked to indicate that the transaction was considered suspicious.”). 
 282. See id. at 11 (noting that “specific criteria for determining whether a 
transaction was suspicious” had not yet been developed). 
 283. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 30, at 5 
(explaining that FinCEN was created to “improve coordination of financial 
crimes enforcement” within the Treasury Department). 
 284. The congressional hearings for the Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money 
Laundering Act of 1992 expressly refer to Treasury’s efforts to use FATF as an 
inspiration for the Act. See Money Laundering Enforcement Amendments of 
1991: Hearing Before Comm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation, and Ins., 
Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 11–12 (1991) (“In the 
Treasury’s view, the most important legislative amendments in this session 
relate to implementation of the recommendations of the FATF.”). 
 285. See Alford, supra note 246, at 460 (“As part of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Annunzio–
Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (Annunzio–Wylie Act). The Act implements 
many of the recommendations of the G-7 Task Force.”). 
 286. See Gouvin, supra note 271, at 967 (“[Suspicious Activity Reports] were 
an attempt to fine tune the money laundering reporting system in light of the 
fact that a bright line dollar amount rule or even a requirement to pick up 
smurfing sometimes left suspicious transactions unreported.”). 
 287. The Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) collapsed in 
1991. See 137 CONG. REC. S9461-04 (1991) (statement of Sen. Cranson) 
(discussing whether UAE sales linked to international drug money laundering). 
 288. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 358 (“Legislators and law enforcement 
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as a general requirement for all U.S. financial institutions. To 
implement the requirement, Congress opted for a broad 
delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury, who was given the 
power to demand reports for any violation of law or regulation.289 
This sweeping authorization forms the foundation of the United 
States early reporting system, under which financial institutions 
alert U.S. regulators for potential money laundering and other 
illegal acts.290 The statute also prohibits filers from informing 
clients about their reports.291 However, the Annunzio–Wylie Act 
did not define what constitutes suspicious activity, nor did it 
elaborate on the steps that U.S. financial institutions must take 
in order to comply with this obligation.292 The task of clarifying 
these concepts, which form the backbone of customer due 
diligence, fell on the Secretary of the Treasury.293 
Based on the Annunzio–Wylie authorization, the Treasury 
has developed a definition of suspicious activity that applies 
consistently on different segments of the financial system.294 
According to Treasury rules, financial institutions must report 
transactions that involve funds either derived from illegal 
activities or used to disguise them.295 Transactions designed to 
evade Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, such as the 
                                                                                                     
officials have not been entirely blind to the possibility that laundering strategies 
are flexible and therefore require more nuanced responses in addition to the 
mechanistic currency reporting requirements.”). 
 289. See Annunzio–Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, §§ 1513, 
1517(b), 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012) (providing the Act’s “Reporting of Suspicious 
Transactions” provision). 
 290. See id. § 5318(g)(3)(a) (granting protections against liability for filers). 
 291. See id. § 5318(g)(2) (“[N]either the financial institution, director, officer, 
employee, or agent. . . of . . . the financial institution or other reporting person, 
may notify any person involved in the transaction that the transaction has been 
reported . . . .”). 
 292. See id. § 5318(g) (“The Secretary may require any financial institution, 
and any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution, to 
report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or 
regulation.”). 
 293. See id. § 5318(a)(2) (authorizing the Secretary to require financial 
institutions to maintain appropriate anti-money laundering procedures). 
 294. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 163.180 (2015) (regarding savings associations); id. 
§ 208.62 (regarding institutions that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System). 
 295. See, e.g., id. § 21.11(c) (detailing when banks are required to submit 
Suspicious Activity Reports). 
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$10,000 CTR threshold, are also regarded as suspicious.296 More 
broadly, financial institutions must report transactions that have 
no business or apparent lawful purpose, or is not the sort in 
which the particular customer would normally be expected to 
engage.297 This definition of suspicious activity reporting places 
financial institutions in a fundamentally different position 
compared to their pre-1992 Bank Secrecy Act obligations.298 
Rather than passively recording and reporting transactions over 
a certain dollar value, financial institutions are hence expected to 
actively seek indications of criminality or illegality.299 Instead of 
their mostly mechanistic role in the past, financial institutions 
now have to use their judgment in order to decide whether to 
report a client transaction.300 They also have to describe the 
transaction to authorities and include the reasons that give rise 
to their suspicions.301 For all these reasons, financial institutions 
have become active participants in the fight against money 
laundering and other financial crimes. 
As the cornerstone of modern anti-money-laundering 
compliance, this definition of suspicious activity reporting works 
in conjunction with an extensive body of other statutory rules and 
regulatory directives, case law, and informal guidance by 
regulators. Over time, subsequent legislative efforts have further 
enhanced the information gathering powers of the Treasury and 
the obligations of financial institutions to collaborate.302 Below, 
                                                                                                     
 296. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (requiring reports of each transaction 
involving more than $10,000.). 
 297. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (demanding banks report 
transactions without an apparent lawful purpose). 
 298. See supra Part IV.B (describing early American models of 
anti-money-laundering rules). 
 299. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.312 (2015) (requiring financial institutions to 
verify and record the identity of individuals conducting certain transactions). 
 300. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(a) (“This section ensures that national banks file 
a Suspicious Activity Report when they detect a known or suspected violation of 
Federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money laundering activity 
or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.”).  
 301. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 11–
12 (discussing the implementation of “know your customer” policies among 
financial institutions). 
 302. See generally Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2243 (1994) 
(Title IV of which is commonly known as the Money Laundering Suppression 
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this Article focuses on two elements of this regulatory apparatus 
that help illustrate the operation of collaborative gatekeeping: the 
standardization of reporting through forms and the sanctions 
against financial institutions for failing to comply.303 The 
following Part discusses the implementation of these legal 
requirements in practice.304 
To streamline SAR submissions, the Treasury collaborated 
with other federal banking regulators and law enforcement 
authorities to develop a specific form for submitting suspicious 
activity reports.305 The form is designed to provide more 
comprehensive directions to filers as to the information they need 
to include.306 For example, the form requires filers to pick a 
specific category or type with which the reported activity 
conforms and to include specific identification information for 
filers and clients.307 Institutions must submit a SAR within thirty 
days after suspicions arise.308 SAR submissions under this regime 
started in April 1996.309 FinCEN, tasked with receiving and 
                                                                                                     
Act); Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-310, 112 Stat. 2941 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5340 (2012)); International 
Counter-Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption Act of 2000, H.R. 3886, 
106th Cong. (2000); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272, 301–
377 (2001) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §5318 (2012)). 
 303. See infra Part IV (discussing the anti-money-laundering regime). 
 304. See supra Part V (discussing the practical application of the anti-
money-laundering regime). 
 305. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306 (2015) (“Reports required by § 1010.311, 
§ 1010.313, § 1010.340, § 1010.350, § 1020.315, § 1021.311 or § 1021.313 of this 
chapter shall be filed on forms prescribed by the Secretary. All information 
called for in such forms shall be furnished.”). 
 306. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 35 
(discussing the evolution of government forms for reporting suspicious 
transactions). 
 307. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING COMMON ERRORS NOTED IN SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
REPORTING 3–4 (2007), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/SAR 
_Common_Errors_Web_Posting.pdf (providing examples of common errors made 
when filing out these forms). 
 308. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012). 
 309. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE 
SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS, & ISSUES 4 (2010), 
https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_18.pdf (“SAR filing for 
depository institutions has only been in place since 1996, and more recently for 
other industries.”). 
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aggregating SARs, regularly issues guidance regarding how to 
better complete SARs.310 
These expansive reporting requirements gain strength 
through a strict sanctioning mechanism. A willful violation of the 
obligation to submit suspicious activity reports may entail civil 
penalties,311 or even criminal penalties of up to five years in 
jail.312 At the same time, financial institutions must maintain 
anti-money-laundering programs that oversee compliance, train 
employees, and submit reports.313 The USA PATRIOT Act, passed 
shortly after the 9/11 attacks, further tightened financial 
institutions’ obligations to collect information about clients’ 
backgrounds, business purposes, and anticipated account 
activities.314 Moreover, courts have developed a “willful 
blindness” doctrine, under which deliberate failure to collect 
information amounts to willfulness to conduct money 
laundering.315 This web of provisions and interpretations provides 
regulators with the power to enforce anti-money-laundering laws 
closely and intently.  
This Part has outlined the history of the modern 
anti-money-laundering regime. Using newly released archival 
data, we have shown how collaborative gatekeeping in the area of 
anti-money laundering emerged in an unlikely country—
Switzerland—and quickly spread throughout the world.316 
Contrary to expectations, banks and other financial institutions 
did not fight these new regulatory requirements tooth and nail, 
                                                                                                     
 310. For an example of filing guidance, see generally FINANCIAL CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 237. 
 311. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1)–(2) (dictating that the civil penalty ranges 
from $25,000 to $100,000). 
 312. See id. § 5322(a) (noting that imprisonment will not exceed 5 years). 
 313. See id. § 5318(h) (mentioning that financial institutions must also 
create the development of internal policies in compliance with the Act). 
 314. See id. § 5318 (providing, among other requirements, that the Secretary 
of the Treasury prescribe regulations requiring financial institutions to 
“consult[] lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations”). 
 315. See Cuéllar, supra note 7, at 344–45 (explaining that “willful blindness 
can amount to such knowledge, at least (1) when the defendant claims to lack 
such knowledge, (2) the facts suggest deliberate ignorance, and (3) jurors would 
not misunderstand the instruction as mandating an inference of willful 
blindness”).  
 316. See supra Part IV.B (discussing universal reporting in the United 
States). 
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but instead helped create them.317 More specifically, two critical 
elements of the regime, the imposition of regulatory requirements 
on big and small gatekeepers alike, and the standardization of 
reports, were introduced at the insistence of large banks. That 
said, we have not yet explained how this regime has worked in 
practice. The next Part explores this question and shows how 
gatekeepers and regulators have collaborated in their efforts to 
implement the modern anti-money-laundering regime. 
V. The Anti-Money-Laundering Regime in Practice 
This Part discusses the operation of the 
anti-money-laundering regime on the ground. It helps address 
two critical concerns about the collaborative gatekeeper model. 
First, how might gatekeepers react to the requirement that 
clients provide early warning to regulators, and report client 
activity that seems suspicious? Will gatekeepers be able to 
separate the suspicious from the innocuous, and will they be 
willing to pass on this information to regulators? Second, how 
might regulators respond? Will they make full use of suspicious 
activity reports (SARs), or will they set these aside in favor of 
other priorities and sources of information?  
As the subpart below discusses, financial institutions across 
the United States, representing all segments of the market and 
diverse lines of business, are increasingly submitting SARs in 
recent years.318 This widespread embrace of suspicious activity 
reporting indicates a shift in the way the industry approaches 
money laundering: Instead of withholding information out of 
concerns about betraying clients, financial institutions have come 
to view reporting as an obligation equally applicable to all. To 
carry out this mission, financial institutions created populous 
compliance departments, structured under specific regulatory 
guidelines and operating under regulatory supervision.319 They 
                                                                                                     
 317. See supra Part IV.D (discussing customer due diligence and reporting 
law). 
 318. See infra Part V.A (discussing the volume and quality of SAR filings). 
 319. See Bruce Kelly, Firms Pumping Millions into Their Compliance 
Departments to Keep Regulators at Bay, INV. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20141026/REG/310269996/firms-pumping-
millions-into-their-compliance-departments-to-keep (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) 
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have also invested heavily in modern technology for data analysis 
and sharing to scout for violations, explore and analyze 
surrounding circumstances, and submit and review reports.320 
This compliance infrastructure has greatly expanded 
gatekeepers’ information processing capacity, thus boosting their 
chances of actually catching misconduct. But it has also changed 
dynamics within gatekeepers, blunting the conflict of interest 
between gatekeeper firms and their employees. That is, the new 
compliance infrastructure utilizes a broad range of employees, as 
well as technological infrastructure, to flag suspicious activities, 
rather than leaving this task to those employees who courted a 
particular client, and who are most likely to suffer from conflicts 
of interest. The industry’s embrace of SARs and the related 
compliance infrastructure suggest that the proposed theoretical 
framework is not entirely impracticable.  
Are these investments paying off? Does the information 
gathered through suspicious activity reporting have any value for 
enforcement authorities? The paragraphs below show that 
regulators believe that SARs reveal a lot and thus devote 
significant time and resources in reviewing SARs. They review 
SARs not only to fight money laundering, but also to combat 
diverse types of financial crime and non-criminal fraud.321 
Indeed, since the introduction of the SAR filing obligation, 
criminal cases targeting money laundering, as well as 
convictions, have generally increased.322 These developments 
illustrate that gatekeepers’ intimate knowledge of their clients’ 
business models, and their ability to distinguish between 
legitimate business proposals and potentially fraudulent ventures 
at an early stage, are proving valuable to regulators. They thus 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that firms are spending millions of dollars for their compliance 
departments) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 320. See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE 
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 100 (2004) (estimating that capital costs 
account for two-thirds of anti-money-laundering compliance costs). 
 321. See infra Part V.B (discussing SAR filings that relate to other issues 
other than money laundering). 
 322. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 109–13 (noting that money 
laundering adjudications increased from 1,159 in 1994 to 1,420 in 2001). 
Similarly, money-laundering convictions over the same period increased from 
81% to 88%. Id. at tbl.5.2. 
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highlight the potential of collaborative gatekeeping as a blueprint 
for reforming financial regulation.  
A. Volume and Quality of SAR Filings Indicates Industry Buy-In 
U.S. financial institutions, though initially apprehensive 
about filing SARs, quickly espoused the practice with eagerness. 
In 1996, there were about 50,000 SARs filed with FinCEN;323 by 
2003, the SARs filed per year had risen to over 300,000.324 Ten 
years later, in 2013, filed SARs had exceeded 1,600,000.325 During 
this period, FinCEN has intensified its efforts to police 
submission of suspicious activity reports and has imposed fines 
some view as extraordinarily large.326 The Department of Justice 
has criminally prosecuted financial institutions for 
anti-money-laundering violations, putting some out of 
business.327 
To put SARs’ increase in perspective, it is worth contrasting 
them to Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), triggered for 
every transfer of over $10,000 through the financial system.328 
The volume of CTRs has remained relatively stable over the same 
period, ranging from about 12 million in 1996 to over 14 million 
in 2011.329 The comparison between CTRs and SARs also reveals 
that financial institutions are selective about submitting a SAR. 
In 2011, there were over 14 million CTRs filed, compared to about 
                                                                                                     
 323. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR 
ACTIVITY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2004), www.fincen.gov/news_room/ 
rp/files/sar_by_numb_03.pdf. 
 324. Id.  
 325. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL, supra note 28, at 1. 
 326. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1414 (2007) (noting two instances of $30 million fines). 
 327. See id. at 1415 (“$43 million in combined criminal and civil fines 
against Riggs Bank . . . put the bank of out of business.”). 
 328. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CURRENCY TRANSACTION 
REPORTING—OVERVIEW, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/ 
OLM_017.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (explaining that multiple transactions 
equaling $10,000 or more are treated as a single transaction) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 329. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2011, 7 (2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2011, http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/rp/files/ annual_report_fy2011.pdf. 
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1.4 million SARs.330 Fears that filers would simply submit a SAR 
for every client that crosses their institution’s doorstep and thus 
dilute SARs’ signaling value, seem to not have materialized. 
Instead, it seems that the suspicions threshold pushes filers to 
think hard about when to alert regulators to client activity.  
All segments of the market have contributed to the increase 
in suspicious activity reporting. Financial institutions from across 
the nation, big and small, in one or in multiple lines of business, 
are increasingly reporting their suspicions to authorities.331 Such 
diversity in filers indicates that many market participants come 
to view reporting suspicions to regulators as their obligation. As 
one compliance officer stated: “There has been a cultural change 
in the banking industry. Before we were focusing more on the 
customer, now we have to focus more on compliance.”332 Indeed, 
finance professionals currently consider SARs as the main 
channel through which the U.S. government collects intelligence 
about money laundering.333  
The exponential increase in SARs represents a staggering 
growth in the amount of tips bank regulators are receiving about 
money laundering. How informative are these tips for 
enforcement authorities? Generally, regulators treat SARs as an 
important source of information about financial misconduct, 
suggesting that many disclosures are of high quality. Reports by 
regulators that regularly review SARs, such as the Federal 
Reserve and the FDIC, have stated that they see little evidence of 
defensive filing, such as reports that provide only skeletal 
information in an effort to discharge a regulatory obligation 
without triggering an investigation.334 As further discussed 
                                                                                                     
 330. See id. (providing a comparison of the volume of the different reporting 
methods). 
 331. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: BY THE NUMBERS 4 (2013) https://www.fincen. 
gov/news_room/rp/files/btn18/sar_by_numb_18.pdf (describing filers from 
different segments of the market); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 15 
(2006) [hereinafter TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2006], https://www.fincen. 
gov/news_room/rp /files/sar_tti_10.pdf (discussing filings by state). 
 332. NEIL KATKOV, TRENDS IN ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2011, at 5 (2011). 
 333. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 106 (explaining that SARs 
are viewed as being more informative). 
 334. See MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 19 
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below, many regulators invest significant time and effort in 
reviewing SARs every month, which highlights the importance of 
SARs for their agenda.335 As Andrew Ceresney, Director of the 
SEC’s enforcement division, put it: 
The SEC receives tens of thousands of tips and referrals every 
year from many different sources including investors, 
whistleblowers and SROs. But SARs coming from 
broker-dealers often stand out from this pack in terms of 
reliability because the best ones contain allegations of 
wrongdoing that are described clearly and comprehensively, 
but also concisely. This reduces the amount of research and 
assessment that is needed before determining whether and 
how to act. 336 
This does not mean that all reports are equally informative. 
Unfortunately, examining SAR disclosures themselves is not 
possible for researchers, as they are confidential by law.337 But 
regulatory institutions have described their use of SARs in a 
variety of annual overviews and statements.338 This evidence 
suggests that the quality of information provided through SARs 
varies, with some reports providing important leads for 
enforcement actions, and others offering little of substance.339 
FinCEN itself has stated that a number of reports do not fully 
sketch the reported suspicious activity, by failing to answer basic 
questions such as “who, what, when, were, why, and how.”340 In 
                                                                                                     
(noting that “[b]oth banks have a policy of not filing suspicious CTRs”). 
 335. See infra Part V.E (discussing collaborative regulators). 
 336. Andrew Ceresney, Remarks at SIFMA’s 2015 Anti-Money Laundering 
and Financial Crimes Conference, Feb 25, 2015, http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/022515-spchc.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 337. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2012) (explaining that neither the reporting 
institution nor government may disclose the information contained in the SAR). 
 338. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE 
SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 1 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDS, TIPS 
& ISSUES 2013] (“The SAR Activity Review—Trends, Tips & Issues is a product 
of continual dialogue and collaboration among the nation’s financial institutions, 
law enforcement officials and regulatory agencies to provide meaningful 
information about the preparation, use and value of Suspicious Activity 
Reports . . . .”). 
 339. See generally REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 107; Ceresney, 
supra note 336. 
 340. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, REPORT 
ON OUTREACH TO DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION 30 
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light of the enormous volume of reported cases, some variation in 
SAR quality is, perhaps, not very surprising. As FinCEN 
concludes, the vast majority of filed SARs are generally in line 
with regulatory guidance in describing activity as suspicious.341  
An indirect way of assessing SARs’ potential impact is to 
explore whether the increase in filings has changed the landscape 
for enforcing anti-money-laundering laws. Indeed, U.S. data 
suggest that, as SAR filings have increased, so has the number of 
money laundering cases brought and the number of convictions 
won by criminal authorities.342 To give one example, regulators 
report that between 2003 and 2012, depository institutions 
reported over 200,000 cases of suspected insider abuse, such as 
cases where bank employees used client funds for personal 
gain.343 In more than half of these cases, the executives involved 
were subsequently fired or suspended.344 These connections are 
only tentative because confidentiality rules prevent researchers 
from connecting a specific SAR to a specific conviction. That said, 
the fact that regulators, the only persons with the full picture, 
make extensive use of available SARs suggests that they find 
much that is useful in these reports. 
B. SAR Filings Besides Money Laundering 
Perhaps one of the most staggering aspects of SAR 
submissions is that the vast majority of reported cases do not 
involve money laundering.345 Indeed, only 27% of all SARs 
submitted to FinCEN in 2014 ended up concerning money 
                                                                                                     
(2011) [hereinafter DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION], 
www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/pdf/Banks_Under_$5B_Report.pdf. 
 341. See id. (mentioning that, although the SARs are typically consistent 
with what is suspicious activity, many of them are filled out incorrectly). 
 342. See Elod Takats, A Theory of “Crying Wolf”: The Economics of Money 
Laundering Enforcement 28 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/81, 
2007) (explaining that “the number of money laundering convictions measures 
how efficient SARs are in providing useful evidence to convict criminals”). 
 343. TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2013, supra note 338, at 12. 
 344. Id. at 13. 
 345. See generally SAR Stats, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK [hereinafter FinCEN SAR Stats], https://www.fincen. 
gov/news_room/rp/sar_by_number.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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laundering.346 As regulators quickly realized, money laundering 
occurs through actions that are common in many different types 
of fraud. Typical activities that trigger money laundering 
suspicions involve transactions with no apparent economic 
purpose, use of multiple locations or accounts for a common goal, 
questionable or false documentation, counterfeit instruments, etc. 
All these machinations are not exclusive to money launderers, 
but could easily involve tax evasion, insider trading, consumer 
fraud, identity theft, and a host of other activities—either 
fraudulent, criminal, or both.347 As a result, SARs have opened a 
window into diverse criminal undercurrents in the financial 
system.  
This extensive review of SAR information has opened 
regulators’ eyes to problems they did not clearly see before. For 
example, depository institutions clearly identified elder abuse as 
a rising trend in financial fraud, as older Americans need to 
manage sizeable resources but are not as technologically savvy.348 
A stream of SARs prompted FinCEN to conduct an extensive 
report and to identify practices that indicate elder abuse.349 
Moreover, SARs help regulators collect intelligence about new 
structures or tools in the financial system, particularly when 
these new tools can also facilitate misconduct. For example, when 
bitcoins emerged as a successful virtual currency, SARs were 
crucial in providing the government with information about the 
bitcoin ecosystem and shaping regulatory guidance.350 
                                                                                                     
 346. According to FinCEN, of the 2,413,447 activities reported in 2014 by 
depository institutions, only 672,136 involved money laundering. Exhibit 5: 
Number of Filings by Type of Suspicious Activity by Depository Institutions, 
FINCEN (2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/SAR02/Section_2-
Depository_Institution_SARs.xls. 
 347. See generally FinCEN SAR Stats, supra note 345.  
 348. See, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
ADVISORY TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON FILING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
REGARDING ELDER EXPLOITATION 1 (2011), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/ 
guidance/pdf/fin-2011-a003.pdf (crediting financial institutions’ increased 
reporting of elder abuse as motivation for advisory). 
 349. See id. (“Analysis of SARs reporting elder financial exploitation can 
provide critical information about specific frauds and potential trends, and can 
highlight abuses perpetrated against the elderly.”). 
 350. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (2014), 
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SARs have also contributed a lot of granular information to 
well-known weaknesses of the financial system, thus aiding 
regulators in addressing long-standing problems with significant 
social consequences. Mortgage fraud, which ran rampant in the 
period before the 2007 collapse of the subprime market, has been 
targeted by FinCEN intelligence gathering efforts.351 As a result, 
the Federal Housing Agency has been able to use nearly 100,000 
mortgage loan fraud SARs as the basis for subsequent action.352 
Another example of a well-known regulatory effort where SARs 
have made significant contributions is the fight against various 
forms of insider abuse, such as insider trading, breach of 
fiduciary duties, and other ways of using executive privileges for 
personal advantage.353  
These examples of issues that SARs have helped address, 
outside of money laundering, are a further indication of the value 
of SARs as efforts to gather intelligence. At the same time, 
gatekeepers are not obliged to submit SARs for all types of 
financial fraud; these diverse SARs are submitted because money 
laundering sometimes intersects with other types of crimes.354 
The extension of the suspicious activity reporting requirement 
seems likely to draw regulators’ attention to much more 
misconduct.  
                                                                                                     
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R011.pdf (discussing 
FinCEN’s policy and implementation responses to virtual currency issues). 
 351. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Federal, State Partners 
Announce Multi-Agency Crackdown Targeting Foreclosure Rescue Scams, Loan 
Modification Fraud (Apr. 6, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg83.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“To this end, Treasury and 
FinCEN announced an advanced targeting effort already underway to combat 
fraudulent loan modification schemes and coordinate ongoing efforts across 
agencies to investigate fraud and assist with enforcement and prosecutions.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 352. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 329, at 39. 
 353. See TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2013, supra note 338, at 12–13 (describing a 
rise in the reporting of insider relationships between 2003 and 2009). 
 354. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.300–340 (2015) (identifying when financial 
institutions must file a SAR). 
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C. Compliance Process and Technology Behind Suspicious 
Activity Reporting 
How are SARs produced? The paragraphs that follow explain 
that gatekeeper firms have made major investments in personnel 
and technology to comply with their regulatory obligations. 
Technological innovations are already allowing computers to flag 
many suspicious transactions, so that firms need not rely solely 
on front-line employees who might face conflicts of interest.355 
While these investments are sizeable, survey data suggests that 
firms do not find these burdens impossibly heavy.356 The 
existence of this compliance infrastructure makes the extension 
of the collaborative gatekeeper model to other fields more 
plausible. 
The resources devoted by financial institutions into staffing 
their anti-money-laundering compliance programs show the 
extent of private industry participation in this regulatory 
effort.357 To start with a captivating example: J.P. Morgan, the 
largest U.S. bank by assets,358 has 8,000 employees working 
solely on anti-money-laundering compliance—more than the 
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve combined.359 J.P. 
Morgan has about 15,000 employees working on regulatory 
compliance (including anti-money laundering) and 250,000 
employees worldwide.360 In large banks with multinational 
                                                                                                     
 355. See TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 2006, supra note 331, at 52 (“While a 
computer may flag activity for review, it is the person looking at the screen who 
should determine whether a series of transactions is a reportable event.”). 
 356. See infra notes 379–403 and accompanying text (providing data 
suggesting that firms have come to terms with the regulatory obligations). 
 357. See REUTER & TRUMAN, supra note 320, at 100 (estimating the cost of 
compliance as exceeding $3 billion per year). 
 358. See Erik Holm, Ranking the Biggest U.S. Banks: A New (Old) Entrant 
in Top 5, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 10, 2014), www.blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/ 
12/10/ranking-the-biggest-u-s-banks-a-new-old-entrant-in-top-5 (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2016) (noting the bank’s reported $2.5 billion dollars in assets as of late 
2014) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review). 
 359. See J.P. MORGAN, ANN. REP. 2013, at 12 (2014) http://investor.share 
holder.com/common/download/download.cfm?companyid=ONE&fileid=742266&f
ilekey=2bd13119-52d2-4d78-9d85-a433141c21ae&filename=01-
2013AR_FULL_09.pdf (describing the firm’s “industry leading Anti-Money 
Laundering” program). 
 360. See Monica Langley & Dan Fitzpatrick, Embattled J.P. Morgan Bulks 
Up Oversight, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 12, 2013), www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
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presence, anti-money-laundering operations include one large 
team that concentrates information and coordinates action, and 
specialized officers working on the many different lines of 
business in the institution.361 Big banks can have over eighty 
different lines of business, each with a dedicated 
anti-money-laundering officer.362 A medium-sized bank with over 
$100 billion in assets would typically have about 200 
anti-money-laundering officials.363 Even the smallest banks, with 
up to $1 billion in assets, typically have ten or fewer 
anti-money-laundering officials.364 Many of these officials started 
their careers as front-line employees and have a good 
understanding of the institution’s client relationships, while 
others have worked in other compliance positions or in larger 
banks.365 
The expanding size of anti-money-laundering departments 
has boosted financial institutions’ compliance firepower, but it is 
modern technology that has really revolutionized their 
monitoring philosophy. Financial institutions have developed 
software that recognizes specific transaction patterns, based on 
typologies sketched out on the basis of past investigations and 
violations.366 This software can be enriched and adapted over 
time, “learning” more violations and modern techniques for 
money laundering. Overall, banks’ newly automated systems are 
capable of identifying unusual patterns in transactions by sifting 
                                                                                                     
10001424127887324755104579071304170686532 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) 
(“J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., facing a host of regulatory and legal woes, plans to 
spend an additional $4 billion and commit 5,000 extra employees this year to 
clean up its risk and compliance problems, according to people close to the 
bank.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 361. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, REPORT 
ON OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (2009) [hereinafter 
OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS], https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_ 
infobase/documents/FinCEN_DOCs/FIOI_Bank_Report_Large_DIst_200910.pdf.  
 362. Id.  
 363. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 6. 
 364. Id.  
 365. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note 
340, at 12. 
 366. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 
15 (“Banks build typologies gleaned from previous investigations into their 
investigative strategy, creating risk models that assist the monitoring tools to 
identify suspicious activity.”). 
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through multiple data points in a manner that manual laborers 
would find hard to imitate.  
Because software typology relies on past events, it cannot 
catch fraudulent transaction structures that appear for the first 
time. To improve their alertness to money laundering novelties, 
financial institutions have tried an alternative approach: they use 
software that observes metrics of client behavior and compares 
them to a “peer group” of clients that are expected to behave in 
similar ways over time.367 Peer groups vary by line of business, 
client background, geography, and other factors. In addition, 
most banks assess not only individual clients, but also a line of 
business as a whole, in terms of susceptibility to money 
laundering.368  
Financial institutions’ use of technological advances has been 
one of the primary drivers of the increase in SARs, according to 
finance professionals and regulators interviewed for a GAO 
study.369 That said, referrals from front-line employees continue 
to contribute a significant amount of the cases that ultimately 
result into a SAR.370 In some banks, software-generated referrals 
amount to 75% of total SAR candidate cases.371 In other banks, 
the picture is reversed: software contributes only 20% of their 
referrals.372  
The increased use of software in anti-money-laundering 
supervision has allowed financial institutions to outsource a 
significant portion of their compliance heavy lifting. This can 
reduce conflicts of interest significantly, by empowering many 
individuals besides front-line employees to report on suspicious 
activities. There are about twenty providers of 
anti-money-laundering software in the world.373 Among financial 
                                                                                                     
 367. See id. at 14 (explaining that “peer groups may by segmented by LOBs, 
product types, geography and/or account types”). 
 368. See id. at 6–7 (explaining the various ways banks access suspicious 
activity). 
 369. MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 17. 
 370. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 2 
(“[B]anks unanimously indicated that they believe their best source of 
information . . . comes from referrals by front-line branch personnel and 
relationship managers.”). 
 371. Id. at 16–17. 
 372. Id.  
 373. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 3. 
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institutions, 90% find themselves running their software in house 
in collaboration with outside vendors, while 10% outsource their 
software management completely.374 Of course, developing 
sophisticated software solutions and staffing populous compliance 
departments do not come without a cost. According to a recent 
survey, the aggregate global expenditure in anti-money-laundering 
supervision in 2011 reached $5 billion per year, with $1.2 billion 
spent on software and $3.8 billion devoted to staff and other 
operational expenses.375 
These costs are contributing to a growing trend in 
structuring compliance departments: increasing integration 
between anti-money laundering and general fraud operations. 
From a substantive perspective, it is becoming clear that, through 
anti-money-laundering supervision, institutions receive alerts 
about other types of fraud.376 Anti-money-laundering technology 
can be readily used, with just a few alterations, against financial 
fraud more generally.377 Many institutions find that modern 
solutions applied in anti-money laundering deliver superior 
results compared to antiquated fraud detection systems.378 The 
pressure to contain costs is particularly strong in smaller 
institutions, which have started to use the same staff as both 
anti-money laundering and anti-fraud compliance officers.379  
Perhaps because gatekeepers directly reap some of the 
benefits of the early detection of client fraud, they have come to 
terms with these significant compliance costs. Periodic surveys of 
the top global banks suggest that large majorities find the 
anti-money-laundering regulatory burden acceptable.380 The 
                                                                                                     
 374. Id. at 12–13.  
 375. Id. at 4. 
 376. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 
10 (discussing the connection between money laundering and financial fraud). 
 377. See id. at 11 (reporting regulators’ push to encourage financial 
institutions to use their fraud resources to combat money laundering). 
 378. KATKOV, supra note at 332, at 29. 
 379. See DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra 
note 340, at 2, 12 (mentioning the need for staff at smaller institutions to play 
multiple roles). 
 380. More specifically, KPMG surveyed a wide variety of professionals in the 
financial industry involved in anti-money laundering in dozens of countries. 
Eighty-four percent of respondents in the 2004 survey believed the regulatory 
burden was acceptable, 93% of respondents in the 2007 survey believed the 
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significant investments firms have made to combat money 
laundering indicate that implementing the collaborative model 
has proven feasible in this field. Rather than setting up 
compliance systems from scratch, it seems likely that firms would 
draw on their existing infrastructure if called on to give early 
warning about a broader range of fraudulent activities. In short, 
while the expansion of the collaborative gatekeeper model to a 
broad range of crimes would undoubtedly involve significant 
costs, experience with the AML regime suggests these might not 
be insurmountable. 
D. Filing a SAR: Efforts for Investigation and Drafting by 
Front-Line Employees, Compliance Officers, and Management 
To assess how effectively the “suspicious activity” threshold 
helps filers distinguish between dubious and harmless 
transactions, one can look at the process for filing an SAR. 
Compliance officers receive information about many potentially 
suspicious situations but proceed with filing in a small subset of 
these cases.  To draw on one available example, a small financial 
institution conducted 439 investigations in 2009 but decided to 
file in only thirty-nine cases. Thus, institutions seem to put 
serious thought into the potential violations hidden in the 
situation at hand, rather than simply filing a report even in 
remotely suspicious cases, so as to avoid any regulatory 
sanctions. 
Investigating a potentially suspicious transaction requires 
significant personnel commitment.381 In many institutions, the 
                                                                                                     
regulatory burden was either acceptable or should be increased, while 85% of 
respondents in the 2011 survey found the burden acceptable. KPMG, GLOBAL 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 2014, 7 (2014), https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/ 
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/global-anti-money-laun 
dering-survey-v3.pdf. This question was not repeated in the 2014 survey. Id. 
While most AML professionals found the overall burden acceptable, they also 
desired various reforms to the system, notably more guidance and closer 
cooperation with regulators. See generally id. at 7; KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING SURVEY 2011: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 9 
(2011), https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/ 
Documents/Global-Anti-Money-Laundering-Survey-O-201109.pdf. 
 381. See generally OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 
361. 
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compliance officer handling the filing is a former law enforcement 
official or experienced investigator.382 In other cases, it is 
front-line employees whose investigative efforts lay the 
foundation for the suspicions.383 In one example, a bank teller 
informed the anti-money-laundering officer that one client’s cash 
deposits had a strong odor of pepper, often used by drug 
traffickers to disorient drug-sniffing dogs.384  
To determine whether the case merits filing, the compliance 
officer may present it to an oversight committee.385 These 
procedures demand significant efforts from all employees 
involved. In the pepper odor case, the institution’s staff spent 
about 160 hours collecting evidence and drafting the report.386 To 
better coordinate their filing efforts, gatekeepers use case 
management software, which incorporates significant details, 
timelines, and reminders.387 
 At the management level, compliance officers have direct 
links with a committee typically composed of independent board 
members and can also present reports to the whole board. Thus, 
the SAR filing process engages personnel at different levels inside 
the institution who become increasingly committed to the 
anti-money-laundering effort. 
The effort that the institution puts in submitting a SAR often 
drives it to reevaluate its relationship with the clients involved.388 
After a SAR is filed, financial institutions monitor the client 
much more closely.389 Some banks may inform clients that they 
                                                                                                     
 382. Id. at 17. 
 383. See generally id. 
 384. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note 
340, at 29. 
 385. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 6 
(“Governance of the program is typically conducted by key committees 
established to ensure the timely escalation and consideration of issues by senior 
management.”). 
 386. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note 
340, at 29. 
 387. See OUTREACH TO LARGE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, supra note 361, at 6 
(discussing web-based case management systems). 
 388. See id. at 7–9 (exploring SAR-related account closure at large financial 
institutions). 
 389. See id. at 1 (“Generally, once a bank files a second SAR on a customer’s 
activity, the account is closely monitored and may be closed, depending on law 
enforcement interest.”). 
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are under monitoring and will follow up with educational 
material on their anti-money-laundering policies, such as 
brochures or letters.390 Once a second SAR is filed, many large 
financial institutions are likely to close an account as a matter of 
practice and consider terminating the client relationship more 
generally.391 Even smaller financial institutions, for whom 
maintaining clientele may be more pressing, did not have 
difficulty deciding whether to end the relationship, apart from 
few cases with highly idiosyncratic facts.392 
The procedures above suggest that, as a regulatory tool, the 
suspicions threshold might be striking a fine balance. On the one 
hand, it calls for a well-researched and justified report that 
gatekeepers do not seem to be undertaking lightly. On the other 
hand, it presents gatekeepers with a workable reporting 
obligation, which they can satisfy by using specialized personnel 
and technology. 
E. Regulators in Collaboration 
Collaborative gatekeeping places significant demands not 
only on private industry, but also on the state. Will regulators 
have the resources to sort through and follow up on the huge 
volumes of tips gatekeepers pass along? The discussion that 
follows explains that, to process the millions of SARs they receive 
as part of the anti-money-laundering regime, regulators have 
combined conventional regulatory methods with new approaches. 
Significant regulator efforts to review and process SARs suggest 
that regulators consider the reports gatekeepers provide 
potentially informative.  
Enforcement authorities have invested significant resources 
into organizing appropriate systems for analyzing the millions of 
AML suspicious activity reports per year. The Treasury 
Department has established a specialized bureau, the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which receives and 
                                                                                                     
 390. Id. at 9. 
 391. Id. at 1. 
 392. DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS WITH ASSETS UNDER $5 BILLION, supra note 
340, at 8. 
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maintains financial transaction data.393 FinCEN operates a 
single database accessible to other financial regulators, criminal 
authorities, and other state and local bodies investigating 
criminals and other violators that may leave footprints on the 
financial system.394 In the first six months of 2014, FinCEN’s 
portal received inquiries by over 350 unique agencies, including 
federal, state, and local authorities, self-regulatory organizations, 
and state attorney’s offices.395 In that period, FinCEN’s database 
received over 1 million inquiries.396 No other financial regulator 
offers comparable access to its information. 
Apart from reactively opening its files to specific requests 
related to existing investigations, FinCEN also leads efforts to 
proactively scan its database in order to discover hitherto hidden 
misconduct. For that purpose, FinCEN has spearheaded a 
multi-agency task force that systematically reviews SARs to 
determine the viability of allegations in the report itself.397 Task 
force participants include criminal authorities such as the DEA 
and the FBI, regulators such as the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, 
and the SEC, and other agencies such as the IRS.398 The task 
force employs over 100 different SAR review teams covering 
different geographical areas across the country.399 Teams in areas 
with higher potential concentration of financial crime may be 
                                                                                                     
 393. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(a)–(b) (2012) (describing the structure of FinCEN). 
 394. See id. § 310(b)(2)(B) (explaining what the government-wide data access 
service is supposed to contain). 
 395. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL., supra note 28, at 1. 
 396. See Rachel Louise Ensign, Number of U.S. Suspicious Activity Reports 
on the Rise, WALL STREET J. (July 18, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskand 
compliance/2014/07/18/number-of-u-s-suspicious-activity-reports-continues-to-
rise/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (“Fincen also shed some light on how these 
reports are used, saying that in the first six months of 2014, a wide range of 
agencies accessed the database that contains the SARs, conducting more than a 
million queries.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 397. PROTIVITI, GUIDE TO U.S. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14–17 (2012), https://www.protiviti.com/en-
US/Documents/Resource-Guides/Guide-to-US-AML-Requirements-5thEdition-
Protiviti.pdf. 
 398. Id. 
 399. See Kevin Sullivan, The Thin Green Line: The Benefits of a SAR Review 
Team, ACAMS TODAY (May 29, 2012), www.acamstoday.org/benefits-of-a-sar-
review-team (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (noting the breadth of SAR review team 
placement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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larger and meet more regularly than other teams. For example, 
the New York SAR review team goes over 4,000 reports per 
month and, after initial assessment, selects a few hundred for 
deeper examination.400 According to FinCEN, these teams can 
cover over 180,000 SARs in a quarter.401 At this rate, more than 
50% of all SARs submitted can get reviewed by an enforcement 
official.402 
As a rulemaker, FinCEN’s primary goal is to streamline the 
process for composing and submitting SARs.403 Its rules guide 
filers in providing information about all relevant aspects of a case 
in a standardized and readily researchable manner.404 It 
supplements its rules with extensive guidance about handling 
SAR submissions. In addition, FinCEN is also providing guidance 
to institutions considering how to build their compliance 
departments so as to better satisfy their reporting obligations.405 
For this purpose, FinCEN has collaborated with other financial 
regulators and created a manual specifying criteria and 
procedures for examining an institution’s anti-money-laundering 
compliance department.406 First issued in 2005, the manual 
compiles best practices from different regulators and institutions 
and seeks to provide consistency in supervision.407 
                                                                                                     
 400. Id. 
 401. SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULL., supra note 28, at 1. 
 402. This calculation is based on 2014 data on submissions and reviews, and 
may change if SAR submission changes.  
 403. See 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(D) (2012) (empowering FinCEN to administer 
the reporting requirements under § 5311).  
 404. FinCen allows e-filing of SARs in order to streamline submissions, 
enhance record keeping, and allow better and faster access to financial 
information. See Mandatory E-Filing FAQs, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FINCEN, 
http://www.fincen.gov/forms/e-filing/Efiling_FAQs.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2016) (describing reasons for implementing a mandatory e-filing policy) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benefits of Using BSA E-Filing, FIN. 
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/Why_use_ 
BSA_002.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (listing benefits of e-filing) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 405. See generally Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination 
Manual, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_ 
infobasepages_manual/OLM_002.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 406. See id. (describing the criteria). 
 407. See generally id. 
COLLABORATIVE GATEKEEPERS 891 
To further instill compliance, regulators also followed more 
traditional approaches, such as bringing highly publicized 
enforcement actions against institutions for violating their 
reporting obligations. Some of these cases result from supervisory 
examinations that reveal weaknesses in the institutions’ 
compliance system. Regulators will typically be satisfied with an 
undertaking by the board of directors that it will take remedial 
action, although sometimes they will require a written 
commitment from the institution to that effect.408 In other cases, 
an institution’s failure to submit required reports becomes 
apparent only after the underlying fraud is revealed, often to 
significant losses for victims. Sanctions for failure to report have 
become increasingly harsh in recent years.409 FinCEN has 
imposed fines some view as extraordinarily large.410 And the 
Department of Justice has criminally prosecuted financial 
institutions for money laundering violations, putting some out of 
business.411  
Since the 2007–2008 financial crisis, regulators and criminal 
enforcement authorities have used anti-money-laundering law as 
a platform for launching some of the most far-reaching actions 
against some of the biggest banks, both domestic and 
international. Anti-money-laundering violations are at the heart 
of four out of the eight biggest fines levied against banks since 
2000, as tallied by the Wall Street Journal,412 including $8.9 
billion against BNP Paribas for intentionally hiding transactions 
with links to countries targeted by U.S. sanctions, such as Iran 
and Cuba; $2.6 billion against J.P. Morgan for failing to identify 
the Madoff fraud;413 $2.6 billion against Credit Suisse for failing 
                                                                                                     
 408. MONEY LAUNDERING: NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 279, at 18. 
 409. See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Is Penalized $2 
Billion Over Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7. 2014, 9:41 AM), www.dealbook.ny 
times.com/2014/01/07/jpmorgan-settles-with-federal-authorities-in-madoff-case 
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 410. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 326, at 1414 (explaining that one 
European bank was hit with a $30 million fine). 
 411. See id. at 1415 (highlighting fines of $43 million and $50 million). 
 412. Grocer, supra note 5. 
 413. See supra Part II.B (discussing the weaknesses of the reputational 
model in the Madoff context). 
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to ensure that U.S. citizens with Swiss bank accounts were not 
evading taxes.414 These cases illustrate the importance of the 
anti-money-laundering framework as a readily available tool for 
instilling discipline in global banking.  
Perhaps the most characteristic example involves the 2012 
settlement between U.S. authorities and HSBC, which included 
civil penalties of $1.9 billion.415 HSBC’s U.S. subsidiary developed 
close links with HSBC’s Mexican subsidiary and became the 
channel through which about $9 billion in cash and $670 billion 
in wire transfers entered the United States even though they 
could have been illegally acquired.416 Internal email 
correspondence provided clear indications that HSBC chose to 
turn a blind eye to clients with potential drug cartel 
connections.417 It was, however, the inefficiencies in HSBC’s 
anti-money-laundering compliance that became the focus of its 
deferred prosecution agreement that chastised the bank’s 
understaffed compliance department and its decision to treat its 
Mexican subsidiary as low-risk.418 
                                                                                                     
 414. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to 
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 416. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Attachment A ¶10, United States 
v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12–CR–763, (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), 
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 417. See id. ¶ 39 (describing how HSBC learned of the money-laundering 
scheme from employee emails). 
 418. See id. ¶ 19 (“[F]rom at least 2006 to 2009, HSBC Bank USA rated 
Mexico as standard risk, its lowest AML risk category. As a result, wire 
transfers originating from Mexico, including transactions from HSBC Mexico, 
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Legislation that put in place the modern 
anti-money-laundering regime raised two significant questions. 
First, would banks cooperate with the regime, reporting 
suspicious transactions to regulators, or would they try to turn 
their eyes away from potential crimes to shield their clients? 
Second, would regulators be able to process the information 
banks provided and succeed in using it to convict money 
launderers? It is impossible to tell exactly how well this regime 
has worked, because individual suspicious activity reports remain 
confidential.419 But the high volume of SARs’ gatekeepers 
turnover, regulators’ assessments that many of these reports are 
revealing, and regulators’ eagerness to access SARs suggest that 
money-laundering legislation is no paper tiger and might 
significantly dent criminal activity. Anti-money-laundering 
efforts offer the one area where the collaborative gatekeeper 
model has been put into practice, with at least some success. That 
said, is the area of money laundering highly unusual, or could 
this model of collaborative gatekeeping be extended to other field? 
The next Part turns to this question. 
VI. Applying the Collaborative Model in Other Areas  
The collaborative gatekeeping template was implemented 
with some success in anti-money-laundering law, growing 
stronger through the extensive use of information technology in 
recent years, as the previous two Parts have chronicled. This Part 
explores whether and how collaborative gatekeeping can serve as 
a model for other issue areas and identifies features that 
facilitate its operation as well as conditions that might constrain 
its effectiveness. 
In its simplest form, as an obligation to “know your 
customer” and report suspicions, the collaborative model could 
easily work across many different gatekeeping relationships.420 In 
                                                                                                     
were generally not reviewed in the CAMP system.”). 
 419. See 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(d)(12) (2011) (stating that SARs are 
confidential and creating exceptions for law enforcement, filing joint SARs, and 
certain employment references or termination notices). 
 420. See supra Part III (outlining the elements of the collaborative 
gatekeeper model). 
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various segments of the financial industry, gatekeepers already 
conduct some due diligence toward their clients, either because 
law requires it or because they need to preserve their 
reputations.421 In the context of due diligence, and their ongoing 
client relationships, most gatekeepers can come across potentially 
compromising information about their clients.422 One could easily 
imagine requiring gatekeepers to report this information. But 
even though the model’s building blocks can be readily 
transplanted to other areas, they might not be as successful in 
catching misconduct. 
The collaborative model works best in areas where financial 
fraud follows well-trodden paths. Suspicions can easily arise 
when a gatekeeper can compare a client’s conduct with the 
actions of other clients. To evaluate whether a client behaves a lot 
like past fraudsters, or simply deviates unjustifiably from current 
norms, a gatekeeper’s point of reference is necessarily the activity 
of others. In turn, comparisons of transactions are easier in fields 
that are relatively homogenous. The more standardized the 
transactions a gatekeeper sees, the easier it is to identify the 
fraudulent ones. Moreover, relatively standardized violation 
types are more straightforward to investigate, as front-line 
gatekeeper employees can be instructed to ask specific questions 
or look for certain indications.  
This backwards-looking perspective of the collaborative 
model constitutes an important limitation, both conceptual and 
practical. No doubt, in referring to past misconduct in order to 
identify the future, one might risk leaving innovative types of 
fraud off the hook. In many core areas of the financial system, 
like securities trading, standardization is quite advanced. Other 
areas of the financial system, like derivatives, are becoming more 
standardized. Moreover, as the number of financial transactions 
continues to grow, the data points that gatekeepers have 
available for their comparisons also increase. In these fields, 
                                                                                                     
 421. See Cunningham, supra note 66, at 329 (noting that some gatekeepers, 
such as auditors and lawyers, have duties arising “initially from contract but 
include a regulatory overlay of professional standards” and that “both put 
reputations and liability on the line”). 
 422. See id. at 328 (explaining that some gatekeepers work “directly with 
and essentially inside the enterprise”). 
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there is a lot of currently uncollected information that could 
significantly improve enforcement. 
In addition, the collaborative gatekeeper model works best in 
fields where gatekeepers control an essential component of our 
financial infrastructure. The payment system, which modern 
banks control with their deposit and wire transfer services, is a 
key channel for introducing new money into the financial 
universe. As a result, banks are well placed to collect information 
that might point to illegal funds. Other components of essential 
financial infrastructure include various stock and commodity 
exchanges, central securities depositories, and central 
counterparties in derivatives. Most of these infrastructures allow 
access only to certain finance professionals under strict licensing 
requirements, typically imposed through regulatory supervision. 
Thus, these finance professionals can gather important 
information about types of fraud occurring through their services. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, transactions arranged 
privately and tailored to the needs of specific clients would be 
harder for gatekeepers to decode. Securitizations, collateralized 
debt obligations, or acquisition financing depend a lot on parties’ 
expectations about the future, which might diverge substantially. 
Moreover, these transactions tend to have many moving parts, 
combining securities issuance, derivatives, collateralization, and 
corporate governance arrangements. As a result, gatekeepers in 
these transactions might have greater trouble identifying a 
party’s conduct as suspicious, especially at an early stage.  
Yet, even in settings of high transaction complexity, 
collaborative gatekeeping might prove helpful in one respect. 
Typically, complicated transactions tend to include multiple 
gatekeepers with different specializations: bankers, accountants, 
external auditors, and other technical experts. Some specialists 
get only a partial look at the transaction. Thus, although they 
may not be able to ascertain fully whether a transaction is 
fraudulent, specialists may become suspicious of how the 
malfunctions they identify might affect the other parts of the 
transaction. These suspicions could form a basis for a report that 
might prove helpful for regulators, especially if multiple 
gatekeepers flag the same transaction. 
To illustrate how these scope conditions of collaborative 
gatekeeping would work in the context of specific subject matters 
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in financial regulation, the remaining sections of this Part discuss 
two possible extensions of the model. The first extension concerns 
the regulation of broker-dealers, responsible for trading in 
securities. Broker-dealers regulation exemplifies an area of high 
transaction traffic, advanced standardization, and gatekeeper 
control over an essential market entry point. This extension is 
theoretically straightforward and is easy to conceptualize in 
practice through the lens of a real life example that hit national 
headlines: J.P. Morgan’s indictment for its role as Bernie 
Madoff’s chief banker and broker. The second extension examines 
how the model might apply, after some adjustments, in a field 
involving varied and complicated transactions: equity offerings.  
A. Collaborative Gatekeeping in Broker-Dealer Regulation 
Just like banks are the essential administrators of our 
payment system, brokers are the key operators of our securities 
trading venues.423 Broker-dealers are the only professionals 
licensed to access stock exchanges, so investors need to hire them 
in order to trade.424 Moreover, brokers enjoy significant 
regulatory privileges, such as the ability to vouch for an investor 
so as to exempt transactions from registration requirements.425 
Investors seeking to buy or sell securities through these venues 
and private offerings typically engage a broker to act on their 
behalf. As a result, broker-dealers have significant information on 
the flow of funds in and out of key segments of the financial 
system. The nature of this information is very similar to 
                                                                                                     
 423. See Trade Executions: What Every Investor Should Know, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/tradexec.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 
(explaining that brokers act as an intermediary between the investor and the 
stock market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 424. See Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (Apr. 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) 
(“Most ‘brokers’ and ‘dealers’ must register with the SEC and join a 
‘self-regulatory organization,’ or SRO.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 425. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (exempting many 
private placements from registration requirements); Securities Act of 1933, 
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 (2015) (exempting certain primary 
securities offerings from federal registration); id. § 230.144A (exempting certain 
secondary market transactions from registration requirements). 
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information that banks collect regarding the flow of funds into 
the banking sector when customers deposit funds, make 
payments, or cash checks.  
Another similarity between banks and broker-dealers is the 
importance of client networks. To scout the market for investor 
interest in the securities they trade, brokers have established 
multiple outposts around the country,426 instituted online 
services that are increasingly popular,427 and established 
branches and subsidiaries across borders.428 Moreover, brokers 
seek to build long-standing relationships with their clients so as 
to handle their securities portfolio over time.429 As a result, 
broker-dealers also have information on clients’ holdings, 
backgrounds, and trading patterns.430 
Brokers’ unique position at the crossroads of securities 
trading and their expansive client networks allow them to gather 
intelligence about violations for which securities trading is the 
primary medium. For example, insider trading involves sales or 
purchases by people who possess non-public information about a 
security, sometimes due to their relationship with the security’s 
issuer.431 Brokers possess information both about trades and 
                                                                                                     
 426. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Letter, supra note 1, at 81 (noting the presence of 
5,602 branches serving over 36 million customers as of 2014). 
 427. See, e.g., CHARLES SCHWAB CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 13, 55 (2015), 
http://aboutschwab.com/images/uploads/inline/Schwab_2014_Annual_Report_co
mplete.pdf (noting that over 10 million clients were served with only 325 
domestic branch offices due to a large online presence). 
 428. See Michael Konczal, A Wall Street regulator’s race against time, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (June 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2013/06/22/a-wall-street-regulators-race-against-time/ (last visited Jan. 16, 
2016) (explaining that the financial crises of “AIG, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup 
off-balance sheet SIVs, Bear Stearns, Long-Term Capital Management, and the 
‘London Whale’ of JP Morgan” all involved exposures to derivatives across 
multiple countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 429. See, e.g., Tap Our Resources, BCI FIN., http://www.broker 
ageconsultants.com/jobdetails.php?job_id=1622 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) 
(explaining in a job posting that its firm hopes to attract new clients to 
eventually form long-standing client relationships) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 430. Id. 
 431. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (stating 
that “[u]nder the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability, 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the 
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information”). 
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary 
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about certain connections between issuers and their key 
executives, such as employment or marital relationships.432 
Another example of a fraudulent scheme that relies heavily on 
trading is market manipulation, whereby clients seek to inflate 
artificially interest in their securities.433 Again, brokers may be 
able to see through clients’ schemes based on the orders they are 
called on to execute. 
Besides misconduct that centers on trading, broker-dealers’ 
information could also help illuminate instances of fraud that 
happen to occur through their distribution channels. For 
example, brokers might buy and sell securities for private hedge 
funds, and thus may develop a sense of odd patterns of trading 
that may foreshadow the hedge fund operator’s disappearance 
into a remote tax haven with the investors’ money. In another 
example, a broker who is intermediating a transaction between 
two parties might come to realize that one party’s representations 
might be duplicitous, and thus potentially misleading.434  
While these indications might be readily apparent or easily 
available to brokers, they have little motivation to collect or use 
them. Under current law, broker-dealers are not under a general 
                                                                                                     
Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429 (2013); Yesha Yadav, 
Insider Trading in Derivative Markets, 103 GEO. L. J. 381 (2015). 
 432. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–49 (explaining how the defendant 
used knowledge of a planned tender offer from the company he represented for 
his own benefit). 
 433. See Market Manipulation Fraud, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar/market-manipulation-fraud (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016) (defining market manipulation as “artificially raising or lowering the price 
of stock on any national securities or commodities exchange or in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) marketplace”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 434. See Press Release, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in 
Structuring and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages, SEC (Apr. 16, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 
2016) (explaining that the SEC assessed a $550 million dollar penalty because 
“Goldman wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage 
market to heavily influence which mortgage securities to include in an 
investment portfolio, while telling other investors that the securities were 
selected by an independent, objective third party”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Steven M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman 
Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 529, 530–33 (2012) (discussing this settlement). 
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obligation to alert regulators about potential fraud.435 The 
general anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws provide 
victims with private rights of action only if brokers were primary 
participants in fraud436 and acted with scienter, i.e., intentionally 
or knowingly. Brokers have various obligations of a fiduciary 
nature toward their clients, such as to obtain the best execution 
for their orders,437 to avoid trading ahead of clients,438 and to 
disclose their commissions.439 Most of these obligations aim to 
protect clients from brokers’ own overreaching, rather than from 
third-party fraud. Thus, information that could be useful in 
prosecuting fraud and other misconduct typically remains 
scattered and unearthed, out of the reach of regulators. 
 Collecting this information will probably require some 
additional effort both by broker-dealers and by regulators, but the 
institutional preconditions for launching this effort are already in 
place. Brokers are subject to registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which specifies their licensing 
requirements.440 Just as federal banking regulators oversee the 
application of the anti-money-laundering regime, the SEC could 
oversee the expansion of suspicious activity reporting obligations 
in fraud and misconduct. Broker-dealers already have in place 
well-staffed compliance departments and supervisory procedures, 
                                                                                                     
 435. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 159 (2008) (finding the defendants had no duty to disclose).  
 436. See id. at 155–56 (affirming that private plaintiffs cannot use § 10(b) of 
the 1934 Act to hold brokers liable for aiding and abetting fraud); see also Cent. 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
191 (1994) (“[W]e hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and 
abetting suit under § 10(b).”). 
 437. FINRA Rule 2320(a) (2009). See FINRA Regulatory Notice 09-58, SEC 
Approves Amendments Regarding Best Execution and Interpositioning (SEC 
Oct. 9, 2009), 2009 WL 3320542 (applying the best execution obligation to all 
customer orders, including those involving interposed third parties). 
 438. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Company Act, 17 
C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2005) (adopting a code of an investment-advisor code of 
ethics). 
 439. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–10 (2014) (requiring brokers and dealers 
effecting transactions in securities to disclose commissions in writing). 
 440. 15 U.S.C. §78o(d) (2012). See also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. 
Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS 
Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 351–54 (2013) (outlining the different gateways through 
which a company can become public, and the attendant requirements). 
900 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016) 
because they need to oversee employees’ handling of client 
funds.441 Moreover, broker-dealers are already participating in 
the anti-money-laundering regime described above, and thus 
have experience with suspicious activity reporting and the 
infrastructure necessary to satisfy this obligation.442 Some 
broker-dealers are already using technology developed in the 
anti-money-laundering context to keep track of employee fraud.443 
By building on their existing capabilities, brokers could easily 
enhance the scope of violations that are subject to greater 
scrutiny.  
A proposal for transposing a regulatory regime from one 
subject matter to another might justifiably generate some 
hesitation, as it brings a whole industry into uncharted territory. 
To better understand how suspicious activity reporting might 
work in brokers’ violations, we next turn to a case that, although 
brought under the anti-money-laundering laws, involves fraud 
that would be typically associated with trading, not laundering.444 
As discussed above, some suspicious activity that is associated 
with money laundering can also lead authorities to other 
violations.445 As a result, there is an overlap between the 
anti-money-laundering regime as it currently stands and the 
proposed extension of suspicious activity reporting to brokers.446 
By analyzing a case that happens to fall within this small area of 
overlap, we can get a fairly good glimpse of how the suggested 
                                                                                                     
 441. See Gadinis, supra note 77, at 714–22 (discussing the supervision 
obligation using empirical data from recent SEC investigations of large and 
small firms for failure to supervise). 
 442. See David W. Blass, Broker-Dealer Anti-Money Laundering 
Compliance—Learning Lessons from the Past and Looking to the Future, SEC 
(Feb. 29, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171489982 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (“[W]ithin a few years of the President signing the 
PATRIOT Act into law, broker-dealers went from having basic reporting and 
recordkeeping obligations to a robust and complimentary set of obligations 
aimed at detecting and deterring money laundering and criminal financing.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 443. See supra Part V.B (discussing the use of suspicious activity reports). 
 444. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (introducing the J.P. Morgan 
and Bernie Madoff case). 
 445. See supra Part V.E (concluding that the collaborative model has found 
success in the anti-money laundering context). 
 446. See supra Part V (discussing the current state of the anti-laundering 
regime in depth). 
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extension might operate in practice. Because such cases would 
only represent the tip of the iceberg, we can gauge whether a 
large mass of undetected fraud might lie beneath the surface. 
In 2014, J.P. Morgan paid $2.6 billion in fines to various U.S. 
regulators for its role as Bernie Madoff’s primary broker and 
bank.447 The thrust of regulators’ case relied on J.P. Morgan’s 
failure to report any suspicions to authorities about the Madoff 
Ponzi scheme under the Bank Secrecy Act. J.P. Morgan, one of 
the largest U.S. financial institutions, holds both broker-dealer 
and banking licenses.448 Since 1986, J.P. Morgan maintained a 
banking relationship with various entities in the Madoff group 
and was in charge of the accounts through which money was 
directed in and out of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.449 As a broker, J.P. 
Morgan intermediated on behalf of clients who sought to invest 
into Madoff’s funds and developed derivatives based on Madoff 
fund returns, selling some to clients and maintaining a 
significant portion for itself.450 In the context of this relationship, 
J.P. Morgan came across indications that Madoff’s operations 
were fraudulent, as the paragraphs below explain.451 Although 
J.P. Morgan’s compliance systems managed to spot these 
indications, the investment bank failed to follow through, conduct 
appropriate due diligence, and file the suspicious activity reports 
necessary to alert regulators.452 Thus, the case offers a good 
illustration of the indications that brokers may be able to gather, 
the actions that they should take to pass on these tips, as well as 
the efforts of regulators to impose sanctions that reinforce filers’ 
regulatory obligations. 
The most important red flags that J.P. Morgan failed to 
evaluate properly were the consistently high abnormal returns 
                                                                                                     
 447. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing J.P. Morgan’s 
penalties).  
 448. See Commercial Banking Disclaimer, J.P. MORGAN, https://www.jp 
morgan.com/global/jpmorgan/cb/commercialbankingdisclaimer (last visited Feb. 
26, 2016) (explaining the relationship with J.P. Morgan affiliates, which 
includes both banking and brokerage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 449. DPA Statement of Facts, supra note 3, ¶¶ 9–10. 
 450. Id. ¶¶ 33–36. 
 451. See generally id. 
 452. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 70–78 (noting J.P. Morgan’s failure to file a SAR). 
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that Madoff funds purported to generate.453 Individual J.P. 
Morgan analysts expressed surprise at these profits, which had 
the tendency to arise even under adverse market conditions, and 
concluded that they were “possibly too good to be true.”454 Due to 
its role as manager of Madoff’s accounts, J.P. Morgan had already 
realized that he was engaging in transactions with no apparent 
or very limited economic purpose.455 The bank received alerts 
from its software about unusual third-party wire activity and 
Treasury bond redemptions at least twice.456 Moreover, J.P. 
Morgan saw Madoff transferring tens of millions of dollars daily 
to another institution’s account, only to have them return shortly 
thereafter.457 None of these observations could render J.P. 
Morgan “aware” of the Madoff fraud, as they could also result 
from legal activity.458 Nevertheless, they were sufficient to raise 
suspicions of illegality and could have led enforcement authorities 
to Madoff earlier.459  
These red flags prompted J.P. Morgan’s employees to start 
due diligence, only to be met with Madoff’s unwillingness to 
cooperate.460 Yet, these concerns were never communicated to 
J.P. Morgan’s anti-money-laundering department, and no 
suspicious activity reports were filed ahead of Madoff’s confession 
and arrest.461 Even after Barron’s, a well-respected business 
magazine, published an article about potential fraud at Madoff, 
compliance officers disregarded it, thinking that U.S. regulators 
would have already examined these concerns.462 This lack of 
                                                                                                     
 453. Id. ¶ 29. 
 454. Id. ¶ 32. 
 455. Id. ¶ 25. 
 456. Id. ¶ 21. 
 457. Id. ¶ 24. 
 458. See id. ¶ 24 (quoting a J.P. Morgan employee as concluding he was just 
using the money “as a float”). 
 459. Id. ¶ 25. 
 460. Id. ¶ 31. 
 461. Id. ¶¶ 70–79. 
 462. See Erin E. Arvedlund, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Bernie Madoff Attracts 
Skeptics in 2001, BARRON’S (May 7, 2001), www.online.barrons.com/ 
article/SB989019667829349012.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (mentioning 
that “[t]hree option strategists for major investment banks told Barron’s they 
[could not] understand how Madoff churns out such numbers [using his 
strategy]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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appropriate response suggests weaknesses at J.P. Morgan’s 
compliance systems, as the bank itself has admitted. One could 
similarly chastise U.S. regulators for failing to take action on 
Madoff earlier despite urgings by the Press.463 Essentially, 
gatekeepers and regulators were locked into mutual inactivity, 
with each party waiting for the other to act, and interpreting the 
other’s silence as tacit approval.464 Yet, if all relevant pieces of 
information were combined in a central system, perhaps this 
uniform inactivity would have broken down sooner. 
While J.P. Morgan’s U.S. operations continued their 
relationship with Madoff despite his unresponsiveness and lack of 
transparency, its U.K. subsidiary grew increasingly wary.465 In 
the United Kingdom, J.P. Morgan’s relationship with Madoff was 
centered on brokerage services.466 The bank’s London team had 
underwritten approximately $1.14 billion in investments into 
Madoff’s funds, including $343 million of J.P. Morgan’s own 
money.467 By June 2007, the U.K. subsidiary’s management 
called for additional due diligence on Madoff’s investment 
strategy.468 Although Madoff agreed to answer questions, he 
refused to allow full due diligence of his entities.469 When U.K. 
executives tried to analyze Madoff’s strategy, they also failed to 
explain the returns he was presenting.470 As a result, around 
September 2008, they decided to unwind their own positions in 
                                                                                                     
 463. See id. (noting the unusual amount of secrecy around Madoff’s 
strategy). 
 464. See DPA Statement of Facts, supra note 449, ¶ 55 (“‘[T]hey were 
assured by the claim that FINRA and the SEC performed occasional audits of 
Madoff,’ but that they ‘appeared not to have seen any evidence of the reviews or 
finds.’”). 
 465. Id. ¶¶ 54–63. 
 466. See id. ¶ 58 (explaining that in 2008, Madoff Securities was the main 
subject suspect in the United Kingdom). 
 467. Id. ¶ 32. 
 468. The U.K. subsidiary had put together a Hedge Fund Underwriting 
Committee, who had to approve continuation of this underwriting due to its size. 
Id. ¶ 39. This committee discussed the Madoff case on June 15, 2007. Id. ¶ 40. 
Present at the meeting were a number of high-ranking executives, risk officers, 
and employees dealing in Madoff-related transactions. Id. The written materials 
presented to the committee regarded systemic fraud as “extremely unlikely,” yet 
the committee decided to investigate Madoff further. Id. ¶ 42.  
 469. Id. ¶ 43. 
 470. Id. ¶ 51. 
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Madoff.471 A U.K. analyst explained the misgivings associated 
with Madoff in a lengthy memorandum on October 16, 2008, 
detailing Madoff’s inability to confirm assets supposedly held in 
custody and wondering about the “‘odd choice’ of a small, 
unknown accounting firm.”472 Interestingly, the memorandum 
also referred to casual observations of J.P. Morgan front-line 
employees in their dealings with Madoff entities: they described 
Madoff’s personnel as “defensive and almost scared of Madoff,” 
alluding to an atmosphere where “no one dares to ask any serious 
questions as long as the performance is good.”473 Later in October 
2008, J.P. Morgan’s U.K. entities filed a suspicious activity report 
with the U.K. Serious Organized Crime Agency under the 
Proceeds of Fraud Act, reflecting the concerns outlined in the 
internal memorandum.474 However, they never communicated 
their report to their U.S. colleagues.475  
J.P. Morgan’s failure in reporting the Madoff fraud provides 
a clear illustration of how collaborative gatekeeping could work in 
practice. J.P. Morgan had strong suspicions, but it had also 
reached the end of its ability to get to the bottom of the problem, 
in light of Madoff’s uncooperative stance. If it were required to 
report these suspicions and enlist the help of regulators, it could 
have precipitated the uncovering of Madoff’s fraud and protected 
some investors from falling prey to his deceits. Admittedly, the 
SEC had received warnings about Madoff from a disgruntled 
former competitor, Harry Markopolos.476 But Markopolos had no 
inside information about Madoff, and many reasons to vilify 
him.477 J.P. Morgan’s submissions would probably have carried a 
                                                                                                     
 471. Id. ¶ 53. 
 472. Id. ¶ 55. 
 473. Id. ¶ 56. 
 474. Id. ¶ 58. 
 475. Id. ¶ 65. 
 476. See Madoff Whistleblower: SEC Failed to Do the Math, NPR (Mar. 2, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
124208012 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“Madoff didn’t leave any footprints in 
the market because he never traded stock, Markopolos explains: ‘It was all made 
up and his story was so fanciful and far-fetched that the SEC should have seen 
through it immediately. And they didn't.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 477. See Andrew Clark, The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Bernard Madoff, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:17 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
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different weight in the eyes of the regulator, as they would have 
pitted a close collaborator and Wall Street stalwart against the 
secretive Ponzi-schemer. J.P. Morgan’s alert would have been 
harder to ignore. 
More generally, the Madoff example shows the type of 
information that brokers can collect regarding their clients. 
Trading flows and account movements can be a real data mine for 
enforcers looking for indications of fraud, providing brokers with 
an unparalleled overview of the financial system. The high 
numbers of clients and relatively homogeneous transactions that 
a broker supports facilitate comparisons and can readily uncover 
odd patterns, such as Madoff’s unrealistic returns. While 
regulators sit behind their desks, at a distance from market 
developments, brokers are participants in, and entryways into, 
the action in the market. Their reports could be a major boost to 
enforcement efforts. 
B. Collaborative Gatekeeping for Accountants on Equity Issuance 
The collaborative model applies most straightforwardly in 
fields that represent a good match for its prerequisites, like 
broker-dealer regulation, but it also has a lot to offer in issue 
areas where conditions might not be as favorable. This Part 
focuses on one such area: accountants in equity issuance. Acting 
as external auditors to companies issuing and selling securities to 
the public, accounting firms are called upon to verify the accuracy 
of the issuer’s financial statements. This verification is a 
necessary precondition for a company seeking to enter the public 
markets, for example, by listing shares on a stock exchange. 
Thus, accounting firms play a decisive role in determining access 
to a central component of our financial infrastructure. However, 
key features of the issuer-auditor relationship, and the regulatory 
regime established to govern it, render this a hard case for the 
collaborative model.  
                                                                                                     
business/2010/mar/24/bernard-madoff-whistleblower-harry-markopolos (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016) (describing Markopolos as “a belatedly celebrated 
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Compared to a broker simply executing a client’s orders, the 
scope and intensity of accountants’ services is much wider. To 
perform an audit of a company’s financial statements, 
accountants must spend significant time in learning about the 
company, request and review extensive information, and meet 
repeatedly with management and key employees. Because each 
company has some unique features, comparisons are harder. 
Moreover, all the effort and resources accountants must devote 
toward an audit suggest that they have much to lose by reporting 
their clients to enforcement authorities. As accountants tend to 
cultivate client relationships over many years, the conflicts of 
interest they face may be particularly strong. 
A web of regulation requires accountants, before they finalize 
their audit, to clarify any inhibitions they may harbor about the 
company’s accounting, or else record them. If they fail to do so, 
accountants may be liable toward investors. For example, under 
§ 11 of the sSecurities Act of 1933, if a company’s financial 
statements are inaccurate or misleading, investors have a claim 
for damages against auditors.478 To best protect themselves from 
investor lawsuits, accountants who come across indications of 
illegality should make further inquiries and obtain clarifications 
from management. Fearing that management might be reluctant 
to provide additional information, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 put in place a framework designed 
to strengthen accountants’ bargaining position against their 
clients. Section 10A of the Exchange Act479 requires accountants, 
once they come across potentially illegal activity, to notify 
management (for example, the CFO) and request that remedial 
action be taken.480 If management fails to satisfy the accountants, 
they must submit a formal report to the board, which is also 
required to notify the SEC within one day.481 And if the board 
fails to notify the SEC, auditors must resign.482  
Sarbanes–Oxley further enhanced auditors’ exposure to 
liability, requiring them to verify not only the accuracy of specific 
                                                                                                     
 478. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
 479. Id. § 78j-1. 
 480. Id. § 78j-1(b)(1).  
 481. Id. § 78j-1(b)(2)–(3). 
 482. Id. § 78j-1(b)(4).  
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statements, but also the adequacy of the procedures that the 
company follows to gather the data necessary to draft the 
statements.483 If, in examining these procedures, auditors spot 
weaknesses that the company refuses to address, they can 
publicly disclose their views to investors.484 Moreover, for any 
issues they identify with regard to management’s handling of 
financial statements, external auditors have access to an audit 
committee composed entirely of independent directors.485  
At first glance, this dense framework for the regulation of 
accountants, anchored in § 10A’s requirement to explore any 
indications of illegality, shares many features with the 
collaborative gatekeeping proposal we advance in this Article. 
However, there is a key difference. Section 10A is designed to 
provide the company with an opportunity to avert regulatory 
intervention by nipping a complaint in the bud.486 Notifying 
management is the first step that accountants must take in order 
to clarify their suspicions, and notifying the board is the second. 
These steps ensure that the relationship between accountants 
and their clients remains as strong as ever. In reality, § 10A 
mostly codifies pre-existing standards of professional conduct and 
passed without any objection by the accounting industry.487 
Despite its rhetoric, § 10A leaves accountants with the same 
dilemma that gatekeepers typically face. Their first option is to 
launch an eponymous attack on management practices, based on 
whatever evidence they can gather on their own, to avoid alerting 
their client and risk obstruction. The second option is to turn a 
blind eye, hoping that fraud will go undetected, or, if revealed, 
they will avoid liability. As we explain below, the second option 
might seem more appealing in many circumstances. 
                                                                                                     
 483. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012); id. § 7213; see also Auditing Standard No. 5, 
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If accountants decide to pick a fight with management, they 
run the risk of losing their client and hurting their professional 
reputation. Whether they publicly air their disagreements with 
the company’s financial statements, or they simply raise their 
concerns with independent directors, they must be able to back 
up their fears with some evidence. Even when accountants spot 
“red flags,” such as mishandled transactions, mislabeled 
accounts, or potentially distorting diversions of funds, they need 
further information to determine whether these odd practices 
hide a real problem. On their own, accountants do not have the 
legal tools to dig deeper against express management wishes, or 
simply evasiveness. In practice, the SEC has received fewer 10A 
reports than hoped when the provision was passed.488 This low 
reporting rate might reflect that companies actually respond to 
the problems pointed out by accountants. But it might also mean 
that it is in accountants’ interest to avoid flagging problems in 
the first place.489 In any case, even though accountants might 
have indications of potential misconduct, the current regime’s 
notification requirements do not really encourage them to come 
forward. 
By not acting on their suspicions, accountants are left with 
the second option and may expose themselves to liability toward 
investors. However, they might find hope in that the relevant 
liability rules provide them with significant leeway.490 With 
regard to financial statements provided in a public offering of 
securities, § 11(b) allows accountants to claim a due diligence 
defense if they conduct a reasonable investigation into the 
company’s practices.491 If a company’s financial statements follow 
a reasonable interpretation of U.S. GAAP, behind which 
accountants can stand in good faith, then they have satisfied 
                                                                                                     
 488. According to a 2003 GAO Report, a total of twenty-nine reports had 
been submitted in compliance with § 10A between Jan. 1, 1996 and May 15, 
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 489. John C. Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1307 (2003). 
 490. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (setting out 
liabilities and exemptions to liabilities). 
 491. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y. 
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their due diligence defense.492 As far as accountants are able to 
show that they submitted their concerns to management and 
received a somewhat satisfactory response, they should be off the 
hook. Accountants’ risk of liability is even lower in cases where 
investors cannot bring a § 11 claim and have to rely on Rule 10b–
5, for example because the misrepresentation occurs in financial 
statements subsequent to a public offering. To satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 10b–5, plaintiffs must show that 
accountants provided misleading information in scienter, i.e., 
that they were essentially aware of the problem in the financial 
statements.493 Thus, as long as accountants can validly claim 
that, based on the information available to them following their 
inquiries, they did not have knowledge of clients’ misconduct, 
they should be able to avoid liability.  
Although such information may not prove misconduct, it 
could provide a promising start or a helpful boost to 
investigations. For example, in In re WorldCom, a $7 billion 
fraudulent scheme begun to unravel when an internal accountant 
discovered that $400 million held on provision for potential losses 
were reclassified as capital expenditures to increase the 
company’s income.494 Although not improper on its face, this 
accounting practice was unusual. As long as this information does 
not render accountants aware of the problem, they can continue 
ignoring it. Given the relatively low probability of detecting 
fraud, this might be a plausible strategy but is not without its 
risks. 
Collaborative gatekeeping offers accountants a new option: 
To provide this information directly to regulators by submitting a 
suspicious activity report. With the anonymity of the report 
preserved, accountants do not risk disrupting their relationship 
with their clients. Clients unwilling to cooperate with external 
auditors have less flexibility toward regulators, who possess more 
extensive legal tools to extract information. If proven correct, 
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accountants can still rely on the immunity in order to avoid 
liability. Thus, collaborative gatekeeping can help dislodge the 
strong ties between accountants and issuers, and allow the 
gatekeepers to overcome the conflicts of interest and alert the 
regulators. 
VII. Conclusion 
Although gatekeepers are key pillars of our regulatory 
framework, they often find themselves straddled between their 
regulatory obligations and the pressures of building client 
relationships in a highly competitive market. In an effort to serve 
both masters at once, gatekeepers avert sanctions by making sure 
that they remain unaware of “red flags” indicating client 
misconduct. As a result, they turn a blind eye to information that 
could prove particularly useful in enforcement.  
In this Article, we have offered a novel approach out of this 
impasse. Our goal is not to expand substantially gatekeeper 
liability for clients’ faults but to entice gatekeepers to work more 
closely with authorities. We propose that gatekeepers report 
suspicions of misconduct to authorities. In return, they stand to 
gain immunity from actions arising out of their reports by 
regulators and private investors alike, provided they continue to 
act in good faith. But if they choose not to report promptly, then 
they will be subject to sanctions for failing to report, on top of any 
other violations they might be committing. This regime, we 
argue, can motivate gatekeepers to cooperate with authorities; 
they invest significant time and effort in building a client 
relationship, thus fueling conflicts of interest. Moreover, the 
routine submission of suspicious activity reports can help change 
the market perception about collaborating with regulators, from a 
largely stigmatized decision that often costs individual 
professionals and firms their reputation for client loyalty, to a 
morally sound obligation arising from their gatekeeping function. 
Rather than relying exclusively on theoretical 
argumentation, our collaborative gatekeeping proposal has also 
been tried in practice in the area of anti-money-laundering law. 
We trace the beginnings of anti-money-laundering law in 
Switzerland to show that banks, rather than opposing the 
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imposition of these rules, embraced the new regime after 
negotiating some compromises. We then show how most countries 
in the world, including the United States, have amended and 
adopted the Swiss template. The implementation of this regime 
in the United States illustrates its promise to increase the flow of 
information from market participants to regulators. Especially 
with the aid of modern technology, gatekeepers and regulators 
were able to aggregate and review information, explore financial 
fraud besides money laundering, and identify areas of concern 
that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. We have illustrated 
how the collaborative model could work in two additional areas in 
finance, broker-dealer regulation and accounting in equity 
issuance. 
We conclude this Article by discussing some concerns that 
might arise in connection with the new responsibilities that 
regulators and private industry are to assume. Collaborative 
gatekeeping seems to trust regulators to read submitted reports, 
decide which ones are worth pursuing, investigate further, and 
successfully bring an enforcement action. But even if regulators 
did possess all the information that collaborative gatekeeping 
promises to bring to them, would they be able to fully take 
advantage of it? Regulators might lack resources and staff to 
pursue every lead and might simply have other priorities. To take 
a famous example, the SEC first learned that something was 
amiss with Madoff through Harry Markopolos, a securities 
analyst who worked for a Madoff rival and studied Madoff’s 
revenue stream in order to replicate it.495 The SEC even 
investigated Madoff in 2006 about his management of customer 
funds but failed to uncover the Ponzi scheme. So, does the 
collaborative model rely too heavily on government intervention, 
while authorities may not be up to the task? 
While the collaborative model focuses on alerting regulators 
early, one should not underestimate the impact of the 
information it produces for private plaintiffs. Collaborative 
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gatekeeping introduces a very disciplined compliance model, 
supported by modern technology and dedicated staff to comb 
through clients’ operations repeatedly. This mechanism produces 
a detailed paper trail of staff concerns, inquiries, meetings, 
reports, and discussions. Without suspicious activity reporting, 
all these would have remained unrecorded and, in most cases, 
unaired. But once expressed and recorded, these documents can 
provide valuable ammunition to private plaintiffs seeking to 
establish liability. While gatekeepers would be shielded from 
liability under the terms of the immunity, other participants in 
the transaction would not have such benefits. Thus, records 
produced in the context of preparatory work for suspicious 
activity reports empower private plaintiffs as well. 
Gatekeeper companies themselves might change their stance 
once this information is compiled. A submitted report flags a 
client or transaction as potentially harmful for the gatekeeper. As 
mentioned above, some retail banks have decided to terminate 
relationships with all clients that become the targets of two 
SARs, regardless of whether regulators decide to follow up. Thus, 
SARs boost the internal monitoring capacity of corporations as 
well, and can motivate management to look more closely into 
cases that might have otherwise gone unnoticed. Overall, 
collaborative gatekeeping’s success or failure does not rest solely 
on the shoulders of regulators but spurs private industry and 
plaintiffs into action. 
But as collaborative gatekeeping seeks to transform the 
internal discipline and liability risk for gatekeeper firms, one 
might worry that it is likely to face stiff opposition from the 
financial industry. Clearly, intensified monitoring requires a 
significant investment in infrastructure and resources, which can 
pressure corporate profits. However, compared to other regimes 
of gatekeeper liability, collaborative gatekeeping has one 
advantage: It leaves the initiative of gatekeeping activity with 
the intermediaries themselves. Gatekeepers are in charge of 
information collection efforts and handling clients, so that they 
can continue to manage their relationships at every step. At the 
same time, gatekeepers are responsible for spotting and 
disciplining misbehaving employees, and even for firing failed 
managers, evaluating the risk of fraud at every step and reaching 
decisions accordingly. Moreover, gatekeepers can decide what 
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type of compliance structure works best with their needs, which 
compliance staffers to hire, what they want out of their 
information technology, and, ultimately, which reports to submit. 
As a result, they are also in charge of compliance costs and can 
allocate funds in a way that suits the need of their company and 
their business. Overall, this continuous monitoring process 
translates into greater certainty for gatekeeper firms because it 
offers them a way to manage suspicious clients before these 
clients grow into an inextricable problem. 
Gatekeepers’ autonomy to set up a monitoring system that 
fits the needs of their firm and area of activity, which our 
proposal offers, is also one of the key advantages that advocates 
of strict liability typically underline. At the same time, our 
proposal is unlikely to distort the gatekeeper business model to 
the extent that strict liability proposals might. Even proponents 
of strict liability recognize the possibility of over deterrence and 
market distortions arising from the substantially higher fees that 
gatekeepers will be forced to charge. Instead, the collaborative 
gatekeeping model simply adds a reporting obligation, whose 
anonymous character and standardized application over the 
entire industry seek to minimize any negative market fallout. For 
these reasons, collaborative gatekeeping is far more palatable 
politically to the industry, while also bringing about important 
changes put forward by other reform proposals. 
Calls for increasing gatekeeper liability persist loudly many 
years after the financial crisis, as bankers and other finance 
professionals continue to attract the ire of policymakers and the 
wider public. But, perversely, increased gatekeeper liability ties 
the fortunes of gatekeepers with the fate of their misbehaving 
clients, at times pushing gatekeepers to ally with fraudsters 
rather than working against them. Instead, our goal should be to 
offer gatekeepers a way to disassociate themselves from their 
clients, provided they contribute enough to the enforcement 
process. To reform the conventional gatekeeper model in this 
direction, we need to think out of the box. This Article started 
from the same premise that gatekeepers’ critics start, namely 
that gatekeepers do not always act to prevent potential fraud, 
even though they have reasons to suspect that it is about to 
happen or is already under way. But rather than simply 
punishing gatekeepers for their failings, we reconceptualized this 
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problem as one of information retention and dissemination and 
proposed ways to help gatekeepers share their information. 
Gatekeepers are often eyewitnesses when financial fraud 
happens—eyewitnesses with valuable, if partial, information. 
Rather than alienating them, we are better off bringing them to 
our side. 
